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DEVELOPING A SUITABLE WATER ALLOCATION LAW
FOR PENNSYLVANIA
BY JOSEPH

I.

W. DELLAPENNA*
OVERVIEW

In many respects, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is unusual. One of the original thirteen colonies, Pennsylvania continues
to adhere more closely to the original common law legal system the
colonists brought over in 1683. For example, plaintiffs in Pennsylvania still must denominate a complaint in the lowest level courts
as sounding either in assumpsit (contract) or in trespass (tort),'
something few, if any, other states still require. Another unusual
feature of Pennsylvania is that it sprawls across large parts of three
major watersheds-the Delaware, the Ohio and the Susquehannaas well as several smaller watersheds. Because of this geography,
major water crises seem seldom to affect more than one-third of the
Commonwealth at a time. As a result of the combination of legal
conservatism and unusual geography, water law reform proponents
in Pennsylvania have been unable to muster a majority in the legislature, leaving Pennsylvania as one of the largest states in which
common law riparian rights remain the primary regime for water
allocation. 2 Its law governing other aspects of water is similarly
* Professor of Law, Villanova University; B.B.A., University of Michigan
(1965);J.D., Detroit College of Law (1968); LL.M. in Public International & Comparative Law, George Washington University (1969); LL.M. in Environmental Law,
Columbia University (1974). Professor Dellapenna is director of the Model Water
Code Project of the American Society of Civil Engineers, and as such, led the drafting of the REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE and the APPROPRATIVE RIGHTS
MODEL WATER CODE, as well as supervising the preparation of three model interstate compacts.
1. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1123(a)(4) (West 2004) (outlining jurisdiction of community and municipal courts). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1515
(West Supp. 2005) (outlining jurisdiction of magisterial district courts).
2. See, e.g., Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)
(holding lower riparian owners had right to enjoin electric company as upper ripa-
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rooted in historical forms, although federal mandates have forced
the Commonwealth to enact legislation regarding dams, drainage,
3
pollution and the environment generally.
Pennsylvania received the common law, including the common law of riparian rights, early in its history.4 In Pennsylvania
legal practice, the term "appropriation of water" refers to the condemnation of water rights rather than to the doctrine of prior appropriation found in western states.5 Pennsylvania follows the
6
similar reasonable use theory for disputes over groundwater.
Pennsylvania also recognizes the usual private remedies for waterrelated pollution. 7 Pennsylvania bifurcates its law of diffused surrian owner from raising level of water course and increasing its flow by discharging
imported and non-riparian water into water course); Waxman v. Loranger Plastics
Corp., 493 A.2d 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding in dispute between adjoining
riparian land owners appropriate method of allocating property situated between
high water mark and low water mark was to give adjoining landowners river frontage on low water mark proportional to their frontage on original high water
mark).
3. See, e.g., The Clean Stream Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 691.1-1001 (West
2003); The Flood Plain Management Act, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 679.101-.601 (West
1997) (discussing participation in National Flood Insurance Program); The Storm
Water Management Act, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 680.1-.17 (West 1997) (discussing
watershed storm water plans); The Dam Safety and Encroachments Act, 32 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 693.1-.27 (West 1997) (discussing regulation of dams and reservoirs,
water obstructions and encroachments).
4. See Beissell v. Sholl, 4 Dall. 211 (Pa. 1800) (stating every man in this country
has unquestionable right to erect mill upon his own land and to use water passing
through his land as he pleases, subject only to limitation that his mill must not be
constructed so as to injure his neighbor's mill and, after using water, he returns
stream to its ancient channel); Chambers v. Furry, 1 Yeates 167 (Pa. 1792) (holding although right to bed of navigable river is presumed to belong to Commonwealth, right of adjoining land rests in owner of soil).
5. See Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 124 A. 747 (Pa. 1924)
(holding appropriation.of waters of stream without bona fide intent to apply to
beneficial use or not following with effort within reasonable time to carry out purposes intended is not appropriation).
6. See, e.g., Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403 (Pa. 1956) (holding in
part that, in view of testimony by defendant's vice president, admitting run-off
water from slag could have been prevented based on facts that area involved was
residential and particular activity of defendant construction company was neither
suited to character of locality nor natural use of land).
7. See, e.g., Lerro v. Thomas Wynne, Inc., 301 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1973) (concluding
corporate owner and operator of apartment house was negligent because should
have known risk of corrosion to 10,000 gallon tank buried in ground and supplying fuel oil for heating of apartment house and should have provided for periodic
inspections); Fleck v. Timmons, 543 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding plaintiffs not entitled to recover from owners of nearby service station who pumped
kerosene into underground storage tanks); Hughes v. Emerald Mines Corp., 450
A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (finding sufficient evidence of causation for jury to
find loss of water was due to coal company's activities in its mining operations and
that loss was compensable and was not damage without legal wrong or legal
liability).
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face water, applying the common enemy doctrine to urban land
and the natural servitude rule to rural land. 8
The relative lack of administrative regulation of water use in
Pennsylvania perhaps reflects the Commonwealth's relatively wet
climate. Recurring droughts (water use emergencies) in the eastern and central parts of the Commonwealth suggest that greater
regulation is necessary. 9 This pattern is only likely to become more
pronounced in coming decades if the predictions of climate change
are realized.' 0 In response to these developments, Pennsylvania's
8. See Bentz v. Armstrong, 8 Watts & Serg. 40 (Pa. 1844) (holding where several persons unite in purchase of piece of ground and divide same into smaller lots
upon each of which house is built and then partition is made between them, each
must regulate and grade own lot so water falling or accumulating upon it shall not
run upon lot of neighbor). But see Taylor v. Harrison Constr. Co., 115 A.2d 757,
759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (expressing difficulty in finding distinction between
rules actually applied to urban and rural property). See generallyJoseph W. Dellapenna, The Legal Regulation ofDiffused Surface Water, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 285 (1991)
(discussing evolving legal trends regarding regulation of both drainage and exploitation of diffused surface water).
9. See Leslie M. MacRae, Water, Water Everywhere but Much Less Than You Think,
11 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 189 (2003) (discussing water demands associated with
Endangered Species Act, public trust doctrine and doctrine of reserved water
rights); see alsoJack Brubaker, It's Been Dry Before, but Drought Hits ExpandingPopulation Harder: DroughtEmergencies Have Been Declared in Four of the Last Six Years, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Feb. 8, 2002, at 10; Lori Myers, Utilities Face Security, Competition as
Major Issues, CENr. PENN. Bus. J., Jan. 24, 2003, at 16; Kathleen Brady Shea & Matthew P. Blanchard, Drought Sinks in as Rain Doesn't: Emergency Status Spreads in Pa.
and Remains in All of N.J., PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 12, 2002, at BI; see generally
QUENCHING THE WATER CRIsis: A PROACTIvE APPROACH (Donald A. Wilhite ed.,
2005).
10. See GORDON B. BONAN, ECOLOGICAL CLIMATOLOGY (Cambridge Univ. Press
2002); IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE VARIABILITY ON HYDROLOGICAL
REGIMES (Jan C. Van Dam, Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
ON THE UNITED

STATES:

THE

POTENTIAL.

CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY

(National Assessment Synthesis Team, Cambridge Univ. Press 2000);
R. Edward Beighley et al., Impacts of California's Climatic Regimes and Coastal Land
Use Change on Streamflow Characteristics,39 J. Am. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1419
(2003); Levi D. Brekke et al., Climate Change Impacts Uncertaintyfor Water Resources in
the SanJoaquinRiver Basin, California,40J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 149 (2004);
Heejung Chang et al., The Effects of Climate Change on Stream Flow and Nutrient Loading, 37J. AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 973 (2001); Woonsup Choi, Climate Change,
Urbanisation and HydrologicalImpacts, 4 INT'LJ. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 267 (2004);
Daniel Cluis & Claude Laberge, Climate Change and Trend Detection in Selected Rivers
Within the Asia-Pacific Region, 26 WATER INT'L 411 (2001); Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1301 (1999); Gilberto Gallopin &
Frank Rijsberman, Three Global Water Scenarios, I INT'LJ. WATER 16 (2000);J. Kevin
Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate
Counsel-It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89 (2004); Brian H. Hurd et
al., Climatic Change and U.S. Water Resources: From Modeled Watershed Impacts to National Estimates, 40 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 129 (2004); Katharine L. Jacobs
et al., Climate Science and Drought Planning: The Arizona Experience, 41J. AM. WATER
AND CHANGE

RESOURCES

ASS'N 437 (2005); Peter M. Kiffney et al., Climatic and Hydrologic Variabil-
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legislature has considered, over the past fifteen years, a number of
proposals to enact a regulated riparian state statute.1 1 Thus far,
these proposals largely have failed, resulting only in legislation to
create a statewide water planning system enacted in 2002.12 As part
of the planning process, the legislature required that all large water
users in the state register their uses, 13 but it was careful to indicate
that the new statute would not in any way affect private rights to use
water. 14 It is plausible that the planning process will eventually lead
to a proposal to modify or replace the existing laws governing water
use in Pennsylvania. This Article delineates the contours of the law
that governs the allocation of water in Pennsylvania, the alternatives
that might be substituted for the existing law and some of the
problems that would be encountered in making such a change.
5
Section II of this Article discusses riparian rights in Pennsylvania.'
16
Section III of this Article sets forth alternatives to riparian rights.
1
7
Section V disSection IV discusses groundwater in Pennsylvania.
ity in a Coastal Watershed of Southwestern British Columbia, 38J. AM. WATER RESOURCES
ASS'N 1437 (2002); Ashutosh Limaye et al., Macroscale Hydrologic Modeling for Regional Climate Assessment Studies in the Southeastern United States, 37 J. AM. WATER
RESOURCES ASS'N 709 (2001); Norman L. Miller et al., Potential Impacts of Climate
Change on California Hydrology, 39 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 771 (2003);
Thomas C. Pagano et al., Using Climate Forecastsfor Water Management: Arizona and
the 1997-1998 el NiAo, 37 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1139 (2001); James F.
Saunders, III et al., The Influence of Climate Variation on the Estimation of Low Flows
Used to Protect Water Quality: A Nationwide Assessment, 40 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES
ASS'N 1339 (2004); Mike R. Scarsbrook et al., Effects of Climate Variability on Rivers:
Consequencesfor Long Term Water Quality Analysis, 39J. AM. WATER RESOURCES AsS'N
1435 (2003); Mark C. Stone et al., Impacts of Climate Change on Missouri River Basin
Water Yield, 37J. AM. WATER RESOURCES Ass'N 1119 (2001); Mark A. Snyder et al.,
Modeled Regional Climate Change in the Hydrologic Regions of California: A C0 2 Sensitivity Study, 40J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 591 (2004); A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law
Reform in West Virginia: The Broader Context, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 495, 508-09 (2004);
Glenn A. Tootle & Thomas C. Piechota, Suwanee River Long Range Streamflow Forecasts Based on Seasonal Climate Predictors, 40 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 523
(2004).
11. See Basil S. Donnelly et al., Note, Considering Comprehensive Water Legislation: Pennsylvania as a Case Study, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 443 (1992).
12. See Water Resources Planning Act, 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3136
(West Supp. 2005) (discussing water resources planning).
13. See id. § 3118 (stating large water users generally are water users who withdraw average of at least 10,000 gallons per day for thirty-day period).
14. See id. § 3136 (discussing limitations on department, water allocation authority, municipalities and relating to compacts).
15. For a discussion of riparian rights in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 21-104
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of alternatives to riparian rights, see infra notes 105-271
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of groundwater in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 272-310
and accompanying text.
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cusses regulation and planning in Pennsylvania. 18 Section VI discusses constitutional guarantees of environmental rights. 19 Finally,
20
Section VII addresses the future of Pennsylvania water rights.

II.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN PENNSYLVANIA

In most respects, Pennsylvania's law of riparian rights is rather
ordinary. What is unusual for such a large state is that riparian
rights remain, for Pennsylvania, the primary body of law governing
the allocation of surface waters to particular uses. This section explores the law of riparian rights as applied in Pennsylvania and why
that body of law is no longer suitable to the needs of the Commonwealth.
A.

Pennsylvania Version of Riparian Rights

Riparian rights attach to riparian land, i.e., to land that is bounded by a defined body of water on or across which a defined body
of water lies or flows. 2 1 The word "riparian" itself derives from the
Latin word "ripa," meaning a riverbank. 22 Riparian rights derive
from the natural availability of water to the land.2 3 Despite the importance of contiguity to water as the basis of riparian rights, the
actual boundary of lands along water bodies usually has not been
2 4
surveyed in Pennsylvania, leaving considerable uncertainty.
18. For a discussion of planning and regulations in Pennsylvania, see infra
notes 311-422 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of constitutional guarantees of environmental rights, see
infra notes 423-30 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the future of water rights in Pennsylvania, see infra
notes 431-44 and accompanying text.
21. See Lord v. Meadville Water Co., 19 A. 1007 (1890) (holding where spring
water flows off land in well defined course owner of land is entitled to rights of
riparian owner only and may not divert its course but may dip it up and confine it
in barrels); Chambers v. Furry, 1 Yeates 167 (Pa. 1792) (holding while right to bed of
navigable river is presumed to belong to Commonwealth, right of adjoining land
rests in owner of soil); Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (holding lower riparian owners had right to enjoin electric company as upper riparian owner from raising level of water course and increasing its flow by
discharging imported and non-riparian water into water course). See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under "Pure"Riparian Rights, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs § 7.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001).
22. SeeJohnson v. McCowen, 348 So. 2d 357, 360 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(stating although often interchanged, riparian rights according to strict meaning
of term are connected with ownership of banks and streams or rivers).
23. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.R.I. 1827). "The natural
stream, existing by the bounty of Providence for the benefit of the land through
which it flows, is an incident annexed, by operation of law, to the land itself." Id.;
see alsoJOHN GOULD, THE LAW OF WATERS § 148 (3d ed. 1900).
24. See Knud E. Hermansen, The Aliquot Division of Unsureyed RiparianLand in
Pennsylvania, 4 DICK. J. ENvTm. L. & POL'y 71 (1994) (discussing valuable land
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In Pennsylvania, riparian fights arise in relation to any natural water body,25 including underground streams 2 6 and artesian basins. 27 The navigability of a natural body of water affects ownership
of the bed of the water body. 28 Owners of land contiguous to a
non-navigable lake are entitled to use only the water column overly29
ing their own part of the lakebed, rather than the entire lake.
Navigability does not affect other riparian rights.
In principle, riparian rights do not attach to artificial water
bodies.3 0 Thus, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a landowner whose land abuts an artificial lake lying entirely over analong Pennsylvania's lake shores, rivers and streams; many times boundaries between high water and extent or line of common law ownership are not marked and
have never been included in survey).
25. See Kunkle v. Borough of Ford City, 158 A. 159 (Pa. 1931) (stating lot
owner may not obstruct natural channel or channel having character or easement
nor gather surface water into body and discharge it on adjoining land, but may
shut out invading water as common enemy).
26. See Ross Common Water Co. v. Blue Mt. Consol. Water Co., 77 A. 446 (Pa.
1910) (stating water company will be temporarily enjoined from operating artesian
wells where it is definitely shown that large spring whose waters are used by its
owner for commercial purposes is thereby rendered entirely dry); Brown v. Kistler,
42 A. 885 (Pa. 1899) (holding water that percolates through earth but does not
follow well defined channel belongs absolutely to owner of land over which it
passes; but where it flows in well defined channel either above or below surface,
owner of land over which it passes has only qualified right to use it).
27. See Moeller v. Metzger, 491 A.2d 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding
proof of cause of death of landowner's flowers was not essential element in her
cause of action where primary relief requested by landowner was order enjoining
flooding of her land by water coming from neighbors' artesian well).
28. See Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1959) (holding lake
not navigable); Loughran v. Matylewicz, 81 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1951). In Pennsylvania,
navigability has been defined in terms of whether the waters in question are currently "susceptible of being used" for commercial navigation. Mountain Properties, Inc. v. Tyler Hill Realty Corp., 767 A.2d 1096, 1099-1100 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001),
appeal denied, 782 A.2d 547 (2001). If a water body or watercourse is navigable to
any extent, it is deemed navigable throughout its entire length. Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), appealdenied, 761 A.2d
550 (Pa. 1999) (holding Lehigh River navigable and disputed portion therefore
owned by Commonwealth and held in trust for public use). See atsoJames Rogers,
Note, Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
Finds the Lehigh River to Be Navigable, 6 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCESJ. 189 (2002)
(discussing question of navigability of Lehigh River and determining bed ownership and access to Lehigh).
29. See Lakeside Park Co., 153 A.2d 486 (holding lake not navigable); Shaffer v.
Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 141 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1958) (holding plaintiff established prescriptive rights to swim, boat and fish within reasonable distance of land, to maintain present stone dock, and to water cattle in front of land, but rights did not
include right to use any part of lake for commercial boating or other commercial
purposes); Mountain Properties,Inc., 767 A.2d 1096 (2001) (stating if water body or
watercourse navigable to any extent, it is deemed navigable through its entire
length).
30. See generally Dellapenna, Introduction, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 6.02(e) (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001).
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other's land had no right to use the lake water for any purpose. 3 1
Artificial water bodies are subject to riparian ights, however, when
the artificial body replaces a natural body. 3 2 Riparian rights also
apply when the parties have, explicitly or implicitly, agreed to treat
33
the artificial bodies as if they were riparians.
Most of the cases establishing the content of riparian rights in
Pennsylvania are old. They therefore abound in dicta that seem to
embrace the natural flow theory. 34 Yet the cases seem to clearly
establish that an owner of riparian land has a right to make a reasonable use of the water. 3 5 The resulting confusion is found in decisions that define the right to use water in Pennsylvania in terms
like "[t] he right to reasonable use of water in its natural flow, without diversion of it from its ordinary channel by artificial means, is
incidental to the ownership of the land through which it flows
....-36 This confusion turns up in the most recent case in which a
31. See Intili v. Salak, 589 A.2d 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding property
owners did not have right to fish in lake from shoreline and admission in pleadings
that owner had not used artificial lake for any purposes bound owners on issue of
use of lake and defeated claim to prescriptive right to use lake).
32. See Fiedler v. Coen, 505 A.2d 286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding lower
owners asserting prescriptive easement against upper owners as bona fide purchasers for value not required to allege and prove man-made watercourse running
through both properties open and apparent before entitled to order enjoining
upper owners from diverting or obstructing watercourse and requiring them to
maintain flow so water continued to reach lower property).
33. See Miller v. Lutheran Conf. Ass'n, 200 A. 646 (Pa. 1938) (holding in case
of non-navigable lake formed by building dam and where land under water owned
by others, no riparian rights attach to property bordering water and attempt to
exercise any such rights by invading water is trespass as if unauthorized entry made
upon dry land of another).
34. See, e.g., Fricke v. Quinn, 41 A. 737 (Pa. 1898) (holding right of riparian
owner to have natural flow of stream reach land in natural channel and in natural
condition); see also White v. Pennsylvania R.R., 47 A.2d 200 (Pa. 1946) (stating
generally riparian owner has fight to unobstructed flow of water in its natural
channel).
35. See Brown v. Kistler, 42 A. 885 (Pa. 1899) (holding each successive riparian
owner has right to reasonable use of water for supply of natural wants or manufacturing purposes, even to extent of exhausting supply of stream in dry seasons);
Whaler v. Ahl, 29 Pa. 98 (1857) (holding riparian owners have right to detain
water for such time as is necessary for their purposes, but they are liable for improper use if injury of lower owners occurs); Hartzall v. Sill, 12 Pa. 248 (1849);
Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding lower
riparian owners had right to enjoin electric company as upper riparian owner from
raising level of water course and increasing its flow by discharging imported and
non-riparian water into water course).
36. See Webb v. Bennett's Branch Imp. Co., 29 A. 260, 261 (Pa. 1894) (stating
right to reasonable use of water in its natural flow without diversion from ordinary
channel by artificial means is incidental to ownership of land through which it
flows and extent to which it may be used and applied affects use and consequent
value of land itself); Horn v. Miller, 20 A. 706, 707 (Pa. 1890); In re Octararo Water
Co., 15 Pa. D. 767 (Lanc. Cty. C.P. 1906) (holding water company has no power by
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Pennsylvania court actually tried to apply riparian rights to a dis37
pute, Alburger v. PhiladelphiaElectric Co.

Alburger was an unusual case concerning a riparian rights theory because it involved a plan to increase the flow of the Perkiomen
Creek as a means of conveying water from one part of the Commonwealth to another, 38 rather than a dispute over the withdrawal
of water to use it, which forms the more common form of riparian
dispute.3 9 A three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court in Alburgerdelivered three different opinions, none of which was joined
by more than onejudge. The two opinions, that together produced
a majority for the plaintiffs in the case, stated the basic premise of
riparian rights in nearly identical terms: "[s]ubject to the right of
reasonable use by other riparian owners, a riparian owner has a
right to have the natural flow of a water course reach his land in its
natural channel and its natural condition." 40 Only Judge Joseph
Doyle, in his dissent, noted that this formulation combines two diametrically opposed theories that cannot be reconciled: "under the
,reasonable use' theory ... every riparian owner can conduct rea-

sonable uses even though they may affect the natural flow of
41
water."
What then is the proper theory of riparian rights in Pennsylvania? In every other state in which such confusion has appeared, courts invariably chose to apply the reasonable use theory
eminent domain to take Pennsylvania water which naturally flows into Maryland
and, if such power exists, damages to be assessed under Pennsylvania laws to Maryland riparian owners). See also Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 22 A. 989, 990 (Pa.
1891). "The rule is uniform and undoubted that every riparian owner is entitled,
as an incident to his land, to the natural flow of the water of a stream running
through it, undiminished in quantity and unimpaired in quality, subject to the
reasonable use of the water by those similarly entitled, for the ordinary purpose of
life ...

."

Id.

37. See 535 A.2d 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding PA is in jurisdiction
using "reasonable use" approach to riparian rights).
38. See id. at 730 (stating case involves conduit that discharges Delaware River
into East Branch of Perkiomen Creek).
39. Seegenerally Dellapenna, supra note 21, §§ 7.03(a), 7.03(c)-(c) (2) (describing conflicts between consumptive and non-consumptive uses, and between similar
and dissimilar types of consumptive uses).
40. See Alburger,535 A.2d at 731 (reciting rights of riparian owner under "reasonable use" riparian doctrine). The second version of this rule was phrased
slightly differently: "... the course of the natural flow is subject only to reasonable
use .... " See also id. at 733-34 (Craig, J., concurring) (illustrating slight difference
in second version of doctrine).
41. Id. at 737 (Doyle, J., dissenting) (noting riparian owner can conduct uses
affecting natural flow of water under "reasonable use" doctrine). See also Allentown Portland Cement Co. v. Huy, 27 Pa. D. 396 (Berks Cty. C.P. 1917) (stating
riparian owner can use water diminishing natural water flow to lower riparian
owners).
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rather than the natural flow theory when an actual choice became
necessary. 42 The natural flow theory is too restrictive on water uses
for a modern economy.43 The only cases in which the natural flow
theory was actually applied in the twentieth century involved actions against local governments that were required by state constitutions to compensate persons whose property (here, water rights)
was taken by governmental action, 4 4 or, as in Alburger, where the
dispute was over increased flows rather than water withdrawals. 45
B.

Applying Riparian Rights to Particular Disputes

Even under the natural flow theory, a riparian owner has an
unlimited right to use water to meet domestic needs. 46 In Pennsylvania, priority for domestic needs extends even to persons living
in a large institutional setting, such as a hospital for the mentally ill,
as long as the water is consumed on the riparian tract on which the
water is withdrawn. 4 7 As for non-domestic uses, no riparian owner
can safely make any use under the natural flow theory without a risk
of being enjoined by a lower riparian claiming an infringement of a
legal right even without proof of injury to the complainant. 48
42. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(c) (asserting natural flow theory is
disfavored and courts not likely to apply theory against private party).
43. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 856 (1939) (stating natural flow theory provides no protection for non-riparians); Sheldon J. Plager, Some Observations
on the Law of Water Allocation as a Variable in IndustrialSite Location, 1968 Wis. L. REv.
673 (1968) (stating natural flow theory could have prohibitive effects on industrial
use of water). A few commentators have embraced the natural flow theory because
of its supposed ecological benefits. See also Lynda L. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic
Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested Frameworkfor Analysis, 1986 ILL. L. REv.
439 (1986) (describing common law has "failed ... to give rise to free market for
water rights"); Nicola R. Wheen, A Natural Flow-A History of Water Law in New
Zealand, 9 0TAGO L. REv. 71 (1997) (explaining water as public good needing
protection and preservation is not concept apparent in law).
44. See, e.g., Dimmock v. City of New London, 245 A.2d 569 (Conn. 1968).
The Dimmock case is analyzed in Dellapenna, supranote 21, § 7.02(a) (2) nn.124-36.
45. See, e.g., G&A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379
(Ala. 1974). G&A Contractors is analyzed in Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(c)
nn.206-16.
46. See Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 124 A. 747 (Pa. 1924)
(holding "every riparian owner is entitled to use so much of a stream running by
or through his lands as may be necessary for domestic needs or other similar purposes"). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(b) (1) (explaining how
courts give preference to use of water for "natural wants" which include domestic
needs).
47. See Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1903) (holding
domestic needs not confined to individual homeowners in residential setting and
can be extended to persons living in hospital for mentally ill in large institutional
setting).
48. See, e.g., Ulbricht v. Eufala Water Co., 6 So. 78 (Ala. 1889) (holding plaintiff could perpetually restrain defendant from consuming water even though plain-
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The reasonable use theory is considerably more complex when
applied to particular disputes. The reasonable use theory assures
each riparian an equal claim to use the water, with a court allocating water in disputes in a way that maximizes the social benefit of
the use of the water while minimizing the harm caused by one user
to the others. 49 Courts determine reasonableness by weighing the
facts of the case. 50 The only firm rule regarding reasonableness is
that because the right to use water arises from the riparian nature
51
of the land, any use on non-riparian land is per se unreasonable.
Even riparian owners have no right to use water on non-riparian
lands.5 2 Pennsylvania courts, however, have limited the watershed
rule (limiting riparian land to land within the watershed of the
water source from which the water is withdrawn) to cases in which
water use outside the watershed causes actual injury to the com5
plaining party.

3

tiff could not and did not use that water); Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288 (1845)
(allowing action against defendant who diverted water from stream even though
diversion occurred below and on opposite side from where plaintiff lived); Robertson v. Arnold, 186 S.E. 806 (Ga. 1936) (holding riparian owner has right to have
water run in same way in which it was accustomed to run regardless of whether
there is use to which running water can be applied); Shamleffer v. Council Grove
Peerless Mill Co., 18 Kan. 24 (1877) (holding diversion through channel by upper
riparian owner was invalid even though there was no proof of actual harm by lower
riparian owner); Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 520 (1871) (holding plaintiff did
not acquire right by prescription to build dam for commercial use whether or not
such dam causes damage to lower riparian owner); Mackleton Hotel Co. v. Connellsville & S.L. Ry., 89 A. 703 (Pa. 1914) (restraining use of water by locomotive
company without any proof of injury); Woody v. Durham, 267 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954) (granting injunction to prevent future diversion of water by nonriparian owner even though such diversion did not affect "natural use" by riparian
owner). See generally Frank Trelease, Coordinationof Riparian and Appropriative Rights
to the Use of Water, 33 TEX. L. REv. 24, 40 (1954) (describing that lower riparian
could enjoin development by upper riparian without showing proof of injury).
49. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 cmt. d (1977) (stating
law promotes "greatest beneficial use by each with minimum harm to others").
50. See Hartzall v. Sill, 12 Pa. 248 (1849) (determining reasonable use by looking at specific circumstances of case); Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1988) (illustrating generally court's weighing specific facts of case).
See generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, §§ 7.02(d)-(e) (discussing "reasonableness"
and ways courts have used concept to resolve conflicts).
51. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d) (1) (stating courts have generally
held any non-riparian use is unreasonable per se whenever it interferes with riparian use); Olivia S. Choe, Note, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an
Era of Scarcity, 113 YALE L.J. 1909 (2004) (asserting courts have announced per se
rule against any use by non-riparians).
52. See Lackawanna Mills v. Scranton Gas Co., 150 A. 633 (Pa. 1930) (holding
landowner whose property is not riparian to brook holds no title or claim to its
water merely because predecessor acquired contractual rights to its water).
53. See Belin v. Dept. of Envtl. Res., 291 A.2d 553 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972)
(holding Department of Environmental Resources could allow for diversion of waters from one watershed to another when there is no showing of injury to neigh-
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If there is not enough water to serve all needs, courts sometimes prefer pro rata sharing among competing users as the fairest
resolution of a dispute under the reasonable use rule.5 4 Such sharing is not always possible, however. In such cases, choices must
be made to cut off one user altogether so that another riparian
might continue to use the water. An excellent example is Harris v.
Brooks.55 The case involved a dispute between a commercial boat
rental service (a boat livery) operating on a small lake and a rice
farmer who drew water for his fields from the same lake. A severe
drought made it impossible to satisfy both of their needs. 56 Applying the reasonable use theory, the Arkansas Supreme Court stressed
that the goal was to assure the equal rights of each riparian "as near
as may be." 57 This is not simply a question of stopping one water
user from interfering with or harming another water user. As economist Ronald Coase pointed out, in a case like this, each use necessarily interferes with the other, and whichever prevails necessarily
destroys the other.58 The Harris court quoted from the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

to explain its approach:

boring landowners). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(a) (2) (asserting Pennsylvania's intermediate court rejected watershed rule absent proof of
injury).
54. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. Ct. App.
1957) (holding competing users have "correlative right" to use of water to "extent
of a reasonable share" when there is scant water supply); White v. East Lake Land
Co., 23 S.E. 393 (Ga. 1895) (reasoning water is not severable proportionately);
Bouris v. Largent, 236 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968) (explaining that one riparian
owner cannot use water in way that unreasonably impairs other owner's right to
enjoy same water). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.03(c) (1) (describing remedy of "proportional sharing" as option courts have used, particularly in
western states, in settling disputes of competing riparian rights).
55. 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955). For a more detailed analysis of the case, see
Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d).
56. See Harris, 283 S.W.2d at 130-31 (describing effect of drought on boat
rental service and rice farmer).
57. Id. at 133 (describing court's objective to achieve equitable distribution of
rights).
58. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. LAw & ECON. 1, 3-15
(particularly at 12-13) (1960) (arguing problem is of reciprocal nature in which
avoiding harm to one will necessarily inflict harm to another). Bill Rodgers sought
to make light of this insight by using a chicken farmer competing with a neighboring fox rancher as a model. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
AIR AND WATER § LB at 6 (1986). "Causation-neutrality that attributes the spillover damage in equal parts to the hunger of foxes and the tastiness of chickens is
a hard sell among people who can tell the difference between aggressor and victim." Id. In a contest between a rice farm and a boat livery, there is little of the
intuitive sense of which use is the aggressor that is so appealing in the fox/chicken
example; and if one philosophically favors the "natural outcome," does this make
one unsympathetic to the fox? See generally Dellapenna, supra note 30, § 6.01 (b) (1)
nn.341-46.
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The determination in a particular case of the unreasonableness of a particular use .

.

. should not be an unrea-

soned, intuitive conclusion on the part of the court or
jury. It is .

.

. an evaluating of the conflicting interests of

each... contestant[ ] before the court in accordance with
the standards of society, and a weighing of those, one
against the other ....

[I]t is only when one riparian['s]

... use of the water is unreasonable that another who is
harmed by it can complain, even though the harm is intentional. Substantial intentional harm to another cannot
be justified as reasonable unless the legal merit or utility of
the activity [that] produces it outweighs the legal serious59
ness or gravity of the harm.

This test requires a weighing of the social value of the two uses
against each other to determine which is more socially valuable. 60
The court enjoined Brooks' pumping whenever the level of the surface of the lake fell below 189.67 feet above sea level, which the
court described as the "normal level" of the lake. 6 1 The court was
careful to insist that it chose that level because it was the level at
which Brooks' pumping for his rice fields unreasonably interfered
with the plaintiffs' use of the lake, not because it was "normal."
The Har:is court provided only a vague discussion of how to
balance uses against each other. Balancing requires a polycentric
process that strains the capacity of courts to act according to the
traditional model of disinterested umpire rather than actively involved manager. 62 In such cases, courts give only minimal, if any,
attention to non-economic questions such as the natural characteristics of the stream, general social concerns, or abstract justice. 6 3
The key appears to be the economic value of the competing activi59. See Harris, 283 S.W.2d at 135 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS,
supra note 43, § 852, cmt. c).
60. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d) (2) (describing "reasona-

ble use" theory as one that benefits of competing social values).

61. See Harris,283 S.W.2d at 135-36 (concluding that pumping water for rice

farming cannot unreasonably interfere with commercial boating activity). On very
similar facts, the Arkansas Supreme Court favored the rice farmer when the boating and fishing were for personal, rather than commercial, recreation. Nilsson v.
Latimer, 664 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. 1984).
62. See Lon Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PROC. AM. Soc'v INT'L

L. 1 (arguing that balancing interests requires court to act more as body with
"managerial authority").
63. These principles figure prominently in the RESTATEMENT even if they do
not figure prominently in the cases. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 850A. See
generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d) (3) (arguing judicial problem of eco-

nomic analysis lies in bringing in neglected, non-economic concerns).
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ties. 64 Because of this, a court would have to reopen a suit when65
ever market values of the products change significantly.
Litigation centering on individual claimants does not serve well
for managing water crises or for protecting public values. 66 Courts
normally focus on the interests of the actual parties and are illequipped to consider the interests of riparians not involved in the
suit, let alone the interests of the public generally. 67 The lack of
efficient, system-wide management creates a systematic bias in favor
of large users. 68 Small users are less able to afford litigation or to
organize collectively for litigation if the water they need is taken by
a more affluent riparian. Even if they succeed in organizing for
litigation, the balancing process generally favors large users over
smaller users because the economic value of the water to the large
user usually outweighs the economic loss of the small users. While
smaller users can aggregate their claims through reliance on a
public system, legal doctrines generally limit the riparianness of
public systems. 69 Aggregation also requires submission to a largescale enterprise.
64. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d) (3) (discussing role of "economic
and other values in determining reasonableness"); Phyllis P. Saarinen & Gary D.
Lynne, Getting the Most Valuable Water Supply Pie: Economic Efficiency in Florida'sReasonable-BeneficialUse Standard,8J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 491, 500-04 (1993) (asserting riparian law is comparative system seeking to "maximize value of use of
waterway" by favoring "new and higher uses").
65. The resulting instability has been used to explain the shift to appropriative rights in western states and the shift to regulated riparianism in eastern states.
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (holding Colorado adopts appropriate rights statute); Drake v. Earhart, 23 P. 541 (Idaho 1890);Jones v. Adams,
6 P. 442 (Nev. 1885) (upholding prior appropriative rights statute, not common
law, provided protection of landowners' rights and privileges as to running waters
in Pacific coast states). See also FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., A MODEL WATER CODE:
TEXT AND COMMENTARY

189-91 (Univ. of Florida Press 1972); Richard C. Ausness,

WaterRights, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Protectionof Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REv. 407, 416-18 (stating that "comprehensive administrative structure . . . which
modifies the appropriation system . . . now typically regulates water users in the
West"); M. Mason Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resources Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON.
& SOCIOLOGY 131, 137-38 (1969).
66. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.05(a) (arguing reasonable use theory
favors large users over small users or non-economical public interest users because
process emphasizes economic values).
67. See George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence Duringthe Decision-MakingProcess, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 291 (1998) (discussing
implications arising from judicial use of scientific evidence found by judges).
68. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d) (3).
69. See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 16 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. 1941) (holding action by riparian owner against municipality for pumping its water supply from
stream is not demurrable on its face); Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 19 S.E.2d 700
(Va. 1942) (holding municipality may be enjoined from diverting water away from
riparian owner's property). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.05(c).
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Finally, persons seeking to acquire a right to use water might
want to "buy" riparian rights without buying riparian land to create
a "non-appurtenant" riparian right.70 The Pennsylvania cases
establish that riparian rights can be conveyed or condemned. 7 1 Just
what is acquired through conveyance or condemnation remains unsettled in Pennsylvania law, which probably explains the relative rarity of such transactions. In the late nineteenth century case of
Irving's Executors v. Burgess of Borough of Media,72 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that a riparian owner could not convey water
for use on non-riparian lands, at least when another riparian complained of the non-riparian use.
In a more recent decision, the same court held that while a
conveyance would bar an action by the grantor against the grantee
of the riparian rights, even a conveyance in which the grantor expressly promised not to use the water would not bar the grantor
from continuing to use the water so long as the continued use did
not inflict a provable injury on the grantee in Borough of Media v.
Edgmont Golf Club, Inc.73 As against the grantor, a grantee could use

the water conveyed so long as the use did not materially increase
the burden contemplated in the grant.74 Some courts in other
states have held that a buyer of a non-appurtenant riparian right
acquires a right to make a reasonable use as against other riparian
70. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.04(a)(3) (describing process used to
create "non-appurtenant" riparian right).
71. See Borough of Media v. Edgmont Golf Club, Inc., 288 A.2d 803 (Pa.
1972) (stating current owner may acquire riparian rights from predecessor in title); Daniels v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 137 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1958) (permitting coal
mine to discharge mine water into stream despite objection of lower riparian
owner due to contractual agreement); 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 639 (West 1997) (authorizing public water supply agencies to exercise eminent domain powers over
water and water rights); City of Philadelphia v. Phila. Suburban Water Co., 163 A.
297 (Pa. 1933) (holding riparian owners' right to take water for domestic use is
paramount to municipality's interest in navigation); Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton
Water Supply Co., 124 A. 747 (Pa. 1924) (recognizing acquisition of riparian rights
by grant, prescription and appropriation or condemnation).
72. 45 A. 482 (Pa. 1900); see also Lackawanna Mills v. Scranton Gas Co., 150 A.
633 (Pa. 1930) (stating purchasers of non-riparian land cannot assert title to water
because predecessors were accustomed to receiving water); Lord v. Meadville Water
Co., 19 A. 1007 (Pa. 1890) (holding corporation with right of eminent domain has
no higher right than ordinary riparian owner).
73. 288 A.2d 803 (Pa. 1972); see also Zimmerman v. Union Paving Co., 6 A.2d
901 (Pa. 1939) (holding that license to receive water from another's property is
not property right).
74. See E. Pa. Power Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 92 A. 47 (Pa. 1914) (stating grant
of water power is not grant of riparian rights); Duncan v. Gheen, 138 A.2d 168 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1958) (allowing easement to take water from spring to continue after
owner of dominant estate improved pipe line).
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owners. 75 Whether such a right is measured by the reasonable
needs of the seller (avoiding prejudice to other riparians) or of the
buyer (treating the buyer as a full, equal riparian) is unclear. Conveyances of non-consumptive uses are less problematic, although
the effect of such a conveyance on the rights of other riparians also
76
remains unclear.
Riparian rights can also be lost to prescription. 77 Prescription
in Pennsylvania requires twenty-one years of open, notorious, continuous, adverse and undisputed use. 78 A prescriptive right is measured by the extent of the least use actually made during the
prescriptive period. 79 This proposition can turn complicated because in effect there is a series of rolling prescriptive periods (each
twenty-one year period of continuous prescriptive use), and once
the property right is acquired it does not disappear just because the
owner no longer uses it, unless a court finds an intent to abandon
the property right.
C.

Why Riparian Rights Cannot Be Expected to Survive in
Pennsylvania

As the foregoing shows, riparian rights suffer from serious problems, including the vagueness and unpredictability of the criteria
of decision, the instability of the resulting legal decisions, the lack
of a process for managing water during shortages or for protecting
75. See Mianus Realty Co. v. Greenway, 193 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1963) (finding
no grant of riparian rights are subject to inverse condemnation); Belvedere Dev.
Corp. v. Dep't Transp., 476 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1985) (holding riparian rights are
transferable and condemnable); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (Ga. 1980)
(finding that right to reasonable use of water on non-riparian land can be acquired by grant); Sundell v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315, 1321 (N.H.
1979) (holding riparian rights are subject to inverse condemnation); Thomas v.
Clark, 346 A.2d 189, 190-91 (Vt. 1975) (upholding dominant estate's right to use
of spring that did not interfere with right of servient estate to use of spring).
76. See Pocono Highland Lake Estates Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Palys, 822 A.2d
879 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (upholding easement across property in dispute between adjacent property owners).
77. See Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 141 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1958) (creating prescriptive easement for use of lake); Fiedler v. Coen, 505 A.2d 286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(upholding prescriptive easement in favor of lower riparian owners). See generally
Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.04(c).
78. See Shaffer, 141 A.2d at 585; Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co. v. Stowe Twp., 96 A.2d
892 (Pa. 1953) (enjoining unreasonable use of riparian easement); Loughran v.
Matylewicz, 81 A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. 1951) (setting out requirements of prescriptive
easement); Graham v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 173 A. 311 (Pa. 1934) (denying recovery after erection of dam flooded property); Consolidated Water Supply Co. v. State Hosp. for Criminal Insane, 66 Pa. Super. 610, 624 (1917).
79. See Shaffer, 141 A.2d at 589; City of Philadelphiav. Phila. Suburban Water Co.,
163 A. 297 (Pa. 1933); Scranton Gas Co. v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 88 A. 24 (Pa.
1913) (upholding injunction to restrain diversion of stream).
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public values, a systematic bias in favor of large users and the impracticality of markets under such a legal regime. Given the vague
and unpredictable criteria of decisions, even long-established uses
could be cut off without compensation if a court decides that a recently begun use is more reasonable.8 0 As water shortages become
chronic, such problems could become a serious impediment to pri81
vate investment in water facilities.
The problems with riparian rights arise because riparian rights
are a form of common property.8 2 A common property system cannot survive in the face of growing shortages, as biologist Garrett
Hardin explained nearly forty years ago in The Tragedy of the Commons.83 A common property system functions well only when the
common resource is available in much greater supply than the demand for the resource. Because each common owner can decide
for herself whether to increase her use, regardless of the effect on
other common owners (except for instances of direct interference),
each owner appropriates for herself the whole of each additional
increment of use, but all owners share the cost imposed on the
common resource. Hardin used cows grazing on a common pasture as his example. For each cow I add to the herd, I obtain the
full benefit, while the common owners as a group share the burden
84
of the reduced carrying capacity of the pasture.
Some scholars have criticized Hardin for over- simplifying how
"commons" functioned in earlier times or in remote areas. These
80. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, §§ 7.02(d) (3)-(e). This is precisely what
happened in Harris v. Brooks. For a discussion of Harris,see supra notes 55-65.
81. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986) (discussing public property
rights and implications in private property regime). See also Tarlock, supra note 10,
at 514.
82. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth
of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 317, 337-45 (2000)
(discussing water markets and public property rights).
83. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
See also MANAGING THE COMMONS (Douglas S. Noonan &John A. Baden eds., Indiana Univ. Press 2d ed. 1988).
84. For more contemporary analyses of Hardin's theory, see GLENN G. STEVENSON, COMMON PROPERTY ECONOMICS: A GENERAL THEORY AND LAND USE APPLICATIONS (1991); Fred P. Bosselman, Replaying the Tragedy of the Commons, 13 YALE J.
REG. 391 (1996) (reviewing book dealing with Hardin's theory in modern settings); Lee Ann Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REv. 907, 913-25
(2004) (discussing Hardin's theory); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons,
Part Two, 15 HARv. J.L. PUB. & POL'Y 325 (1992) (relating free market environmentalism to Hardin's theory); Michael Taylor, The Economics and Politics of Property
Rights and Common Pool Resources, 32 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 633 (1992);James Walker &
Roy Gardner, ProbabilisticDestruction of Common-Pool Resource: ExperimentalEvidence,
102 ECON. J. 1149 (1992).
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critics demonstrate that commons functioned successfully over extended periods even when use was close to the carrying capacity of
the resource through informal limits imposed by the (small) communities sharing the commons.8 5 These examples are irrelevant
to our larger society where most persons are strangers to each
other, informal sanctions are not effective and formal law recognizes no real limits on any one person's exploitation of a commons.8 6 When common owners are strangers to each other and
each user receives the full incremental value of the changes she
induces while bearing only a small fraction of the costs, the only
rational course is for each common owner to increase her use until
87
the resource is exhausted.
Hardin's tragedy is not merely a theory. Users have destroyed common pool resources over and over again in the past
85. See, e.g., CARLJ. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION (1980); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTrIvE ACTION

(1990); ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES
(1994); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES (BonnieJ. McCay &James M. Acheson eds., 1987); Amitai Aviram,
A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of PrivateLegal Systems, 22 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 1 (2004) (examining mechanisms of enforcement in private legal
systems); Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy of the Commons, 7 ENvTL. ETHICS 49
(1985) (discussing success of medieval commons system in its time); Bruce A. Lar-

son & Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rights, Externalities, and Resource Degradation:
Locating the Tragedy, 33J. DEV. ECON. 235 (1990) (developing dynamic model incorporating incentives for resource use under public and private property); Steven W.

Lawry, Tenure Policy Toward Common Property NaturalResources in Sub-SaharanAfrica,
30 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 403 (1990) (considering methods in improving management
of common property natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa); Ramzi Suleiman et

al., Fixed Position and Property Rights in Sequential Resource Dilemmas Under Uncertainty,
93 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 229 (1996) (creating resource-dilemma game in which results show acquisition of property rights were ineffective).

86. See J.W. Harris, Private and Non-Private Property: What is the Difference?, 111
L.Q. REv. 421 (1995) (comparing concepts of communitarian, common, state and
public property).
87. For attempts to describe optimal conditions under which a commons
might function successfully in more developed economic settings, see Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, 89 MINN.
L. REv. 917 (2005) (arguing for openly accessible resources in some cases); Steven

Hackett et al., The Role of Communications in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators,27 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGT. 99 (1994)
(exploring communication and common-pool resources); Ethan Ligon & Urvashi

Narain, Government Management of Village Commons: Comparing Two Forest Policies, 37
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 272 (1999) (investigating whether Joint Forest Management is preferred by either villagers of governments); Charles Mason & Owen

Phillips, Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons Through Cooperation: An Experimental
Evaluation, 34J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 148 (1997) (examining influence of industry size on harvest rates); Charles Mason et al., Expectations, the Commons, and Optimal Group Size, 15J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 99 (1988); Carol M. Rose, Given-Ness and

Gft: Property and the Quest for EnvironmentalEthics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1 (1994) (developing theory of environmental ethics to prevent problem of commons).
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century under the common property rule. s8 We have witnessed
the tragedy of the commons, precisely as Hardin predicted,
for

(to name just a few examples)

fish in the sea,8 9 park

88. See generally Erin A. Clancy, Note, The Tragedy of the Global Commons, 5 IND.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 601 (1998) (addressing degradation of "global commons");
Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 269

(2004) (reflecting on spectrum conflicts that will arise after end of command and
control regulation); Esther Hauk & Rosemarie Nagel, Choice of Partnersin Multiple
Two-Person Prisoner'sDilemma Games, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 770 (2001); Ruth

L. Okidiji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace: Information Markets and the Construction of
Proprietary Rights, 44 B.C. L. REv. 545 (2003) (arguing expansive construction of
intellectual property rights distorts informational properties of those rights); Carol
M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991 (2005) (reviewing concept that defined property boundaries are essential to community living); Carol B.
Thompson, InternationalLaw of the Sea/Seed: PublicDomain versus Private Commodity,
44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 841 (2004) (comparing political contestations over jurisdiction for access and use, for benefit sharing and governance of sea versus seed);
Clem Tisdell, Property Rights in Non-Captive Wildlife and Biodiversity Conservation, 4
INT'L J. GLOBAL ENVrL. ISSUES 195 (2004); Shawn Waliser, Another Tragedy of the
Commons: Placing Cost Where It Belongs by Banning Hazardous Substances in Fertilizer
Through State Legislation, 18 J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 51 (2003) (discussing possible
implementations of bans to hazardous chemicals in fertilizers); Jay Weiser, The Real
Estate Covenant as Commons: Incomplete Contract Remedies over Time, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 269 (2004) (exploring efficiency of legal rules protecting real estate
covenants); Robert Wilson, Student Article, Environmental Regulation of the Human
Gene Pool as a Genetic Commons, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 833 (1996) (examining ethical
boundaries to genetic manipulation of human genes).
89. See RIcHaRD ELLIS, THE EMPTY OCEAN (Island Press 2003); Mary Bergin,
Fish at Risk: We're Eating Tons of Seafood and Not Properly Tending the World's Waters,
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, WI), June 21, 2004, at IB; Steve Connor, Up to Half of
Ocean Species Lost to Overfishing, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 29, 2005, at 21;
Janet Raloff, Empty Nets: Fisheries May Be Crippling Themselves by Targeting the Big
Ones, SCIENCE NEWS, June 4, 2005, at 360; Craig Welch & Sandi Doughton, Report
Callsfor Urgent Action on Oceans: Federal Commission Says Billions Are Needed to Stem
Decline, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, at Al; see also Luz Eugenia Cereceda & Guillermo Wormold, Privatizationof the Sea for Seaweed Productionin Chile, 27 NATURE &
RESOURCES, no. 4, at 31 (1991); Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust
Doctrineand IntergenerationalEquity, 19J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 427 (2004); Manjira
Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, Externalities,Market Power, and Resource Extraction, 37 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 233 (1999); Mark Dowie, Salmon and Caesar: Will a Doctrine
from the Roman Empire Sink Ocean Agriculture?, LEGAL Arr., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 14;
Ronald D. Fischer & Leonard J. Mirman, The Compleat Fish Wars: Biology and Dynamic Interactions,30J. ENvrL. ECON. & MGT. 34 (1996); Kristen M. Fletcher, When
Economics and Conservation Clash: Challenges to Economic Analysis in Fisheries Management, 31 ENVrL. L. RPTR. 11,168 (2001); R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property
and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. LAw & ECON. 679
(2000); R. Quentin Grafton, Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery, 28 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 48 (1995); Terry Heaps, The Effects on Welfare of the Imposition of
Individual Transfer Quotas on a Heterogeneous Fishing Fleet, 46 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 557
(2003); Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheriesfor the Twenty-First
Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REv. 623
(2004); Katharine A. Marvin, Note, ProtectingCommon Property Resources Through the
Marketplace: Individual Transferable Quotas for Surf Clams and Ocean Quahogs, 16 VT.
L. REv. 1127 (1992); Patrick A. Nickler, A Tragedy of the Commons in CoastalFisheries:
ContendingPrescriptionsfor Conservation, and the Case of the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, 26
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 549 (1999); Peter Shelley, Ten Years "After the Fall": Litigation and
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access 90 and even national treasuries. 9 ' I observed just such a tragedy, in a clear and memorable fashion, on a visit to Nova Scotia in
1995.92

When I was planning a vacation to Nova Scotia, I looked forward to having lobster dinners there. Nova Scotia is practically next
door to Maine, a place where one can always get a large lobster for
a small price. Yet, the first restaurant I went to in Nova Scotia did
not have lobster on the menu. The waitress suggested another restaurant, which we tried the next night. When I ordered the rather
puny and expensive one-and-a-quarter-pound lobster that was on
the menu, I was given two tiny lobsters that together weighed perhaps one-and-a-quarter-pounds-probably too small to reproduce. 9 3
I undertook to discover what happened to Nova Scotia's lobsters.
The answer, it turned out, was that the lobstermen, anticipating announced government regulations on lobstering, had rushed to
94
catch and sell them all.

Groundfish Recovery in New England, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 21 (2001); Martin D.
Smith & James E. Wilen, Economic Impacts of Marine Reserves: The Importance of Spatial Behavior, 46J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 183 (2003); M. Stavins, Markets Can Make
Fisheries Sustainable, 22 ENVTL. F. no. 2, at 12 (Mar./Apr. 2005); Symposium, The

Law and Economics of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J. LAw & ECON. 521-840
(1998); Thomas A. Telesca, Sovereignty or the PrecautionaryPrinciple: Which Will Save
Our Fish?, 12 SE. ENVTL. LJ. 23 (2003).
90. See ALEXANDER GARVIN ET AL., URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACES (Urban
Land Inst. 1997); Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural
Resources, 34 ENVTL. L. 1091 (2004) (addressing conflicts between preservationists
and recreationists over natural resources); Amnon Lehavi, PropertyRights and Local
Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAw. 1 (2004)
(exploring property rights and local public goods established by governmental
bodies and aimed at local groups of residents).
91. See Rodney D. Fort &John A. Baden, The Federal Treasury as a Common Pool
Resource and the Development of a Predatory Bureaucracy, in Bu, AucRAcy VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE 9 (John A. Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., Univ. of Michigan Press 1981). See also Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1
(2003) (proposing system to formalize de facto anti-property easements on public
property); Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. LJ.
1041, 1089-92 (2003) (using behavioral economics to analyze regulatory givings).
92. I have told this story before. SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian
Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 539, 562-65 (2004) (relating this
story to Hardin's theory).
93. Cf Steven Dudley, A Taste of Extinction, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1, 2004, at
31.
94. I base this conclusion on personal interviews with Nova Scotia lobstermen
and dealers. For a discussion of other reasons that lobsters might be in decline, at
least further south off the coast of Rhode Island and New York, see Cornelia Dean,
Lobster Boom and Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2005, at F1.
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The Nova Scotia lobster situation was a classic tragedy of the
commons.9 5 Each lobsterman determined for himself when, where
and how small to catch the lobsters until the whole industry was
reduced to capturing lobsters too small to reproduce. Suppose I
were a Nova Scotia lobsterman who wanted to behave responsibly. I
could make a voluntary choice to release lobsters smaller than a
certain size estimated as providing the lobster a reasonable opportunity to reproduce before being caught. 96 As long as the lobster
fishery is a common property resource in which each lobsterman
grabs as grab can, I would have done little or nothing to benefit the
lobsters. Someone else would simply catch most or all of the lobsters I release. On the other hand, I would have reduced my income. I bear the entire cost of attempting to conserve the lobsters,
but the benefit is shared by the less responsible lobstermen who
capture the released lobsters. If I continue to grab every lobster I
can, I maximize my income (I realize the benefit from increased
"use" of the resource), while the costs are spread over all the lobstermen. The only rational course is to grab as many lobsters as I
can-a course that apparently too many Nova Scotia lobstermen
were all too willing to pursue.
Turning to Pennsylvania's water resources, the likelihood of
overexploitation of the Commonwealth's water resources is already
upon us. The Commonwealth has experienced more frequent
drought emergencies in the last twenty-five years than in the previous 300 years. 97 This reflects not so much a change in precipitation
95. Cf JAMES M. ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS
TO MANAGE THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY (Univ. Press of New England 2003); R.
Michael M'Gonigle, The "Economizing"of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9
ECOLOGY L.Q. 119 (1980).
96. Apparently, many Maine lobstermen have informally agreed to mark
some female lobsters with a notch in the tail, with the understanding that no one
will catch them, leaving them to reproduce repeatedly. See Dean, supra note 94, at
F4 (discussing reasons lobsters may be in decline). No one knows if this will be
effective for preserving the large lobsters in the Maine fishery.
97. For articles discussing droughts within the past twenty-five years, see Tom
Avril, There Are No Limits on Biggest Water Users: Drought Rules Don't Apply to Industry
and Farms. Officials Say Jobs Could Be at Stake, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al;
Tom Avril & Edward Colimore, The Drought and How We Got There: Lack of Rain a
Factor; So Is Poor Planning,PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14, 2002, at Al; Sandy Bauers &
Walter Naedele, Region Hit Hard by ContinuingDrought: A Lack of Rain Has Withered
Crops and Lowered Wells. No Relief Seems in Sight. An Emergency May Be Declared,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 16, 1999, at Al; John-Thor Dahlburg, Drought Compounded by
Error in Judgment, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 2001, at A21; Suzette Parmley, Area
Farmers' Harvest Withers Under Effects of Heat, Drought, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 30,
2002, at Al; Suzette Parmley, N.J. Declared a FederalFarm Disaster Area: FarmersAre
Eligiblefor Low-Interest Loans. Pa. Seeks Such Relief; Aid Is Now Available for Some Counties, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al. See generally DROUGHT AND WATER CRI-
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patterns as the exponential growth in demand for water since
World War II-growth fueled by expanding demand for consumptive uses until 1980 and fueled by the growing recognition of demand for in-stream uses since 1980.98 The prospect of climate

change is only likely to make such pressures stronger.99 In state
after state, the pressure of such demands has led to the abandonment of riparian rights in favor of some other body of law.10 0 There
is no reason to think Pennsylvania will not eventually follow them.
This seems particularly likely given that two-thirds of the Commonwealth falls under one or another of two interstate compacts, in
both of which all the other states have already implemented regulated riparian systems. 10 ' The absence of such a system in Pennsylvania is at least cumbersome relative to the operations of the
compact regimes, and could become truly problematic should a severe water crisis arise. A regulated riparian regime in Pennsylvania
could prove particularly significant relative to federal claims to use
water given the particular provisions in the two interstate compacts. 102
SES:

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES
AL., THE WORLD'S WATER,

2005); PETER H. GLEICK ET

(Donald A. Wilhite ed.,
2004-2005: THE BIENNIAL

REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES (2005) (discussing natural and social dimenDIANE RAINES WARD, WATER WARS: DROUGHT, FLOOD, FOLLY,
AND THE POLITICS OF THIRST (2002) (discussing water issues throughout world);

sions of droughts);

Greg Bouwer, Water Resources: East Coast Drought Could Challenge Outdated Plans,
Apr. 2002, at 30; Leticia H. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, The
Necessity of Preventing UnilateralResponses to Water Scarcity - Next Major Threat Against
Mankind This Century, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2001) (discussing fear of
northeast water droughts in 2002); Iver Peterson, Drought on East Coast Raises Worries of Water Rationing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at Al.
98. See Brian E. Gray, Dividing the Waters: The California Experience, 10 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENrrL. L. & POL'Y 141 (2004) (discussing elements necessary to
reinvent California's water scheme in order to protect against future droughts);
Jack A. Stanford et al., A General Protocolfor Restoration of Regulated Rivers, 12 REGULATED RIVERS: RES. & MGMT. 391 (1996) (discussing guidelines for restoration of
rivers); Tarlock, supra note 10, at 501-04 (discussing fundamental changes in water
policies occurring throughout world).
99. For a discussion of climate change on water resources, see supra note 10.
100. SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism,in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, ch. 9 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001).
CRIVL ENGINEERING,

101. For a discussion of regulated riparian systems, see infra note 356 and
accompanying text; see also Tarlock, supra note 10, at 519-20 (discussing state water
permit systems).
102. For provisions concerning interstate compacts, see Delaware River Basin

Compact, art. 2, § 2.5, art. 3, § 3.3, art. 11, § 11.1, art. 15, § 15.1; Pub. L. No. 87328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961); 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.101-.106 (West 1997) [hereinafter Delaware Compact]; Susquehanna River Basin Compact, art. 1, § 1.4, art. 2,
§ 2.2, art. 12, § 12.1; Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970); 32 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 820.1-.8 (West 1997) [hereinafter Susquehanna Compact]. For materials discussing the Delaware and Susquehanna Compacts, see infra notes 339-72 and accompanying text. On federal water rights generally relative to regulated riparian
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Experiences with riparian rights further suggest that if exploitation of common property requires significant capital investment, the inability of potential investors to keep others from
preempting an investor's uses will cause under investment in the
resource.10 3 This fear lay behind the rejection of riparian rights in
the drier, western states in favor of an attempt to create a private
property system such as Garret Hardin argued was necessary for all
commons. 10 4 Yet the West's system of appropriative rights is just as
problematic as riparian rights. It is time to turn to the alternatives
to riparian rights.
III.

THE ALTERNATIVES TO RIPARIAN RIGHTS

In the United States, the climate becomes drier going from
east to west, with truly arid regions between the Rocky Mountains
and the Pacific coastal ranges, before reaching a narrow humid region right along the Pacific Coast, with predictable consequences
for water allocation law.10 5 European settlers in the West, needing
water for mining, irrigation, industrial and municipal uses, concluded that their need for water could not be satisfied under riparian rights.10 6 The newcomers generally displaced the existing
Spanish-Mexican law. 10 7 Aboriginal law was completely ignored.
regimes, see Jeremy Nathan Jungreis, "Permit"Me Another Drink: A Proposalfor Safeguarding the Water Rights of Federal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East, 29 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 369 (2005).
103. See, e.g., In re Waters of Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d 656, 666-67 (Cal.
1979) (discussing effect of uncertain water rights); Fennell, supra note 84, at 92633; Jerome W. Milliman, Water Law and PrivateDecision-Making: A Critique, 2J. LAW
& ECON. 41, 47-51 (1959); Rose, supra note 81.
104. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (exemplifying problems arising from private property system of water). See generally Robert E.
Beck et al., Introduction and Background, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 11
(Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Dual Systems,
in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 8.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol.
2001); Tarlock, supranote 10, at 525-26, 530-31 (discussing pitfalls of common law
water system and providing alternatives utilized by other nations).
105. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 104, § 8.01; Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1510, 1514 (1984) (discussing water laws).
106. See, e.g., Coffin, 6 Colo. 443; Drake v. Earhart,23 P. 541 (Idaho 1890);Jones
v. Adams, 6 P. 442 (Nev. 1885).
107. See Dellapenna, supra note 104, § 8.02(a), § 8.02(b) nn.92-108, § 8.02(c)
nn.200-22 (noting that any apparent survivals of Spanish-Mexican law seem actually to have been fictions invented by common-law judges). See generally NoRRIs H.
HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR WATER, 1770s-1990s, at
1-77 (1992) (describing water policy issue facing Californians); DONALD J. PISANI,
To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902, at 38-46
(1992) (discussing federal reclamation); DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO
WATER ADMINISTRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MExico (1990) (discussing disputes over water rights in Mexico); Peter L. Reich, Mission RevivalJurisRIGHTS DOCTRINE:

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol17/iss1/1

22

2006]

SUITABLEa Suitable
WATER
ALLOCATION
LAW
Dellapenna: Developing
Water
Allocation Law for
Pennsylvania

Instead, the settlers developed their own approach to water allocation-the regime of appropriative rights.
Appropriative rights have failed to catch on in the East. 10 8 Nor
have markets-whether tied to a system of appropriative rights or
otherwise-solved the problems posed by appropriative or riparian
rights, east or west. 10 9 Instead, a new form of water allocation law
called regulated riparianism has developed in the eastern states to
displace traditional riparian rights. 1 10 The following sections explore these topics and what they could offer to the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania if a decision were taken to replace riparian rights.
A. Appropriative Rights
Appropriative rights basically are a private property approach
to water allocation in which the right to use water is defined as to
quantity, time, place and manner of use, 11 and most importantly,
according to their priority relative to other uses. 112 The legal regime of appropriative rights arose from the customs of the early
mining camps in the West. 113 For over 150 years, the miners' rule
has evolved into a complex and sophisticated system of water administration found, in one form or another, in every appropriation
state. 114
prudence: State Courts and Hispanic Water Law Since 1850, 69 WASH. L. REv. 869

(1994) (discussing intentional manipulation of Spanish water laws concerning
water apportionment); Peter L. Reich, The "Hispanic"Roots of PriorAppropriation in
Arizona, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 649 (1995); David A. Reichard, The Politics of Village Water
Disputes in Northern New Mexico, 1882-1905, 9 WESTERN LEGAL HiST. 9 (1996).

108. See Dellapenna, supra note 104, §§ 8.05-8.05(b).
109. See Dellapenna, supra note 82; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Special Challenges to
Water Markets in Riparian States, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 305 (2004) (discussing challenges of using markets as water management tool in riparian jurisdictions).
110. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 100, ch. 9; Jungreis, supra note 102,
at 380-85 (discussing characteristics of riparian water rights).
111. For cases demonstrating private approach to water allocation, see Orr v.
Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988); Rominiecki v.
McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1981); Rencken v. Young, 711 P.2d
954 (Or. 1985); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557
(Wyo. 1978).
112. For cases demonstrating water allocation based on priority relative to
other uses, see Coffin v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882); State ex rel. Cary

v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940).
113. See generally Dellapenna, supa note 104, § 8.01. Contra David B. Schorr,
Appropriation as Agrarianism: DistributiveJustice in the Creation of Property Rights, 32

ECOL. L.Q. 3 (2005) (demonstrating appropriation doctrine was intended to embody modem ideals of property distribution).
114. See C. Peter Goplerud, III, The Permit Process and Colorado's Exception, in 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 15 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001).
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In significant respects, appropriative rights do not work wellfailing to prevent wasteful practices and actually encouraging
waste. 115 Appropriative rights also exhibit more uncertainty than
the principle of "first in time, first in right" suggests. The earliest
priority dates in every appropriative rights state predate the administrative mechanisms. 116 Despite statutes and legal proceedings to
facilitate the recording of these claims, on at least some watercourses in each appropriative rights state the earliest, hence most
valuable, rights to use water have never been quantified.1 17 Prescriptive, abandoned or forfeited rights also create gaps in the official record. 1 18 These and other shortcomings of appropriative
rights become more pronounced when less water remains unappropriated and with the growing recognition of the importance of nonconsumptive uses of water.1 1 9
The rule of "first in time, first in right" promotes premature
development because water users seek to capture unappropriated

115. SeeJohn D. Leshy, The PriorAppropriationDoctrine of Water Law in the West:
An Emperor with Few Clothes, 29J. WEST 5 (1990); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use,
Waste, and Foifeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28
ENVTL. L. 919 (1998) (analyzing success of beneficial use doctrine since inception
100 years ago).
116. The first statute creating a formal administrative system was enacted in
1890 in Wyoming; the most recently enacted was in Alaska in 1966. See generally
Dellapenna, supra note 104, § 8.02(c); Goplerud, supra note 114. Anglo settlement
with claims of appropriative rights, began as early as 1848 in California, and at later
dates in other states, always long before the creation of the administrative machinery. See id.
117. See generally C. Peter Goplerud, III, Adjudication of Water Rights, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 16 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001).
118. See Gibbons v. Globe Dev., Nev., Inc., 553 P.2d 1198 (Ariz. 1976); Sears v.
Berryman, 623 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1981) (recognizing prescriptive rights); People v.
Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1980); Mountain Meadow Ditch Co. v. Park Ditch
Co., 277 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1954); Campbell v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 102 P.2d 745
(Wyo. 1940) (refusing to recognize prescriptive rights); City of Denver v. Snake
River Water Dist., 788 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1990); Jenkins v. State Dep't of Water Res.,
647 P.2d 1256 (Idaho 1982); Crandall v. Water Res. Dep't, 626 P.2d 877 (Or.
1981); Cundy v. Weber, 300 N.W. 17 (S.D. 1941); Provo River Water Users Ass'n v.
Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1982); Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc. v. Town
of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732 (Wash. 1997) (discussing abandonment); State v. Oliver
Bros., 228 N.W. 864 (Neb. 1930); Town of Eureka v. State Eng'r of Nev., 826 P.2d
948 (Nev. 1992);Jones v. Anderson, 467 P.2d 995 (N.M. 1970); In re Cancellation
of the Stabio Ditch Water Rt., 417 N.W.2d 391 (S.D. 1987); Texas Water Rts.
Comm'n. v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1971); Sheep Mt. Cattle Co. v. Dep't of
Ecology, 726 P.2d 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); In re N. Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d
367 (Wyo. 1980) (discussing forfeiture). See generally C. Peter Goplerud, III, Protection and Termination of WaterRights, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 17, § 17.03
(Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2001).
119. See generally Gaffney, supra note 65.
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waters to enjoy the "later rents" of the waters. 120 Withdrawing water
creates a right to use the water in the future; in order to capture
rents, appropriators use as much water as they possibly can. 12 1 A
cost to society from the investment of real social capital to divert,
store and apply water becomes a private gain to the appropriator,
who invests capital in capturing of sub-marginal resources. Excessive diversion capacity is usual under appropriative rights, 12 2 yet
most appropriations exhibit inadequate investment in the post-diversionary aspects of development, especially those designed to save
water. 12 3 Conditional rights make it even easier to capture rents, by
establishing an intent to appropriate with actual use not following
12 4
for many years.
Simply put, appropriators live in an environment where it is
smart to waste water. Much of the water shortage in the western
states would disappear if appropriators paid a realistic price for
water and the shortage would abate substantially if appropriators
simply started thinking in terms of a zero price, instead of, as now,
regarding the cost as negative because of the gain realized by piling

120. See generally Amy Beatie & James Fosnaught, The City of Golden's Application for Surface Water Rights: A Kayak Course, Instream Flow, Dilution, or What ?, 2 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 273 (1999) (discussing application of city trying to confirm
absolute surface water rights and opposition to application). The notion of capturing rents has been developed in a political and economic theory called "public
choice theory." See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FR.cKYv, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY (Maxwell Stearns ed., 1997); Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal
Scholarship, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 490 (1996); David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the
Future of Public-Choice-InfluencedLegal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1997); Maxwell L. Stearns, Restoring Positive Law and Economics: Introduction to Public Choice
Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709 (1998).
121. Charles W. Howe et al., The Performance of Appropriative Water Rights Systems in the Western United States During Drought, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379 (1982).
122. For a discussion of the beneficial use doctrine, see Neuman, supra note
115.
123. See, e.g., Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 173 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981); Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Lambert., 642 P.2d 1219 (Utah
1982); Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980). Western courts occasionally penalize wasteful practices. See, e.g., Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1992). How effective such efforts will be
remains to be seen.
124. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Bd. of Water Works of Pueblo, Colo.,
831 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1992); City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915
(Colo. 1992); In re Application No. 5189-3, 467 N.W.2d 907 (S.D. 1991); Green
River Dev. Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1983). See generallyJackson B.
Battle, PaperClouds over the Waters: ShelfFilings and Hyperextended Permits in Wyoming,
22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 673 (1987); Beatie & Fosnaught, supra note 120.
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up a "history" of "use. ' 125 Even George Gould, in a spirited defense
of appropriative rights, conceded that enforcement of the prohibition of waste has been intermittent because of a "lack of political
Will."

12 6

There are other serious problems under appropriative rights.
Under the rule of "first in time, first in right," appropriators are
senior and junior to one another along a scale from the very first
user to the user who began most recently. When water is short,
junior appropriators must stop using water first and lose everything
before the next senior appropriator loses anything. 127 Exaggerating the risk to junior appropriators protects senior appropriators.
Two basic economizing principles are denied. One is marginal productivity. 128 A junior appropriator who loses all access to water
loses some marginal units of high productivity, while the senior appropriator retains marginal units of low productivity. The other ignored principle is the pooling of risk. Each water right is defined
in a way that introduces great changes in the aggregate variability of
supply beyond the natural variability and distributes these risks
unequally.
Water is also transported wastefully from region to region to
comply with the priority system because service areas from any
given stream, when water rights are claimed by individuals or small
water districts, are scattered.1 29 Wasteful practices arise because
"first in time, first in right" puts a premium on jumping the gun.
Typically, the first claimants on a source are scattered. Once a particular source of supply is fully claimed, included dry lands can
never get water from that source. 13 0 Landowners can, however,
search for other, more remote sources. The results are easily observed: canals crisscross western states carrying water in opposite
125. See Neuman, supra note 115 (examining development and future of beneficial use doctrine).
126. See George A. Gould, A Westerner Looks at Eastern Water Law: Reconsideration of PriorAppropriationin the East, 25 U. ARM. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 89, 96 (2002)
(citing Neuman, supranote 115, at 978-91) (discussing ongoing water regulation in
western states).
127. For one of the most extreme examples, see State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran,
292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940) (holding "use of water by ajunior appropriator does not
become adverse to or injure a senior appropriator until it results in a deprivation
of his allotted amount, or some part thereof.").
128. See generally ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE

20-33 (1990); RICHARD A.

POSNER, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1 (5th ed. 1998); Gaffney, supra note 65, at 140.

129. When administered by large irrigation districts, appropriative rights often
are administered in contained service areas.
130. See Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (allowing senior appropriators' rights to supersede those ofjunior appropriators).
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directions as various appropriators exercise their rights. 3Laws to
protect areas of origin had little impact on this problem.' '
Traditionally, no effort was made under appropriative rights to
protect the public interest in the waters of a state or to distribute
their fruits among the disadvantaged of society.1 32 Many appropriative rights states have now enacted statutes requiring consideration
of the public interest in evaluating applications to make a new appropriation. 13 3 These statutes do not apply to existing water rights
and, thus, have little practical effect in the many water basins in
34
which most or all available water has already been appropriated.
Today, people debate whether society should use water for endangered species or for other public values rather than for irrigation
and other private uses, 13 5 but existing appropriations make it impossible to address such questions.
131. See generally LAWRENCE J.
ING AREA-OF-ORIGIN COMPENSATION

MAcDONNELL ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOP-

(1985);

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER

78-79, 114-15,
225-32, 243-44, 257-59 (1992); Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next
Millennium: A Conceptual and LegalAnalysis, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 181, 215-19, 25153 (1996) (discussing inter-basin transfer restrictions).
132. See Gaffney, supra note 65, at 138.
133. See, e.g., Collins Bros. v. Dunn, 759 P.2d 891, 897 (Idaho 1988) (noting
Department of Water Resource's discretion to consider "local public interest"
TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

when granting or denying permits). See generally Owen L. Anderson, Reallocations,

Transfers and Changes, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 14.04(d) (1) (Robert E.
Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003); Goplerud, supra note 114, § 15.03(c) (3); Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West:
Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARiz. ST. L.J. 681 (1987) (arguing "modern recognition of public values... fits comfortably in the public interest review tradition.").
134. See, e.g., Collins Bros., 759 P.2d at 891 (considering "local public interest"); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985) (noting local public interest
includes benefit to appropriator). Two states seem to have defined the "public
interest" solely in terms of a cost-benefit analysis rather than a more wide-ranging
investigation of social values. See ALAsx.A STAT. § 46.15.080(b) (2004) (considering
benefits, effects, harms and intent in determining public interest); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(2) (West 2004) (stating "[a]llocation of waters among potential uses and users shall be based generally on the securing of the maximum net
benefits for the people of the state"). See generally Norman K. Johnson & Charles
T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to Changing
Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 351 (1989) (examining protection of public interest under appropriative rights doctrine in western
states).
135. See, e.g., Reed D. Benson, A Watershed Issue: The Role of Streamflow Protection in Northwest River Basin Management, 26 ENVTL. L. 175 (1996) (suggesting watershed management efforts focus on streamflows); Lora A. Lucero, Water and the
Disconnects in Growth Management, 31 URB. LAW. 871 (1999) (using New Mexico as
case study); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Managing Reclamation Facilitiesfor Ecosystem
Benefits, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 197 (1996) (considering current approaches to ecosystem beneficence); Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West:
EndangeredFish Versus IrrigatedAgriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319 (1996) (exploring water allocation conflicts between endangered fish and irrigation); Carmen
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Even if one were to disregard the foregoing problems with
appropriative rights and the difficulties with using markets to
overcome those problems, 13 6 there are good reasons why appropriative rights are not adaptable to Pennsylvania. Ten western states
adopted appropriative rights to replace an earlier system of riparian
rights. 137 Generally, legislatures enacted this change, but without
abolishing riparian rights completely because of an inability or unwillingness to compensate the owners of riparian rights. 138 Instead,
legislatures preserved riparian rights in use on the effective date of
the first appropriative rights statute. 139 Even though most transitions occurred when existing water uses were relatively few, the
change produced a dual system that combined the worst features of
40
both appropriative and riparian rights.1

In 1956, Mississippi became the only eastern state to adopt a
dual system.14 1 In 1985, Mississippi repealed its appropriative rights
Sower-Hall & Holly I. Holder, Water Quality Issues in Augmentation Plans and Exchanges, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 96 (1997) (addressing whether "the issue of
water quality has any impact on the adjudication or administration of augmentation plans or exchanges"); Alexandra E.Viscusi, Note, ConflictingDirectives: Water
Quality and Appropriative Water Rights in the West, 20 Wm. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

REV. 121 (1995) (discussing impact of PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash.
Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994), on western water rights); Wendy Weiss, The
Federal Government's Pursuit of Instream Flow Water Rights, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.
151 (1998).
136. See infra notes 153-207 and accompanying text (discussing markets generally and their ineffectiveness for water management).
137. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 104, §§ 8.02(a), 8.02(c).
138. See id. § 8.03.
139. See California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295
U.S. 142, 152 (1935) (noting Oregon statutory provision that all water within state
shall be subject to appropriation); F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d
1164, 1169 (Kan. 1981) (noting Kansas law recognizes existence of vested rights);
Hickman v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 113 N.W.2d 617 (Neb. 1962) (considering validity of appropriation challenged by junior appropriator); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968) (noting North Dakota legislature's intent
"in regard to 'vested rights' was to consider only a previous beneficial use of
ground water"); City of Stillwater v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 524 P.2d 938 (Okla.
1974) (noting law in force governs appropriative water claims); In re Hood River,
227 P. 1065 (Or. 1924) (en banc); Pacific Power Co. v. Bayer, 273 U.S. 647 (1926)
(considering claimants' competing rights); Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley,
176 N.W.2d 239, 245 (S.D. 1970) (noting water resources commission must fully
recognize and give effect to existing vested rights); In re Medina River, 670 S.W.2d
250 (Tex. 1984) (holding Texas riparian rights ruled, not 1833 Mexican land
grant); In re Deadman Creek, 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985) (holding water rights
not put to beneficial use are relinquished). But see Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v.
Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (finding attempted cut-off of
unused riparian rights is void as uncompensated taking).
140. See Dellapenna, supra note 104, §§ 8.03, 8.04.
141. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5 1 -3-3(g) (3) to 51-3-7 (1972). See generally William M. Champion, PriorAppropriation in Mississippi-A Statutory Analysis, 39 Miss.
L.J. 1 (1967) (noting adoption of water appropriation legislation); Al Sage, Missis-
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law, replacing it with a regulated riparian statute. 14 2 During the
twenty-nine years Mississippi had appropriative rights, not one Mississippi court in deciding a water rights dispute, ever referred to the
statute.143 Mississippi's experience suggests why it would be futile
to import appropriative rights into a hydrologically more developed
exeastern state. I have written at some length about Mississippi's
1 44
perience elsewhere and will not repeat it in detail here.
Basically, appropriative rights failed in Mississippi because of
the innumerable consumptive uses of water that had begun before
1956. Claiming an appropriative right only concedes priority to an
opponent claiming a riparian right for a use begun before 1956.
Depending on the interpretation adopted by the dual system of
water rights, either the riparian right would prevail as the earliest
appropriation, 145 or the appropriative right would be a permissive
146
non-riparian use that fails in competition with a riparian use.
The best an appropriator could hope would be that the appropriative use would be balanced against the complaining riparian's use,
which brings us full circle back to the reasonable use version of
riparian rights. 147 Nor, given the added uncertainty from the duality of the system, could one expect markets to remedy defects of the
sippi, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 445, 446-52 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement
vol. 1994).
142. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to 51-3-55 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (outlining general provisions of Mississippi Water Resources Regulation and Control).
143. See Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Miss. 1969)
(deciding action to quiet title); Haisch v. Southhaven Land Co., 274 F. Supp. 392
(N.D. Miss. 1967) (relying on case law in holding upper riparian owner could
rightfully improve land); Phillips v. Davis Timber Co., 468 So. 2d 72 (Miss. 1985)
(allowing invasion of property claim under nuisance doctrine); Black v. Williams,
417 So. 2d 911 (Miss. 1982) (relying on majority rule of other states); HindsRankin Metro. Water Ass'n v. Reid, 256 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1971) (relying on tort
law); Downes v. Crosby Chem., Inc., 234 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1970) (discussing definition of "navigable waters").
144. See Dellapenna, supra note 104, §§ 8.05-8.05(b). See also Dellapenna,
supra note 92, at 579-83 (noting ineffectiveness of Mississippi's appropriation statute); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at
the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 9, 78-82
(2002) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Southeastern States] (discussing process of obtaining permits under current Mississippi law). For critiques of an earlier version
of my review of the Mississippi experience (answered in the writingsjust cited), see
Gould, supra note 126, at 105-08 (questioning costs of permit system); Tarlock,
supra note 10, at 520-30 (explicating lessons of regulated riparianism versus appropriation debate).
145. See Dellapenna, supra note 104, § 8.04(a).
146. See id. § 8.04(b).
147. See, e.g., Wasserburger v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966), modified on
other grounds, 144 N.W.2d 209 (Neb. 1966) (limiting holding to specific facts);
Franco-Am. Charolaise,Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (holding "modified common-law riparian right to . . . reasonable use of" water is
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bureaucratic system established to administer the appropriative
48
rights. 1

When Mississippi repealed its appropriative rights statute, it
gave all claiming rights vested under the appropriation statute one
year to file a document expressing intent to preserve their appropriative right. 149 No such documents were filed. 15 0 Mississippi did
not, however, abandon the regulated system of water allocation that
characterizes modern appropriative rights in favor of an unregulated system of traditional riparian rights. Mississippi replaced its
abortive attempt to introduce the private property system of appropriative rights with another highly regulated system of water allocation-the public property system of regulated riparianism. 151
The Mississippi example strongly suggests that adding appropriative rights to an economically mature, humid eastern state committed to riparian rights would gain little, if anything, in terms of
rational water management at a cost of establishing and maintaining the considerable bureaucratic machinery that is an inherent
part of appropriative rights today. This reality itself ought to preclude serious consideration of appropriative rights as an alternative
to riparian-based systems in the eastern United States even without
the further arguments about the monopolistic and environmentally
unsound biases of appropriative rights. 15 2 As a result, eastern states
making a sharp departure from the more or less pure riparian
rights uniformly rejected the appropriative rights model.
B. Are Markets the Answer?
Appropriative rights are a rather peculiar form of private property. In particular, if one justifies privatizing common property in
order to avoid the tragedy of commons, 153 one finds that rather
than assuring efficient use of the resource, appropriative rights efOklahoma law). See Dellapenna, supra note 104, § 8.04(b) nn.441-47; Christopher
L. Len, Synthesis-A Brand New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 55 (2004).
148. On the dearth of true markets for water, see infra note 165.
149. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-5(2), (3) (noting abandonment if claim is
not filed within three years of April 1, 1985); see id. §§ 51-3-29(a)-(c) (describing
unpermitted waters).
150. See Dellapenna, Southeastern States, supra note 144, at 31 (discussing system change over).
151. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to 51-3-55 (outlining general provisions of
Mississippi's Water Resources, Regulation and Control).
152. See supra notes 115-35 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings
of appropriative rights).
153. See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text (describing how common
property systems do not work with limited resources).
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fectively freeze uses in place, 154 unless the state intervenes directly
and dramatically to transfer water to other uses. To understand
this, one must consider the reality of markets in this supposed private property system of property rights.
Begin with the currently prevalent ideology. Many economists
and others today advocate markets as the best way to manage the
environment generally, 15 5 and water in particular. 156 There are
154. See MALONEY ET AL., supranote 65, at 159; Michael C. Blumm, Seven Myths
of Northwest Water Law and Associated Stories, 26 ENVTL. L. 141, 145-46 (1996) (explaining that market-system with respect to system of water rights is only present in
some western states). See also infra note 165.
155. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991); DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1991); ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: EcoNOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE MEANS? (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1996); John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental Entrepreneurs: Keys to Achieving Wilderness
Conservation Goals?, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 519 (1998) (discussing future of natural
resources under Wilderness Act); John R.E. Bliese, ConservativePrinciples and Environmental Policies, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 23-36 (1998); Bonnie G. Colby &
Tamra Pearson d'Estree, EvaluatingMarket Transactions,Litigation, and Regulation as
Tools for ImplementingEnvironmentalRestoration, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 381 (2000) (analyzing voluntary and compulsory mechanisms used to further environmental restoration in western United States); Robert J. Fassbender, Reducing Great Lakes Toxics:
Can We Do More for Less Through Wastewater Effluent Trading, 1 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 57
(1994) (discussing how struggle to reduce toxics in Great Lakes has created certain
prerequisites for successful effluent trading program); James L. Huffman, Markets,
Regulations, and EnvironmentalProtection, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425 (1994); R. Prescott
Jaunich, The Environment, the Free Market, and PropertyRights: Post-Lucas Privatization
of the Public Trust, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 167 (1994) (tracing history of property
rights and evolution of public trust doctrine); Dean Lueck, Property Rights and the
Economic Logic of Wildlife Institutions, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 625 (1995) (discussing
value of wildlife as compared to other land uses through market analyisis); Seth
Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheriesfor the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherencefrom Legal and Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REv. 623 (2004) (challenging reigning orthodoxy in fisheries policies); Frederic C. Menz, Transborder
Emissions Trading Between Canada and the United States, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803
(1995) (using property rights analysis in looking at natural resource economics);
Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation's Dirtiest Air?: A
Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management District'sRegional Clean Air Incentives
Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1995) (providing descriptive and evaluative overview
of RECLAIM); Kurt Stephenson et al., Toward an Effective Watershed-Based Effluent
Allowance TradingSystem: Identifying the Statutory and Regulatory Barriersto Implementation, 5 ENVTL. LAw. 775 (1999) (proposing model for effective watershed-based
effluent allowance trading system); Symposium, EnvironmentalTrading, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. no. 1, at 3-55 (Summer 2005). See also Gideon Parchomovsky &
Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberty: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REv. 75 (2004) (expanding on economic analysis in looking at
Cheshire town buyout).

156. See, e.g.,

TERRY

L. ANDERSON

& PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS:

PRIMING

(Cato Inst. 1997); HARALD FREDERIKSEN ET AL., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN ASIA (World Bank Tech. Pap. no. 212, 1993); CLAY J.
LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS (1998); BONNIE COLBY
SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); RODNEY T. SMITH, TRADING WATER:
THE INVISIBLE

PUMP
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AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER MARKETING (1988); JOHN TEERINK & MASAHIRO NAKASHIMA, WATER ALLOCATION, RIGHTS, AND PRICING: EXAMPLES

(World Bank Pol'y Pap. no. 198, 1993); WATER
MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds.,
FROM JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

1997); Nir Becker & Naomi Zeitouni, A Market Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian
Water Dispute, 23 WATER INT'L 238 (1998); James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water
Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A Challengefor Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO.
L. REv. 503 (1998) (examining basic elements of Colorado water law); James D.

Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of Water Transfer
Policy, Practices, and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. L. 225 (1996) (exploring types of water rights leases in Pacific Northwest); Antonio Estache &

Lourdes Trujillo, Efficiency Effects of "Privatization"in Argentina's Water and Sanitation
Services, 5 WATER POL'Y 369 (2003) (discussing water relocations in western United
States); Thomas J. Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water Policy: Markets and
Regulation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. no. 2, at 165 (Winter 1998); Brian E. Gray,
The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1994) (evaluating
water reallocation laws that have been engendered); Ronald C. Griffin & ShinHsun Hsu, The Potentialfor Water Market Efficiency When Instream Flows Have Value, 75
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 292 (1993); Donald J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S.
Water Supplies, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. no. 2, at 19 (Fall 2003); Ray Huffaker et
al., InstitutionalFeasibility of Contingent Water Marketing to Increase Migratory Flows for
Salmon on the Upper Snake River, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 671 (1993) (analyzing legal
feasibility of superimposing water market on Idaho prior appropriation water
rights system); Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers: Implications for Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 21-29 (1995); Kaiser, supra
note 131; Ronald A. Kaiser & Laura M. Phillips, Dividing the Waters: Water Marketing
as a Conflict Resolution Strategy in the Edwards Aquifer Region, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J.
411 (1998) (examining efficacy of water marketing as method for water reallocation); Gary D. Lynne & Phyllis P. Saarinen, Melding Private and Public Interests in
Water Rights Markets, 25J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 69 (1993); Frangois Molle, Defining Water Rights: By Prescription or Negotiation , 6 WATER POL'Y 207 (2004); Ari M.
Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional,and Structural Characteristicsof an Active Water
Market, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 971 (1994); Peter N. Nichols & Douglas S.
Kenney, Watering Growth in Colorado: Swept Along by the Current or Choosing a Better
Line?, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 411 (2003) (discussing impact of water-related
bills passed by Colorado legislature in 2003); Mohammad Shatanawi & Odeh alJayousi, Evaluating Market-Oriented Water Policies in Jordan: A Comparative Study, 20
WATER INT'L 88 (1995);Janet C. Neuman, Have We Got a Dealfor You: Can the East
Borrow from the Western Water MarketingExperience?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 449 (2004)
(describing use of markets in western United States); Jack Sterne, Instream Rights
and Invisible Hands: Prospectsfor Private Instream Flow Rights in the Northwest, 27
ENvTL. L. 203 (1997) (offering guidance to Northwest policy makers regarding
privately held instream rights); David Sunding et al., Water Markets and the Cost of
Improving Water Quality in the San FranciscoBay/Delta Estuary, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.
ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 159 (1995)

(applying economic method to problem of Bay/

Delta water quality regulation); Symposium, The Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 1-104 (1996); Symposium, Water Institutional Reforms: Theory and Practice, 7 WATER POL'Y 1-140 (2005); Gregory A.

Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting Stream Flows in California, 15 STAN. EVNTL. L.J. 3 (1996) (developing legal
strategies for maintaining instream flows sufficient to safeguard estuarine ecosystems); Tarlock, supra note 10, at 525-26, 531-32; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REv. 671 (1993)
[hereinafter Thompson, InstitutionalPerspectives]; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty and Markets in Water Resources, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 117 (2005) (exploring
underlying reasons institutions have served as barrier to more active interregional

water markets); Hisham Zarour & Jad Isaac, Nature's Apportionment and the Open
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good reasons to question the extreme to which this idea is pushed.
Some economists seem to advocate markets as the solution for all of
society's difficulties, being so devoted to markets as the only real
mechanism for social ordering that they could be termed "market
fundamentalists." Market fundamentalists exhibit unreasoning devotion to the utility of markets comparable to religious fundamentalists of every stripe. 157 Economics is certainly relevant, but it is not
158
the only relevant mode of analysis.
The most dramatic debacle to result from such devotion was a
proposal by the Department of Defense (the Department) to predict future political events in troubled areas by a "futures market"
on events such as wars, terrorist attacks or assassinations. The Department dropped the plan with some embarrassment as soon as it

Market: A Promising Solution to the Arab-Israeli Water Conflict, 18 WATER INT'L 40
(1993); see alsoJ.J. Hu, A & T.S. KATKO, WATER PRIVATISATION REVISITED: PANACEA
OR PANCAKE? (2003); Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., The Value of Private Water Rights:
From a Legal and Economic Perspective, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOKJ. 313 (2004); Roy
Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, Environmental Takings of Private Water Rights: The
Case for Water Privatization, 32 ENVrL. L. REP. 1162 (2002).
157. For examples of market fundamentalists in action, see TOM BETHELL,
THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES (1998);
Terry L. Anderson, Missed Opportunity, 20 ENVrL. F. no. 1, at 32 (2002); Richard A.
Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
515 (2002); Richard A. Epstein, The "Necessary" History of Property and Liberty, 6
CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2003); Bernard H. Siegan, ProtectingEconomic Liberties, 6 CHAP. L.
REV. 43 (2003) (detailing evolution of treatment of economic liberties and impact
of judicial termination for protections of economic rights); ToddJ. Zywicki, The
Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2003). For critiques
of such fundamentalism, see DAVID BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER
OF OUR COMMON WEALTH

(2003);

DANIEL

H.

COLE, POLLUTION AND

PROPERTY:

COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002); NA_
TURE, PRODUCTION, POWER: TowARDS AN ECOLOGICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (Fred P.

Gale & Michael M'Gonigle eds., 2000); MARC R. TOOL & PAUL DALE BUSH, INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC POLICY (2002); LARS WERIN, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2003).
158. See, e.g., Jon Christensen, Fiscal Accountability Concerns Come to Conservation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at F2 (explaining controversy over funding environmental biology); Erik Claudio, Comment, How the EPA May Be Selling GeneralElectric
Down the River: A Law and Economics Analysis of the $460 Million Hudson River Clean
Up Plan, 13 FoRDHAm ENvrL. L.J. 409 (2002) (analyzing studies on environmental
and economic costs of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) pollution and costs of rehabilitating Hudson River); Theodore A. Feitshans & Kelly Zering, FederalRegulations
of Animal and Poultry Production Under the Clean Water Act: Opportunitiesfor Employing
Economic Analysis to Improve Societal Results, 10 PENN. ST. ENVrL. L. REV. 193 (2002)
(describing effects of Clean Water Act on poultry and livestock business); Guido
Pincione, Market Rights and the Rule of Law: A Casefor Procedural Constitutionalism,
26 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 397 (2003) (criticizing view that nothing in idea of rule
of law should require specific rights); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245 (2002) (considering
whether mix of approaches is optimal).
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became public.1 59 Commentators highlighted the severe problems,
even in terms of economic theory, centering on the ease with which
a heavy "investor" could manipulate such a market, for example, by
staging a terrorist event at the right place and time. 160 Still, a few
market fundamentalists defended the proposal even after it was
abandoned. 16 1 Failure of this proposal did not cause market fundamentalists to become more cautious in the military field. Private
contractors hired to interrogate prisoners in Iraq figured prominently in the subsequent scandal about prisoner abuse in Abu
Ghraib prison. 16 2 Why such private contractors were used is unclear. They were too few to justify as a significant increase in the
personnel available in Iraq and too expensive to justify as a cost159. Bradley Graham, Poindexter to Leave Pentagon Research Job: Project to Create
Futures Market on Events in Middle East Caused Controversy, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003,
at Al; Carl Hulse, Swiftly, Plan for Terrorism Futures Market Slips in Dustbin, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2003, at Al; Shailagh Murray, Pentagon Retreatsfrom TerrorFutures in
the Face of Criticism, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2003, at Cl.
160. See, e.g., Richard Adams, Briefing-The Dark Side of Futures Trading, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 4, 2003, at 23 (describing policy market analysis as used
by Defense Department); Julia Baird, The Nerds Who Want to Punt on Our Future,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Austl.), Aug. 2, 2003, at 37; Todd G. Buchholz, All Bets
Are Off N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A25 (commenting on terrorism futures market); Editorial, Terrorism? Don't Bet on It, Chi. Trib., Aug. 1, 2003, at 26; David
Ignatius, Back in the Safe Zone, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at Al (editorializing on
terrorism futures market); Steven Pearlstein, Misplacing Trust in the Markets, WASH.
POST, July 30, 2003, at El (noting idea of use of private markets for many things,
including intelligence); Richard Siklos, Poindexter Was Thinking Out of the BoxPandora'sBox, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 3, 2003, at 6 (describing controversy of terrorism futures market proposal). See also Mansour 0. El-Kikhia, Can't
Join 'Em, Then Stop Trying SAN ANTONIO ExPREss NEWS, Aug. 1, 2003, at 7B (referring to proposed futures market as "kill an Arab program").
161. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs, Deep-Sixing a Bright Idea, 135 U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT 32 (Aug. 11, 2003) (noting decision to pull plug on Policy Analysis Market); Rana Faroohar & Michael Hastings, Reading the Tea Leaves: A Far Out Idea
Might Have Worked, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 2003, at 39; Hal Varian, Economic Scene: A
Market in Terrorism Indicators Was a Good Idea; It Just Got Bad Publicity, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2003, at C2 (pointing out poor public relations surrounding Policy Analysis
Market); Justin Wolfers. & Eric Zitzewitz, The Furor over "Terrorism Futures",WASH.
POST, July 31, 2003, at A19 (explaining how terrorism futures market would have
worked).
162. Kathleen Cahill, Outside Contractors, Outside Military Law, WASH. POST,
May 9, 2004, at B5 (noting murky waters being created by use of civilian contractors in Iraq war); Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred
between Soldiers and Civilian Contractors,WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al (describing
problems surrounding use of contractors); Sewell Chan & Michael Amon, Prisoner
Abuse Probe Widened: Military Intelligence at Center of Investigation,WASH. POST, May 2,
2004, at Al (noting military probe into Iraqi prisoner abuse); Renae Merle, Prisoner-Abuse Report Adds to Titan's Troubles: Lockhead Plan to Buy Already Stalled, WASH.
POST, May 7, 2004, at E3; Anitha Reddy & Ellen McCarthy, CACI in Dark on Reports
of Abuse: Employee Named in Army Report Still Working in Iraq, Company Says, WASH.
POST, May 6, 2004, at El (stating CACI's reaction to allegations of prisoner abuse
by employees).
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saving measure. Perhaps, as some commentators noted, they were
163
there just to set a precedent in the privatization of the military.
Market fundamentalists have also suffered setbacks, without so
much publicity, in attempts to privatize or marketize water management. In many parts of the world, public opposition has blocked
such attempts. 64 Such failures in the United States include laws
and regulations to block the possibility of market transactions for
bulk or raw water, 165 and communities taking the expensive step of
buying back water utility systems that had been privatized less than
a decade earlier.' 66 None of these setbacks. stopped the effort to
163. See Cha & Merle, supranote 162; Paul Krugman, Battlefield of Dreams, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A29 (explaining negative backlash due to heavy reliance on
contractors in Iraq).
164. See, e.g.,
Martha Carr, S&WB Sell-Off Is Sunk, Nagin Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Apr. 20, 2004, at 1 (noting New Orleans' efforts to privatize sewer
and water systems); DEQ Watching over Water Deal: Evart City Manager Says Department's Request Came as a Surprise,GRAND RAPIDS PREss, Apr. 19, 2005, at B2; Michael
A. Hiltzik, MWD's Vote Endangers Cadiz's Future: Water-The Cancellation of a Mojave
Storage Project Is Another Blow to the Santa Monica Firm, Whose Stock Has Plunged, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at C1 (noting cancellation of Cadiz project to build water
storage in Mohave Desert); Michael A. Hiltzik, Water as a Business Taps into Fears.
Environment: Concern over Possession of a NaturalResource as a Commodity and the Possibility of Firms Taking Treatment Shortcuts HamperDeals, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at
Cl; Judge Disallows Stockton Water Contract Plans, CoNTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut
Creek, CA), Dec. 7, 2003, at 4; Judge Nixes Town's Spring Water Deal with Nestle, MONTREAL GAZET-rE, Mar. 25, 2005, at B6; Nick Mathiason, UK Business Giant to Sue DebtLaden Tanzania, THE OBSERVER (UK), May 22, 2005, at 1; Joseph Sapia, Brick to Buy
Parkway Water Co. Assets, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Jan. 9, 2005, at 1; Erik J. Woodhouse,
Note, The "Guerra del Aqua" and the Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign
Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure,39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003) (examining
foreign direct investment in building of water management resources in Bolivia).

See generally Matthew S. Tisdale, Note, The Price of Thirst: The Trend Towards the
Privatizationof Water and Its Effect on Private Water Rights, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 535
(2004) (analyzing property rights in United States and privatization of water resource management).
165. See Heather Duncan, Legislators Can't Agree on Water Permit Sales, MACON
TELEGRAPH (Ga.), Apr. 24, 2003, at 5 (stating reason homeowners cannot sell unused water);Julia Ferrante, SWITTMUD Says Selling WaterDoesn't Comply with Permits,
TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 12, 2003, at 2; Cy Ryan, Leaders Scuttle Lincoln County-Vidler Water
Deal, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 27, 2003, at 5. See also Tara Boldt-Van Rooy, "BottlingUp"
Our NaturalResources: The Fight over Bottled Water Extraction in the United States, 18 J.
LANn USE & ENVTL. L. 267 (2003) (discussing whether states need to develop
stricter laws to protect quantity of fresh water resources); Okke Braadbaart, Priva-

tizing Water and Wastewater in Developing Countries: Assessing the 1990s' Experiments, 7
WATER POI'y 329 (2005); Clark Mason, Bill Would Protect Albion, GualalaRivers: Declaring Waterways Wild and Scenic Would Block Future Water Export Plans, THE PRESS
DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Apr. 11, 2003, at BI. See generally Werner Troesken
& Rick Geddes, Municipalizing American Waterworks, 1897-1915, 19 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 373 (2003) (discussing public acquisition and threats of municipalization in
water industry).

166. See, e.g., D.L. Bennett, Atlanta Water System: Back in City Hands, Agency
Bogged Down, ATLANTAJ.-CONST.,June 12, 2003, atJNI (describing hardships resulting from water system being reclaimed from private ownership); Kevin P. Con-
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privatize or marketize water management, if only because public
institutions often see that as the only way to raise new capital in an
68
era of tight public budgets. 16 7 Moreover, cognitive psychologists
nolly, Deltona Has Go-Ahead to Purchase Utilities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 2003, at
G1 (noting approval of private buyout of water and sewer utility); Milo Ippolito,
Atlanta Takes over Water System: Huge Utility with Aging Pipes Back Under City Control,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 30, 2003, at B5 (describing Atlanta's water system takeover); Robert King & Archana Pyati, Sales Signals End of Utility Battle, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 25, 2003, at 1 (noting agreement for possible public buyout of
water system); John Stamper, Water Files Suit Against City: Resolution Was Invalid,
Kentucky-American Says, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Ky.), July 18, 2003, at Al; see
also Puerto Rican WaterAuthority Cancels Second O&M Deal, ENGINEERING NEws-REc.,
Jan. 19, 2004, at 7 (noting Puerto Rico's cancellation of second private water utility
contract). See generally HUKKA & KATKO, supra note 156; Saul Levmore, Two Stories
About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2002) (showing conflicting explanations for almost every move toward or away from privatization).
167. See, e.g., Casey Brown & Arthur Holcombe, Pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals in Water and Sanitation, 6 WATER POL'y 263 (2004); Martha Carr, Water
Woes in Atlanta a Cautionary Talefor N.O.: PrivatizationDoable, Not Cure-all, City Told,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 29, 2003, at 1 (suggesting New Orleans
should look to Atlanta's mistakes when privatizing its water and sewer utility);
Jonathan Chenoweth, Changing Ownership Structures in the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector, 29 WATER INT'L 138 (2004); Sharon A. Jones & Catriona Mhairi Duncanson, Implications of the World Bank's PrivatizationPolicy for South Africa, 6 WATER POL'Y
473 (2004); Eric Neff, PanelPushed to OK Nevada Water Deal, LAS VEGAS SUN, May
13, 2003, at 1; Brian Skoloff, Stockton Water Deal Stirs PrivatizationIre, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Mar. 30, 2003, at 4; Tom Zoellner, Phoenix Partially
Privatizes Its Water: Earth Tech to Design, Build, Operate Facility, Aiz. REP., June 2,
2003, at B1. See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting
for the New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1229 (2003) (comparing current privatization efforts with historical practices); Forum, Emissions Trading Moves to Water, but
It's Not as Simple, 20 ENVTL. F. no. 2, at 62 (2003); Symposium, HarnessingMarkets
for Water Quality, 4 WATER RESOURCES IMPACT no. 6 (Nov. 2002).
168. See, e.g., Afamia C. Nakat & Charles D. Turner, Water Use and Transfer
Scenarios in El Paso County, Texas, USA, 29 WATER INT'L 338 (2004);Jennifer Davis &
Dale Whittington, Challengesfor Water Sector Reform in Transition Economies, 6 WATER
POL'Y 381 (2004); Christopher Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and Governance:
Toward Conservation Stewardship of PrivateLand in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 423 (2003) (reorienting legal scholars' and environmentalists' approach to problem of private-lands conservation); Chris Guthrie, Prospect
Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1115 (2003) (summarizing
scholars' efforts to use prospect theory in analysis of legal behavior); Mark Kelman,
Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1347 (2003)
(setting out concept of rational choice theory); JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
PsychologicalCasefor Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003); Lee Ross & Donna
Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice,97 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1081 (2003) (addressing criminal justice system's consideration of "excuses" in assessing mitigating circumstances). See also JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINT.
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Gary Blasi,
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv.
1241 (2002) (discussing how race and other stereotypes function in human mind);
William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 167
(2003) (considering several reasons for lack of empirical work in law and economics); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) (describing phenomenon of regulatory accretion from several perspectives)).
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and economists who style their field of studies as "behavioral
economics" or "socioeconomics"1 69 question the classical economic
models of markets. Without delving too deeply into these alternative schools, the following describes why markets in fact do not
work very well as a water management tool.
As a more or less private property system, one would expect
appropriative rights to give rise to markets for water rights, yet
there never has been a market for appropriative rights to any significant extent. 170 Numerous observers have noted the crying need
169. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Notes on the Bedouin Horse Trade or "Why Doesn't the
Market Clear, Daddy?," 74 TEX. L. REv. 1039 (1996) (using economic modeling to

explain bargaining in Bedouin Horse Trade). See generally William K. Black, The
Imperium Strikes Back: The Need to Teach Socioeconomics to Law Students, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 231 (2004) (discussing teaching strategies); Bryan Caplan, What Makes People Think Like Economists? Evidence on Cognition from the "Survey of Americans and
Economists on the Economy, "44J. LAw & ECON. 395 (2001); Lynne L. Dallas, Law and
Socioeconomics in Legal Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 855 (2003) (providing introduction to law and socioeconomics in legal education); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315 (2003)
(arguing that precautionary principle can be understood as corrective to cognitive
biases); Dibadj, supra note 91, at 1089-92; Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law and
Contested Terrain: A Law and Society Approach to Economic Rationality, 39 LAw & Soc'y
REv. 181 (2004); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001)
(describing effects of advances in behavioral biology); Leo Katz, What We Do When
We Do What We Do and Why We Do It, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 753 (2000) (advocating
self-consciousness); Ronald J. Gilson, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Russel Korobkin, The
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003) (demonstrating
how endowment effect can be incorporated into legal policy analysis); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000) (providing early
blueprint for research in "law and behavioral science"); Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and Culture, 51
BuFF. L. REv. 1 (2003) (examining institutions of language and communication);
Charles F. Mason, Nonrenewable Resources with Switching Costs, 42 J. ENVrL. ECON. &
MGMT. 65 (2001); Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663 (2003) (responding to Dr.
Mitchell's attacks on legal decision theory); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contem-

porary Psychology's Challenge to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081
(2003); Steven A. Ramirez, What We Teach When We Teach About Race: The Problem
of Law and Pseudo-Economics, 54 J. LEGAL EDuc. 365 (2004); Lynn A. Stout, The
Mechanics of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance,28J. CORP. L. 635
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available: Social Influences and BehavioralEconomics,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1295 (2003) (suggesting that understanding of relationship between behavioral economics and law is aided by investigating connection between
behavioral findings and social influences); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and

the Myth of the "HandFormula",4 THEORETICA.L INQUIRIES IN L. 145 (2003).
170. See SALIBA & BUSH, supra note 156 at 4546; SMITH, supra note 156, at 2852; RicHAiuD W.

WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RiGHTS,

197-289 (1989);Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 284 (2001)
AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
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for water transfers in every area, 17 1 yet appropriative rights simply
are not bought and sold freely. The recognition and protection of
third-party rights precludes true market transactions. 17 2 Even the
(highlighting path-dependent nature of water allocation institutions and trading);
Dellapenna, supranote 82; Eric T. Freyfogle, WaterJustice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481,
510-14; Gould, supra note 126, at 100; Zachary L. McCormick, InstitutionalBarriers
to Water Marketing in the West, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 953 (1994); Thompson,
InstitutionalPerspectives, supra note 156, at 723-39; Robert A. Young, Why Are There so
Few Transactions Among Water Users?, 68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1143 (1986).
171. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 156; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 131; SMITH, supra note 156; WAHL, supra note 170, at 140-44; RICHARD
W. WAHL, WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS

11-12 (1993); Blumm, supra note 154, at 14546; Corbridge, supra note 156;James
D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of Water Transfer
Policy, Practices,and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVrL. L. 225 (1996) (exploring possible sources of water, laws and agency regulations); Graff & Yardas, supra

note 156 (examining legal mechanisms for distributing water in western United
States); Gray, supra note 156; Ronald C. Griffin & Fred 0. Boadu, Water Marketing
in Texas: Opportunitiesfor Reform, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265 (1992) (assessing success of water marketing); Charles W. Howe et al., The Economic Impacts ofAgricultureto-Urban Water Transfers on the Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley
in Colorado, 72 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 1200 (1990); Morris Israel &Jay R. Lund, Recent
California Water Transfers: Implicationsfor Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1
(1995) (discussing water transfers in regional water resource systems); Kaiser, supra
note 131, at 185-92; Ronald A. Kaiser & Shane Binion, Untying the Gordion Knot:
Negotiated Strategiesfor Protecting Instream Flows, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157 (1998)
(examining legal strategies available to policy makers); Kaiser & Phillips, supra
note 156, at 436-43; Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural
Water to the Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 2 HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 27, 45-46 (1994) (examining approaches to facilitate increased availability
of water to meet urban demands); Steven J. Shupe et al., Western Water Rights: The
Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 413 (1989); Jack Sterne, supra note 156
(exploring arguments for and against modification of state water laws); A. Dan
Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law:
From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 163, 168-69
(1999); Gregory A. Thomas & Tara L. Miller, Reflections on the "Model Water Transfer
Act" by the NationalHeritageInstitute, 4 HASTINGS W-Nw. ENVTL. J. L. & POL'Y 91, 99101 (1996); Thompson, InstitutionalPerspectives, supra note 156; Young, supra note
170.
172. See generally HAROLD 0. CARTER & HENRY J. VAUX, JR., THIRD-PARTY EFFEcrS: THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE (1994); DAVID L. MITCHELL, WATER MARKETING
IN CALIFORNIA: RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY IMPACT ISSUES (1993); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 131, at 5-6, 38-42, 73-78, 189-91, 225-28, 254-57, 263-65; SMITH,
supra note 156, at 17-26; Uijayant Chakrvorty et al., A SpatialModel of Water Conveyance, 29J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 25 (1995); Bonnie G. Colby, TransactionCosts and
Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 1184 (1990); Corbridge,

supra note 156, at 507-13; Dellapenna, supra note 82, at 350-56; Casey S. Funk &
Amy M. Cavanaugh, Basic Exchange 101, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177 (1998)
(providing brief survey of western state instream flow programs); George A. Gould,
Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1 (1988);
John S. Harbison, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Property Rights, Public Values, and
Instream Waters, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 535, 546-49 (1991); Charles Howe et al.,
Transaction Costs as a Determinantof Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393 (1990)
(proposing new analytical framework); Kaiser, supra note 131, at 213-14, 246-47;

Jay R. Lund, Transaction Risk Versus Transaction Cost in Water Transfers, 29

WATER
RESOURCES RES. 3103 (1993); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 171, at 29-31; Kevin
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highly touted California Water Bank turns out to have been admin1 73
istrative reallocation masquerading as a market.
City and County of Denver v. Fulton IrrigatingDitch Co. 174 shows

what happens when a would-be buyer seeks water for a use fundamentally different from, or considerably removed from, that of the
seller. 175 The City of Denver agreed that Coors Brewing Company
would have the right to use unlimited quantities of Denver sewage
water for its brewery in exchange for Coors giving Denver the right
to Coors' "clear mountain stream" to augment its municipal supplies. 1 76 The transaction failed not because of possible outrage by
beer drinkers, but because farmers downstream from Denver (organized as the Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co.) obtained an injunction
against the trade because it would deprive them of the water on
which they were relying.1 77 The farmers won even though they had
recognized the seniority of Denver's rights over their own in a contract settling an earlier dispute in exchange for Denver's promise
not to reuse any water that "shall have been once used through its
municipal water system.' 78 There could hardly be a clearer demonstration of the impact of the third-party rule on the potential for
markets for bulk or raw water.
M. O'Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in CaliforniaRevisited: The Legacy
of the 1987-92 Drought, 25 PAC. LJ. 1053, 1062-74 (1994) (tracing development of
water marketing in California over past six years); Young, supra note 170.
173. See Dellapenna, supra note 82, at 358-65.
174. 506 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972).
175. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d
46 (Colo. 1999) (discussing reason for court's judgment dismissing appellant property owner association's application for change of water rights); Thompson v. Harvey, 519 P.2d 963 (Mont. 1974); W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Co., 439 P.2d 715
(N.M. 1968) (affirming lower court's ruling); Crandallv. Water Res. Dep't, 626 P.2d
877 (Or. 1981) (allowing for forfeiture of water rights because of nonuse); White v.
Board of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1979).
176. SeeFulton IrrigatingDitchCo., 506 P.2d at 151. The swap involved a sale by
each party of its water rights to the other; it is immaterial for this discussion which
is considered the buyer and which the seller.
177. See id. at 151-53 (noting injunction obtained to ensure supply of water
for farmers).
178. See id. at 151. Denver would have supplied Coors from "imported water,"
water from outside the watershed, over which the city had even greater rights than
if it were merely claiming the rights of a senior appropriator. See id. at 146-49. The
decision in the case would not have depended on the contract if the water had not
been imported water. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches, 990 P.2d 46 (holding that
diversions made pursuant to decreed water right may not be considered as establishing historical use for purpose of change of water right proceeding); Orr v. Arapahoe Water & SanitationDist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988) (holding that right to
have changed point of diversion limited to historical use); C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v.
Rooks, 495 P.2d 1134 (Colo. 1972) (pointing out reason that change in point of
diversion be specified by trial court).
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Advocates of giving free play to markets for bulk or raw water
have insisted that the protection of third-party rights signals an
overly rigid legal regime. 179 They argue that if such restraints were
removed, private property rights would have their due and markets
would flourish. This is incorrect. Area-of-origin statutes, regulations prohibiting the export of water, 180 interfere with private property and prevent market transactions. Protections of third-party
rights prevent market-generated externalities from destroying the
property rights of third parties. Rather than government intervention that prevents or distorts markets, such protections are the minimum necessary to assure that each person's property rights are
transferred only through markets. 8 1
Judge Richard Posner has fully described why such third-party
rights must be protected if society is to ensure that water is used
efficiently under a system that relies on markets as primary water
management tools:
If the effects of return-flow were ignored, many water
transfers would reduce overall value. Suppose A's water
right is worth $100 to him and $125 to X, [a] municipality;
but whereas A returns one half of the water he diverted to
the stream, where it is used by B, X will return only one
179. See, e.g., ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 156, at 17-29, 114-16; NATIONAL
supranote 131, at 70-84; SMITH, supra note 156, at 10-15, 24-25;
WAHL, supra note 170, at 147-91; David P. Jones, Meeting Idaho's Water Needs Through
the Water Right Transfer Process: A Callfor Legislative Reform, 38 IDAHO L. R~v. 213
(2001) (revealing trend in Idaho towards increasing scrutiny of transfer process);
Kaiser, supra note 131, at 214, 247-50, 260; Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons from the Development of Western Water Law for Emerging Water Markets: Common Law vs. CentralPlanning, 80 OR. L. REv. 861 (2001) (examining development of water law in Western
U.S.); Olen Paul Matthews et al., Marketing Western Water: Can a Process Based Geographic Information System Improve Reallocation Decisions?,41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329
(2001) (analyzing process-oriented GIS approach); Andrew P. Tauriainen, California's Evolving Water Law: The Water Rights Protection and Expedited Short-Term Water
Transfer Act of 1999, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 411 (2000) (describing effects of Chapter 938 upon California water law); Young, supra note 170, at 1144-45, 1149.
180. See generally Anderson, supra note 133, § 14.04(d)(2); Robirda Lyon,
Comment, The County of OriginDoctrine: Insufficient as a Legal Right in California,12
RESEARCH COUNCIL,

SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REN,. 133 (2002) (noting potential ineffectiveness of Area of

Origin Doctrine defense); Ralph W. Johnson, The Area of Origin and a Columbia
River Diversion,46 WASH. L. REv. 245 (1971); LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Charles W.
Howe, Area-of-Origin Protectionin Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 527 (1986); Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of
Water Transfers on RuralAreas: A Response to Shupe, Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 13 (1990); Gary C. Woodard & Elizabeth Checchio, The Legal Framework for Water Transfers in Arizona, 31 ARz. L. REv. 721 (1989).
181. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARiz. L. REv. 61
(2005) (incorporating insights of institutional economics into legal theory).
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fourth of the water it obtains from A, and at a point far
below B, where it will be appropriated by D. And suppose
B would not sell his right to A's return flow for less than
$50, while D would sell his right to the municipality's return flow for $10. Given these facts, to let A sell his water
right to X because it is worth more to X than to A would
be inefficient, for the total value of the water in its new
uses (X and D's)-$135-is less than in its old uses (A and
B's)-$150. The law deals with this problem by requiring
the parties to show that the transfer will not injure other
users. In practice this means that A and X in our example,
in order to complete their transaction, would have to compensate B for the loss of A's return flow; they would not do
so; and the transaction would fall through, as under our
18 2
assumptions it should.
If a transfer increases return flows, the arrangements necessary to
protect each water right are even more complex.1 83 When one factors in the probability that much of the water sought to be transferred in the West was acquired through a Federal reclamation
project, the complexities become greater still.184 Nor can one over-

look the structuring of access to water facilities owned by yet some1 85
one else not participating in the basic transaction.
Because of such concerns, small-scale transfers of water rights
among farmers or ranchers, all of whom are making similar uses at
more or less the same place, are the only ones that regularly occur
under appropriative rights without state intervention. 186 Smallscale, like-kind transactions are unlikely to affect third parties. The
only large-scale transactions involving a significant change in the
place or manner of use that can be achieved purely by market trans182. See POSNER, supra note 128, § 3.11, at 87-88. See also Jeffrey L. Jordan,
Externalities, Water Prices, and Water Transfers, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N
1007 (1999).
183. See POSNER, supra note 128, § 3.11, at 88.
184. See WAHL, supra note 170; Reed Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights
and Public Authority over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 363 (1997)
(emphasizing difficulty in deciphering property rights in water acquired via Federal reclamation project).
185. See Timothy Quinn, Wheeling Provisions of the Model Water Transfer Act, 4
HASTINGS

W.-Nw.J.

ENVTL.

L. & POL'Y 83 (1996) (noting importance of water facil-

ity owners in water transfer transactions).
186. See supra note 170; see also Asif M. Zaman, Brian Davidson, & Hector M.
Malano, Temporary Water Trading Trends in Northern Victoria, Australia, 7 WATER
POL'V 429 (2005) (noting only small-scale, like-kind water transfers transpire on
regular basis without state involvement).
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actions would be when the transferor is the last possible beneficial
water user.
Among other matters, distributive equity must be considered
along with economic efficiency.' 8 7 The issue is central even though
economists often are uncomfortable discussing it.188 In the nineteenth century, a time of limited and ineffective government in the
United States, a transition from a private property system (which
had the effect of freezing uses rather than creating a market) to a
common property system at least introduced a measure of flexibility
into the use of water, promoting social and economic development.1i 9 The transition from private property to common property
also, whether intended or not, imposed a massive, if haphazard,
wealth redistribution. 190 The same would be true if the law were to
rely primarily on markets to allocate water to particular uses.
Generally, under markets, wealth is transferred from the
poorest users of water (who hold the smallest water rights or no
water right at all, and in either case are unattractive to potential
buyers) to the wealthier members of society-those who can afford
187. See generally BEYOND

ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS

(Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatismand the
Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2102-14, 2129-41 (1996);Jeanne M.
Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and Economics Theory, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1993); Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2229 (1996); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 75
WASH. L. REV. 329 (1998); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of
Property, 39 TULSA L. REV. 663 (2004); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes,
A Unified Theory ofJustice: The Integration of Fairnessinto Efficiency, 75 WASH. L. REv.
249 (1998) (focusing on critical socioeconomic role that water transfer plays).
188. See RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 14-16 (9th ed. 1990); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 119-27 (2d ed.
1989); Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory: Thickening the "Self' in "SelfInterest" 22J. LAw & Soc'v 50 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal
System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
667 (1994); Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., An Integration of Equity and Efficiency, 75 WASH. L.
REV. 349 (1998) (describing tendency of economists to only focus on economic
inefficiency of water transfer transactions while downplaying socioeconomic impact of such transactions).
189. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 17801860, at 33-42 (1977) (describing advent of reasonable use rule over natural flow
rule).
190. See id. at 33-34. See generally Lily N. Chinn, Can the Market Be Fair and
Efficient? An EnvironmentalJustice Critique of Emissions Trading,26 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 80
(1999); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property Rights in the
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998); Symposium, A Recipe
for Effecting Institutional Change to Achieve Privatization, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 295-465
(1995) (determining effects of transformation from private property to common
property system).
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to buy water rights but need no longer worry about compensating
the small water users who lose their expected return flows. 191 Today, the transition to a common property system seems much less
prudent as the demands for water outstrip supplies, creating a real
risk of the tragedy of the commons for those parts of the United
States that follow traditional riparian rights. 192 Given the probable
one
regressive distributive effects on the allocation of water rights,
93
ought to be wary of any such transition in today's world.1
One recent attempt to make a market for water pulls together
these several strands of thought. The attempt, during a five-year
drought at the turn of the millennium, to transfer Colorado River
water from several large irrigation districts in southern California to
large cities in southern California has been used as proof that markets will work. 194 Careful examination of what happened, however,
suggests otherwise.
The city of San Diego sought to obtain 800,000 acre-feet of
95
water from the Imperial Valley Irrigation District (The District).
That was about eleven percent of the District's allocation from the
Colorado River. The District board voted 3-2 in December 2002 to
reject the proffered contract.' 96 The federal and state governments
191. See

CARL J. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT:

PRIVATIZATION, WATER MAR-

KETS, AND THE STATE IN CHILE (1st ed. 1998); CARL J. BAUER, THE SIREN SONG:
CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2004); ROBERT R.
HEARNE & K. WILLIAM EASTER, WATER ALLOCATION AND WATER MARKETS: AN ANAL-

YSIS OF GAINS-FROM-TRADE IN CHILE 40 (1995); see also CarlJ. Bauer, Slippery Property
Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the NeoliberalModel in Chile, 1981-1995, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 109 (1998); K. William Easter & Robert R. Hearne, Water Markets and

Decentralized Water Resources Management: InternationalProblems and Opportunities,31
WATER RESOURCES BULL. 9 (1995); Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12
Amiz.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183 (1995) (considering adverse impact of water markets
on society's poorest members).
192. For further discussion of potential negative consequences of modern day
property system transformation, see supra notes 82-102.
193. See Schorr, supra note 113 (noting adverse effects of modern day common property system transformation on allocation of water rights).

194. See, e.g., Megan Hennessy, Comment, Colorado River Water Rights: Property
Rights in Transition, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1661, 1672-75 (2004); Seth Hettena, Western
Farmers Turn to Water Sales, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), Dec. 29, 2003, at 2A
(discussing attempt to transfer water from large southern California irrigation dis-

tricts to large southern California cities).
195. See Michael Gardner, San Diego County Needs More Water, Imperial Valley
Has a Lot, SAN DIGEO UN.-TRB., Dec. 8, 2002, at Al. One acre-foot of water-the
amount necessary to cover one acre of land to a depth of one foot-is 325,851
gallons.
196. See Michael Gardner, Imperial Rejects Water Transfer, SAN DIEGO UN.-TRIB.,

Dec. 10, 2002, at Al; Seth Hettena, Water War? Tiny Imperial County Says No to Big
Neighbors, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELE., Dec. 12, 2002, at A17; Dean E. Murphy, California Vote Threatens Deal on Colorado River, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at A24; Daniel
Wood, In Water Transfer, Farmers v. Sprawl, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Dec. 11, 2002, at 1.
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immediately put enormous pressure on the District. 197 In particular, Secretary of the Interior Gail Norton cut the District's allocation of water by eleven percent, to be restored only if it was sold
under the terms of the rejected contract. 198 The Irrigation District
continued to resist the deal, even initiating an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit against Secretary Norton. 19 9 The California legislature
2 00
also threatened to intervene to take the water from the District.
The District gave in and "accepted" the contract by another 3-2
vote. 20 ' This was not a market transaction. It was government administration of the use of water masquerading as a market.
The Imperial Irrigation District-San Diego transaction also
demonstrates the distributed effects and other externalities that
characterize so-called water markets. The transaction provided an
infusion of cash for the owners of the farms served by the District,
but provided nothing but unemployment for farm workers on those
farms as land was idled in order to free up water to transfer to San
197. See Jose Luis Jimenez, Feds Seek Imperial Water Cut; UnprecedentedDecision

Concludes Valley Farmers Waste Water, SAN

DIEGO UN.-TRIB.,

July 4, 2003, at Al; Mar-

garet Kitz, The New Water War: US. vs. California,CAL. J., Apr., 2003, at 40-44, 46;
Seth Hymon, Surplus Water Losing Appeal, MWD Suspects: Agency Might Bow Out of
Talks to Regain Use of Colorado River Supplies that JustAren't Flowing, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2003, § 2, at 8; Don Thompson, Sides Submerged in Water Talks: Blaming Each
Otherfor Loss of Colorado River Surplus, Agencies Call for State Funding,LONG BEACH

PRESS

TELE.,

Jan. 22, 2003, at A15 (highlighting Imperial Valley Irrigation District

Board's initial decision to reject contract that would send water from District to
behind city of San Diego).
198. SeeJimenez, supra note 197; Kitz, supra note 197 (noting Secretary of
Interior, Gail Norton's threat to decrease Imperial Valley Irrigation District's allocation of water).
199, See Michael Gardner, Interior's Powers Upheld: Ruling Could Settle Colorado
RiverFight, SAN DIEGO UN.-TRIB., Apr. 19, 2003, at A3; Jose LuisJiminez,Judge Backs
Imperial District, Restores Water Supply: Injunction Overrules Cutback by Interior, SAN
DIEGO UN.-TRIB., Mar. 19, 2003, at Al; Dean E. Murphy, Judge's Ruling on Water
Gives Imperial Valley Farmers Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at A20; James
Sterngold, U.S. Says Imperial Valley May Lose More Water, S.F. CHRON.,Jan. 17, 2003,
at A2 (discussing Imperial Valley Irrigation District's resistance to water contract).
200. See Bettye Wells Miller, Water Worries 1ntensify Dispute: Pressure on an Imperial County District and a Planned Bill Have Farmers Concerned, PREssENTERPRSE (Riverside, CA), Jan. 23, 2003, at Al (commenting on state legislature's response to
Imperial Valley Irrigation District's response).
201. See Michael Gardner, Imperial OKs Historic Water Deak 3-2 Vote Should
Mean a San Diego Supply for Decades to Come, SAN DIEGO UN.-TRIB., Oct. 3, 2003, at
Al; see also Seth Hettena, Four Water Agencies FinalizeAccord, CONTRA COSTA TIMES
(Walnut Creek, CA), Oct. 11, 2003, at 4; Shaun McKinnon, Interior to Sign Colorado
River Water Deal: Arizona Winner in Lengthy Battle, ARIz. REP., Oct. 16, 2003, at B12;
Dean E. Murphy, Thirsty U.S. Cities Win Larger Share of Colorado River, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2003, at Al; Thirstfor Colorado River Water Is Shifted: Pact Ends Debate, Redirects Usagefrom Farms to California Cities, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at A16 (noting
Imperial Valley Irrigation District's eventual acceptance of contract San Diego
offered).
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Diego. 20 2 The transaction also promised disaster to the ecosystems
that depend on return flow from the farms.

203

And, despite the

offered cash, most landowners felt they were being shortchanged, 20 4 which led to the District's initial refusal to consent to
the transaction. Taking into account the effects on farm workers
about to lose their jobs, once again it transferred wealth from the
20 5
poor to the rich.
In contrast to the intense struggle with the Imperial Irrigation
District over the "sale" of water to San Diego, the Coachella Valley
Irrigation District reached a relatively quiet settlement to sell part
of its water. 20 6 This is hardly a better example of a true market,
however, both in terms of process and in terms of effects. After all,
with the Imperial Valley Irrigation District's experience in front of
their eyes, a vote by the directors of the Coachella District hardly
20 7
proves that the transaction was, in a real sense, voluntary.
C.

Regulated Riparianism

In the second half of the twentieth century, Hawaii and about
half of the states east of Kansas City enacted administrative permit
systems to replace traditional riparian rights. 20

Rather than im-

porting appropriative rights into the east, these states developed a
202. See Michael Gardner, Farm Workers Fear Water Sale Could Cost Jobs, SAN Di-

EGO UN.-TRIB., Dec. 8, 2002, at A10; Aaron Ralph, Comment, Drain the Water and
Pull the Plug on One Community So that Another Community Can Brim over with Economic
Development: Is It Any of the State Water Resources Control Board's Business?, 34 McGEORGE L. REV. 903 (2003) (highlighting disproportionate benefits of Imperial
Valley Irrigation District-San Diego water transaction).
203. See Kathryn Balint, Appellate Court Rules Imperial Valley Has Serious Air Pollution Problem, SAN DIEGO UN.-TRiB., Oct. 1, 2003, at A4; Michael Gardner, Time
Runs Short on Salton Sea: Decaying Desert Lake Is Key to Water Pact, SAN DIEGO UN.TRIB., Dec. 30, 2002, at Al; Snub for the Salton Sea, L.A. TIMIES, Feb. 15, 2003, at 26;
Benjamin Spillman, Salton Sea Caretakers in Tug-of-War with State over Water Inflow,
DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.),Jan. 23, 2005, at B2 (emphasizing environmental
consequences of Imperial Valley Irrigation District-San Diego water transaction).
204. See Harry Cline, Peace Elusive Along the Colorado River, WESTERN FARM
PRESS (Cal.) Dec. 6, 2003, at 9 (noting landowners are discontent with Imperial
Valley Irrigation District-San Diego water transaction).
205. See Elaine Robbins, Winning the Water Wars: In the West, They Say that Water
Flows Uphill to Money, 69 PLANNING no. 6, at 69 (2003) (highlighting disproportionate benefits of Imperial Valley Irrigation District-San Diego water transaction).
206. See Last CaliforniaDistrict Approves Pact on Colorado River Water, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2003, at A8 (describing another California district's approval to sell its
water).
207. See Michael Gardner, River Entitlement Cut in Region Is Affecting Coachella
Valley First,SAN DIEGO UN.-TRLB., May 10, 2003, at A3 (questioning voluntary nature
of Coachella Valley Irrigation District's approval to sell its water).
208. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 100 (discussing use of administrative
permit systems).
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system of water administration based on riparian principles that is
best described as a system of public property.20 9 This system has
210
come to be called "regulated riparianism."
Because the transition from limited regulatory intervention to
more or less comprehensive regulation occurred incrementally,
rather than from a conscious design to revolutionize the system of
water rights, there is some disagreement about when a true regulated riparian system actually emerged. Even today, there are debates about whether certain states have, in fact, crossed the line
from relying largely on unregulated common law riparian rights to
a regulated riparian system. In addition to the eighteen states that
apply regulated riparianism to surface waters and groundwater in
the state,2 1 1 four states apply a regulated riparian system to ground209. See Dellapenna, supra note 30, § 6.01(b) (1) (addressing public property
systems); Dellapenna, supra note 82, at 337-42, 365-77 (describing public property
option).
210. See City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102, 1155-57
(Conn. 2002) (determining whether regulated riparian rights have superseded
common law rights); see alsoJOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 80-92 (3d ed. 2000). See generally Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian
Model Water Code: Blueprint for Twenty First Century Water Management, 25 WM. &
MARY L. & POL'Y REv. 113 (2000) (focusing on riparian systems in thirty-one eastern states); Lee P. Breckenridge, MaintainingInstream Flow and ProtectingAquatic
Habitat: Promise and Perils on the Path to Regulated Riparianism, 106 W. VA. L. REv.
595 (2004) (focusing on emerging regulatory systems in riparian jurisdictions and
their effect on aquatic organisms); Jungreis, supra note 102, at 371 (describing
regulated riparian hybrid); Douglas W. MacDougal, Private Hopes and Public Values
in the "Reasonable-BeneficialUse" of Hawaii's Water: Is Balance Possible?, 18 U. HAw. L.
REv. 1, 18 (1996) (listing major reasons Hawaii and eastern states adopted administrative regulation); Judith V. Royster, Winter in the East: TribalReserved Water Rights
to Water in Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 169, 188-91

(2000) (discussing change from common law riparianism to regulated riparianism); A. Dan Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 69, 90-91 (2000) (describing need to redefine land and
water rights to include landscape conservation component).
211. See ALA. CODE §§ 9-IOB-1 to 9-10B-30 (LexisNexis 2001) (enabling surface and groundwater regulation); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-201 to 15-22-622 (Lex-

isNexis 2003) (declaring purpose of permitting and regulating water); CONN. GEN.
§§ 22a-365 to 22a-380 (1995 & Supp. 2005) (addressing need for water permitting); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6031 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (stating need to
plan and develop water uses in light of population growth); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 373.012-.202 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), 373.203-.619 (West 2005) (containing
STAT.

state water source management plan); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-20 to 12-5-31, 12-5-43

to 12-5-53, 12-5-90 to 12-5-107 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (describing water controlling
permit requirements); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 174C-1 to 174C-101 (1993 & Supp.
2004) (declaring need to plan for water conservation); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 455B.261-.281 (West 2004) (enacting water permitting procedures); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 151.010-.600, 151.990 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2004) (applying
regulated riparianism); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 5-501 to 5-514 (1996 & Supp.
2004) (establishing permitting to protect ground and surface water resources);
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 21G, §§ 1-19 (2002) (enacting water management through
permits); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.001-.315 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) (establish-
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water without applying it to surface waters. 2 12 The Delaware Basin
Water Commission and the Susquehanna Basin Water Commission
also operated a limited sort of regulated riparian system in the parts
of states to which they apply, especially within parts of Pennsyl213
vania.
Little has been written about regulated riparianism, and most
of what has been written on the topic describes regulated riparian
statutes as a set of minor modifications superimposed on the riparian rights that the authors saw as the remaining core of the law in
these states. 2 14 Others have construed regulated riparian statutes as
inartfully drafted appropriative fights statutes. 2 15 Few commentators realized that regulated riparianism represents a truly different
ing permitting process for groundwater and surface water); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 513-1 to 51-3-55 (1999 & 2004 Supp.) (stating legislative policy that groundwater and
surface water be used reasonably and beneficially); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:IA-1 to
58:1A-17 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005) (containing permit requirements for surface
and ground water); N.Y. ENrLv.
CONSERV. LAw §§ 15-1501 to 15-1529 (McKinney
1997 & Supp. 2005) (describing ground and surface water permitting); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215.11-.22K (LexisNexis 2003) (providing framework for groundwater and surface water permitting); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to 62.1-253 (LexisNexis 2001) (explaining circumstances requiring permit); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30.18, 30.28, 30.292-.298, (West 1998 & Supp. 2004), 281.35 (West 2004)
(describing permitting process for groundwater and surface water).
212. But see Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to 45-655 (West 2003 & Supp.
2004) (focusing on Arizona's dependence on groundwater basins for water supply); see 525 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 45/145/7 (West 2004); see also NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 46-656.01 to 46-656.67, 46-675 to 46-692 (2003) (detailing ground water
protection act); see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-10 to 49-5-150 (West 2004) (enacting
groundwater regulating use and reporting act); see generallyJoseph W. Dellapenna,
The Regulated RiparianApproach to Groundwater,in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch.
23 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003) (describing state approaches to
groundwater permitting).
213. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, § 815.101 (compacting effective
riparian system); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, § 820.1 (compacting
comprehensive water management plan). SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, The Delaware
and Susquehanna River Basins, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RiGHTs, at 137 (Robert E.
Beck ed., replacement vol. 1994) (detailing Delaware and Susquehanna Compacts).
214. See, e.g., Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water
Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821, 899-901 (1995) (describing statutory, i.e., regulated riparian-permit systems, as hastily enacted and not fitting with other bureaucratic systems in state or province of enactment, as well as being of little
consequence and not robust enough to deal with any true crisis). See also Richard
C. Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East: A Programfor Reform, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 547, 554-76 (1983) (describing eastern states' efforts to supplement or replace common law rules with statutory water allocation system); Peter N. Davis,
Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedentsfor Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REv. 429,
465-70 (1982) (discussing form Missouri water permit statute should take).
215. See, e.g., FrankJ. Trelease, A Water Management Law for Arkansas,6 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 369 (1983) (proposing self-titled water management law in light
of systems unacceptable for Arkansas' needs).
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model of water law, although that is lately being recognized. 2 16 The
following summary description of regulated riparianism is based on
the common core of principles found in the actual regulated riparian statutes and articulated in the Regulated Riparian Model
Water Code (MODEL CODE) of the American Society of Civil Engineers (the Society) .217 The MODEL CODE is an official standard of

the Society, meaning that the Society endorses it as the proper approach to water law in states operating within the riparian tradition.
No state has a system precisely like the one described here or in the
although several come fairly close. 2 18 Most references here are to the MODEL CODE and to the relevant chapter of
MODEL CODE,

the treatise WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS. 2 19 Both include detailed
commentaries explaining the various provisions and exhaustive references to actual regulated riparian statutes and are the most convenient sources for understanding the structure and application of
regulated riparianism.
Regulated riparianism's most central requirement is that water
is not to be withdrawn from a water source without a time-limited
permit from the state where the withdrawal occurs. 2 20 There are
some exemptions, generally for small users. 2 21 A few of these exemptions are large. Georgia and Kentucky, at the extreme, exempt

216. See, e.g.,Jungreis, supra note 102, at 371 (explaining that regulated riparianism combines eastern and western water doctrines and adds commands and controls regulation).
217. SeeTHE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE: FINAL REPORT OF THE
WATER LAws COMMITTEE OF THE WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

W. Dellapenna ed.,
of water regulation).
Dan Tarlock, who is inclined more favorably toward appropriative rights, has described the MODEL CODE as the "gold standard" for regulated riparianism. See
Tarlock, supra note 10, at 535.
218. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-.202 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), 373.203-.619
(West 2005) (enacting law closely tracking MODEL CODE); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-520 to 12-5-31, 12-5-43 to 12-5-53, 12-5-90 to 12-5-107 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (containing provisions similar to MODEL CODE); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.001-.315 (West
1997 & Supp. 2005) (establishing regulatory system close to MODEL CODE); MISS.
CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to 51-3-55 (1999 & Supp. 2004) (enacting policy similar to
Model Code); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11-.22K (LexisNexis 2003) (containing
close statutory approximation of MODEL CODE).
219. See Dellapenna, supra note 100 (providing information on regulated riparianism).
220. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 6R-1-01; Dellapenna, supra note 100,
§§ 9.03(a)-(a)(2) (explaining permit requirements).
221. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 6R-1-02 (setting levels for exemption
where users whose withdrawals do not exceed specific amounts are not required to
obtain permit); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (3) (providing examples of
statutes with preferences exempting some users from permit requirement).
DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS (Joseph
2003) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (describing unique system
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virtually all agricultural uses from the permit process. 222 Given that
in both states, the substantial majority of the withdrawals of water
for consumptive uses are for agricultural uses, such an exemption is
self-defeating.

223

Under regulated riparianism, the permit determines the water
right, not the riparian nature of the use. 2 24 The new system con-

nects to riparian rights through the criterion by which permit appli225
cations are judged-whether the proposed use is "reasonable."
Yet, the criterion of "reasonable use" is applied very differently
from common law. Moreover, an administering agency decides
whether a use is reasonable before the use begins, both in terms of
general social policy and in terms of the effects of the proposed use
on other permitted uses. 226 Unlike traditional riparian rights, water
users are able to know, for the duration of the permit, whether
their use is reasonable; they cannot be caught unaware by a judicial
222. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-31(a)(3), 12-5-31(b)(3), 12-5-92(5.1), 12-5105(a) (2001) (containing broad farm exemptions); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.140
(LexisNexis 2001) (exempting agricultural purposes from permit requirement).
223. See Dellapenna, Southeastern States, supra note 144, at 70-73 (describing
failings of Georgia water statutes in relationship to farming); John L. Fortuna,
Note, Water Rights, Public Resources, and Private Commodities: Examining the Current
and Future Law Governing the Allocation of Georgia Water, 38 GA. L. REv. 1009, 1015,
1035-36 (2004) (explaining Georgia statutes exempt many "farm uses" from permit
requirement).
224. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 2R-1-01, -02 (stating obligation to
make only reasonable use of water and prohibition of use not based on location);
Dellapenna, supra note 100, §§ 9.03(a), 9.03(a) (2) (describing sometimes arbitrary
nature of riparian rules).
225. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 2R-2-20, 6R-3-01, -02 (describing criteria of reasonable use, specifically standards of permit dictate that use must be
reasonable and how to determine whether use is reasonable); Dellapenna, supra
note 100, §§ 9.03 (b)-(b) (3) (describing role of reasonableness and substitutes for
concept). Some jurisdictions would substitute the terms "beneficial," "reasonablebeneficial," or "equitable" for the term "reasonable." See generally McDougal, supra,
note 210 (using term "reasonable-beneficial"); Kevin E. Regan, Balancing Public
Water Supply and Adverse Environmental Impacts Under Florida Water Law: From Water
Wars Towards Adaptive Management, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 123 (2003)
(describing reasonable and beneficial use standards); Saarinen & Lynne, supra
note 64 (giving history and evolution of reasonable use doctrine).
226. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 6R-2-01 to 6R-2-08, 6R-3-02, 6R-3-05
(specifying contents of application, including basis of water right such as criteria
for determining reasonable use); Dellapenna, supra note 100, §§ 9.03(a) (5) (A),
9.03(b) (1)-(b) (3) (describing typical statutory requirements for issuing permit).
In most states, the majority of permits appear to be awarded almost automatically,
that is, without careful and extensive examination. See Alexander Lane, N.J. Too
Generous with Water, CriticsSay-State Permitsfor Big Users Rose Last Year, STAR LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Sept. 28, 2003, at 21 (describing extent of water-allocation permits
to gold courses, commercial complexes and growing communities); Gary D. Lynne
et al., Water PermittingBehavior Under the 1972 Florida Water Resources Act, 67 LAND
USE ECON.

340, 345-46 (1991).
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decision wiping out their investment without compensation. 227 The
permit allows a potential investor to gauge whether the investment
can be profitable and the proper scale of investment.
The administering agency responsibility is to impose condi2 28
tions on permits to protect other lawful uses and public values.
Regulated riparian statutes often contain preferences for certain
classes of uses. 2 29 Temporal priority, on the other hand, has a
strictly limited role in the permit process. 230 And uses on non-riparian land are no longer unreasonable per se, often, one of the principle motives for enacting a regulated riparian statute was to
authorize the use of water on non-riparian land. 23 1 Finally, the ad-

ministering agency usually issues permits only for a period of time,
ranging from three to twenty years. 23 2 When a permit expires, the
administering agency reexamines the reasonableness of the use, introducing a desirable flexibility into the development, use and pro-

227. See, e.g., Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 891-92 (Cal.
1967) (granting defendant water district summary judgment in case where plaintiffs with rock and gravel business had interruption in business due to upstream
dam defendant had built); see Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955) (granting injunctive relief to owner of lakeside cabin operation; defendant was pumping
water from lake for rice crop). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
228. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 7R-1-01 (detailing permit terms and
conditions); Dellapenna, supra note 100, §§ 9.03(a) (5) (A), 9.05 - 9.05(c) (considering public use and public interest planning in light of permit process); see, e.g.,
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445-72 (Haw. 2002), remanded
afterfurther proceedings, 93 P.3d 643 (Haw. 2004) (stating water code does not supplant public trust doctrine). See generally McDougal, supra note 210, at 3 (describing balance of permitting plus public values); Regan, supra note 225, at 162
(suggesting regulators establish guidelines based on reasonable and beneficial use
factors).
229. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 6R-1-02, 6R-3-04 (indicating that
small withdrawals are exempt from permit requirements and detailing preferences
among water rights); Dellapenna, supra note 100, §§ 9.03(a) (3), 9.05(c) (describing various state priority schedules).
230. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 6R-1-03, 6R-3-02 (setting levels of
exemption from permit requirements and detailing preferences among water
rights); See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (b) (3) (explaining role of temporal priorities in regulated riparianism).
231. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 2R-1-02 (indicating there is no prohibition based on location of water use); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (2)
(explaining common law versus regulated riparian takes on authorizing water use
on non-riparian land).
232. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 7R-1-02 (specifying duration of permits); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (4) (explaining reasoning for limiting
permit to certain time period).
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tection of water resources. 233 The MODEL
23 4
the permit duration.

CODE sets

twenty years as

Regulated riparian statutes contain a full panoply of enforcement mechanisms, including actions for public and private damages, administrative orders, civil penalties, criminal penalties and
injunctions. 2 35 The administering agency is charged to provide
hearings and is subject to judicial review for its decisions. 236 Crimi-

nal prosecutions are rare under regulated riparian statutes, and
most enforcement is achieved through civil or administrative reme233. See Freyfogle, supra note 170, at 515 (suggesting agency limits maintain
maximum social flexibility).
234. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 7R-1-02. For an analysis of the merits
of possible durations for the permits, see MALONEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 173-77
(explaining possible results of various permit lengths); Ausness, supra note 214, at
584-87 (suggesting differences between various permit duration limitations); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a)(4) (comparing time periods chosen by some
states to twenty year span of MODEL CODE).
235. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 4R-3-03 to 5R4-04 (stating specific
rules such as duty to cooperate, special water management areas and judicial review of regulations including agency's authority to inspect place of permit, give
notice of violation, order permit holders to cease or restore, issue injunctions);
Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (5) (B) (describing various enforcement options).
236. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 5R-1-01 to 5R-1-03 (hearings), 5R-301 to 5R-3-03 (judicial review). Courts have generally been very deferential in reviewing decisions under regulated riparian statutes. See, e.g., City of Fort Smith v.
River Valley Regional Water Dist., 37 S.W.3d 631, 639 (Ark. 2001) (explaining
water district's rights and duties under water act); Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Charlotte City, 774 So. 2d 903, 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (deferring to
DEP); Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d
594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Florida statute establishing what constitutes agency rule that exceeds delegated legislative authority); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) (affirming in part and reversing in part case
involving Commission on Water Resource Management); Oxon Hill Recreation
Club, Inc. v. Water Res. Admin., 375 A.2d 567, 569 (Md. 1977) (limiting review to
whether Department of Natural Resources acted with illegality, arbitrariness or unreasonableness); Urban Council on Mobility v. Minn. Dep't of Nat. Res., 289
N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 1980) (using substantial evidence test to review administrative decision); In re City of White Bear Lake, 247 N.W.2d 901, 906-07 (Minn.
1976) (holding that commissioner's decision to deny city's application to encroach
upon bay of lake in order to construct roadway not arbitrary and capricious); In re
Erickson Lake, 392 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding commissioner's refusal to grant unrestricted permit for development of lake not clearly
erroneous); In re Commr's Order Denying Permit Application, 527 N.W.2d 173,
177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding commissioner's denial of permit for water
supply project not untimely or impermissible); In re N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 417 A.2d 1095, 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980), cert. denied, 427 A.2d 539
(N.J. 1980) (holding that town opposing water diversion project approved by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Water Policy and Supply Council was not
deprived of due process rights through approval procedure used by EPA and
Council); High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 276
S.E.2d 472, 474 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (using "whole record" test to affirm agency
declaratory ruling regarding river basin classification).
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dies. The MODEL CODE also includes provisions designed to support alternative dispute resolution and the administrative resolution of disputes among permit holders237-provisions not gener238
ally found in actual regulated riparian statutes.
Traditional water law, whether riparian rights or appropriative
rights, has treated water as a "free good," that is, a good provided
without charge to all with lawful access to the good. 239 As economists and others have been arguing for decades, treating water as a
"free good" creates a perverse incentive to waste water, or at least
not to consider the social costs of consuming water. 240 Users pay
fees to the administering agency for regulated riparian permits, but
such fees cannot be considered payment for the water itself. Statutes setting a uniform charge regardless of the nature of the use or
the amount of water used clearly are not charging for the water as
such. And even when the fee is variable, however, it is set according

237. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 5R-2-01 to 5R-2-03 (detailing dispute
resolution requirements); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(c) (noting regulated
riparian statutes say little about dispute resolution).
238. For the few regulated riparian statutes providing for such remedies, see
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6005(b) (2) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (providing violation remedy procedure); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-42(a) (2001) (providing procedure for handling violators who discharge waste in way that prevents water from meeting purity
standards); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 174C-10, -11 (Supp. 2004) (granting commission
statewide authority to hear water disputes). See generally Anne Deister, Environmental Mediation Strategiesfor Success: Summaries of Two Consensus-Based Cases-Florida's
Growth Management Act Legislation and the Los Angeles River Watershed Task Force, 32
URBAN LAw. 73, 74-81 (2000) (describing examples of Florida environmental cases
using alternative dispute resolution); Sarah Inderbitzin et al., The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in NaturalResources Damage Assessment, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'y Ruv. 1 (1995) (discussing mediation techniques for natural resource damage assessments); Janet Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers Happy-For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 259 (1996)
(describing overall success of Umatilla Basin project mediation).
239. See Anderson & Snyder, supra note 156, at 114-16; Kaiser & Binion, supra
note 171, at 169-73 (describing water rights acquisition methods).
240. See DIANA C. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER (1986);Jfrgen G.

Backhaus, The Law and Economics of Environmental Taxation: When Should the Ecotax
Kick in?, 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 117, 117-18 (1999) (questioning impact of imposing environmental taxes in effort to slow undesirable affects on environment);
Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-DividendHypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 221
(1998) (analyzing distortional effect of pollution taxation); Howard Gensler, The
Economics of Pollution Taxes, 10 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 1 (1994) (giving economic theory
behind effluent taxes); Robert Benjamin Naeser & Lynne Lewis Bennett, The Cost
of Noncompliance: The Economic Value of Water in the Middle Arkansas River Valley, 38
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 445 (1998) (estimating value of water used in irrigating crops in
Colorado and Kansas).
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to the presumed ability of the user to pay, rather than according to
24 1
the value that could be created through water use.

The MODEL CODE breaks new ground regarding fees, requiring
that water use fees be set to compensate the state for the reasonable
value of the water consumed. 24 2 The MODEL CODE fees for water
use are designed to provide economic incentives for the efficient
use of water in a setting where markets are not likely to be effec24 4
tive. 243 The administering agency can vary such fees by class,
with the fees going into the general funds of the state. 245 Any surviving fiscal preferences should be seen as a form of distributive
equity. The result, however, will be the continued use of water for
low-valued uses rather than its transfer to higher valued uses that, in
extreme cases, might find no water available for their needs.
Regulated riparian systems are based on a state's police power
to regulate the withdrawal and use of water in order to protect the
public health, safety and welfare. 24 6 The political, and perhaps the
legal repercussions of such radical interference with traditional
water rights has led state legislatures to exempt from the permit
241. See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (5) (C) (explaining how to finance permit process).
242. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 4R-1-08 (explaining how water use
fees vary according to purpose and quantity of use).
243. See id. (noting water use fees are to be charged to every person using
water under permit issued pursuant to Regulated Riparian Model Water Code).
For further discussion about the likely ineffectiveness of markets, see supra notes
153-207 and accompanying text.
244. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 4R-1-08(3). Any surviving preferences should be based on relative inability to pay, as a form of distributive equity.
See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a)(5)(C). See also Frank E. Matthews &
Gabriel E. Nieto, Florida Water Policy: A Twenty-Five Year Mid-Course Correction, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 365, 373-75 (1998) (discussing budget oversight process in
Florida).
245. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 4R-1-08(4) (stating purpose and
quantity use water fees are to be paid to state).
246. See State v. Braun, 378 A.2d 640, 644-45 (Del. 1977) (holding owner was
not entitled to compensation when water taken for public purposes); Village of
Tequesta v.Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 672 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S.
965 (1979) (holding diversion of water was not "taking" and owner did not have
constitutionally protected right in water); Iowa Natural Res. Council v. Van Zee,
158 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 1968); Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minnesota Dep't of
Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Minn. 1980) (holding city pumping water from
company's site was not unconstitutional taking); Herschman v. State, 225 N.W.2d
841 (Minn. 1975) (holding state did not lose its police power when landowner
previously registered title to land beneath lake); State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699
(Minn. 1963); Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734 (Wis. 1974). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.04(a) (holding statute requiring permit for water diversion was not unconstitutional taking); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property
Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990) (discussing how
changed economy will impact American water law and property rights); Tarlock,
supra note 10, at 510 (discussing common law legacy of water law in eastern states).
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requirement users who were using water when the new statute came
into effect. 24 7 This introduces a significant temporal element. The
MODEL CODE follows a more sophisticated solution to the problem

by guaranteeing existing users an initial permit subject to renewal
on the same basis as any other permit, limiting the temporal preference to a single permit cycle. 248 Existing users who refuse to apply

for a permit within a short period of time can then conclusively be
2 49
presumed to have abandoned their claim.

Regulated riparian statutes include extensive provisions for
protecting or promoting the public interest in water resources, beginning with long-term planning.25 0 A major purpose of the regulated riparian permit system is to assure the gathering of necessary
information to enable planning to occur on an on-going basis. The
MODEL CODE would establish a particularly comprehensive statewide data system. 25 1 Using this system, the administering agency
can incorporate permit conditions based on its plans.2 5 2 Regulated

riparian statutes also protect or promote the public interest by
protecting minimum flows and levels, 253 assuring water for public

247. See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (3) (noting riparian states have
history of preferences for different private users of water).
248. See MODEL CODE, supranote 217, § 6R-1-03; Dellapenna, supra note 100,
§ 9.03(b) (3) (listing contents of permit application). This approach originated in
the MODEL CODE put together by Frank Maloney, Dick Ausness and Scott Morris in
1972. See Maloney et al., supra note 65, at 182-85 (discussing permit application
and usage).
249. Cf United States y. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (discussing cutting off
mining claims); In re Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985)
(cutting off riparian rights in favor of appropriative rights).
250. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 4R-2-01 to 4R-2-04 (outlining planning responsibilities); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.05(a) (describing long-term
riparian statute planning).
251. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 4R-2-03 (explaining statewide data
system, in which state agency gathers and maintains info regarding availability, distribution, quality and use of waters).
252. See id. § 7R-1-01 (describing terms and conditions that must be included
in each permit).
253. See id. §§ 3R-2-01 to 3R-2-05 (describing protected minimum levels); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.05(b) (explaining protection of instream flows historically has been central feature of riparian statutes); Lee P. Breckenridge, Can Fish
Own Water?: Envisioning Nonhuman Property in Ecosystems, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 293 (2005) (discussing suggestions for understanding and shaping property regimes to deal with modern science); Breckenridge, supra note 210 (using Massachusetts as example of how water is managed in riparian jurisdiction).
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uses 254 and providing measures for water emergencies. 255 Some
regulated riparian statutes authorize yet other kinds of conditions
designed to protect aesthetic or ecological concerns. For example,
the MODEL CODE requires the protection of the biological, chemical
and physical integrity of the water source, defined in terms of fed25 6
eral and other relevant legal standards.
Regulated riparianism has not solved every problem relating to
water allocation and management. In particular, problems exist relating to the security of investment and to the transfer of water to
higher valued uses. Investment security could be a problem if the
permit duration is too short, leaving too little time for the initial
cost of a project to be recovered before permit expiration. 2 57 Additional uncertainty arises from the authority of an administering
agency to modify permits to respond to water shortages or water
emergencies. 2 58 As to the transfer of water rights, regulated riparian statutes usually make no express provision for such transfers
259
between potential users.

The

MODEL CODE

charges the administering agency to en-

courage market transfers of water. 260 Given the problems with markets for water, however, it is unlikely that a market will develop to
facilitate the transfer of water under regulated riparian permits to
higher valued uses. 26 1 Indeed, one can see regulated riparian stat254. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 2R-2-15 (defining "public interest" as
"any interest in waters of State... shared by the people of the State as a whole and
capable of protection or regulation by law"); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.05(c)
(providing explanations regarding public uses and how most extreme preference
would be to completely exempt public uses from obtaining permits).
255. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 7R-3-01 (outlining restrictions that
apply during water shortages or emergencies); Dellapenna, supra note 100,
§ 9.05(d) (illustrating how to cope with water emergencies).
256. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 3R-2-01 to 3R-2-05 (describing protected minimum flows or levels standards and effects of water shortages).
257. See Maloney et al., supra note 65, at 175-77 (discussing lengthening of
permit duration); Ausness, supra note 214, at 568, 584-87 (discussing permit duration); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a)(4) (noting permits expire periodically); Gould, supra note 126, at 109-10 (discussing short term and variable term
permits).
258. See Ausness, supra note 214, at 581-84 (discussing allocation schemes during water shortages); Dellapenna, supra note 100, §§ 9.03(d), 9.05(d) (discussing
transferring water rights and planning for emergency situations); Gould, supra
note 126, at 110, 117-21 (discussing shortage responses).
259. See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(d) (outlining multiple scenarios
in which water rights can or cannot be transferred).
260. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 1R-1-07, 7R-2-01 to 7R-2-04, 7R-3-05,
9R-1-01 to 9R-1-02 (explaining modification of permits).
261. See supra notes 153-207 and accompanying text (discussing likely ineffectiveness of markets). Regarding the likely dearth of markets for water permits
under regulated riparianism, see Gould, supra note 126, at 110.
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utes as enacted to enable administering agencies to force such
transfers through the non-renewal of permits. 2 62 The agencies ac-

tually free up less water through the renewal process than theory
suggests because the agencies prefer to tighten conditions on existing uses rather than to deny renewals outright. 263 Non-renewal
of permits probably will remain an infrequent and cumbersome device unless a state is willing to create a good deal of investment
insecurity.
In the actual operation of regulated riparian systems, however,
neither investment insecurities nor transfer problems seem to have
caused much actual difficulty. 264 Such evidence suggests that the

real problem is the opposite-agencies fail to exercise their managerial powers sufficiently rather than too aggressively. 2 65 Authorities in eastern states generally consult major water users in
responding to water emergencies rather than making their own expert determinations regarding the matter.266 States can minimize
these dangers by limiting their regulated riparian system only to
certain water basins or other areas of the state where the competition for water is most intense, avoiding the imposition of these uncertainties and the other costs of the regulatory system on parts of
the state where it is unnecessary. 267 The MODEL CODE provides a
262. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, § 7R-1-02 (stating state agency evaluates

application for approval of modification).
263. See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (4) nn.428-32 (citing several
states' riparian statutes).
264. See id. § 9.03(a) (4) (suggesting there is no empirical evidence to prove
inhibition on investment in water).
265. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 226 (reporting increases in authorized water
withdrawals during major drought).
266. See, e.g., Avril, supra note 97; Avril & Colimore, supra note 97; Bouwer,
supra note 97; Dahlburg, supra note 97; Lesley-Ann Dupigny-Giroux, Towards Characterizingand Planningfor Drought in Vermont, 37J. Am. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 505

(2001); Lane, supra note 226.
267. See ALA. CODE §§ 9-10B-1 to 9-1OB-30 (LexisNexis 2001) (outlining Ala-

bama's Water Resources Act); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-22-201 to 15-22-622 (LexisNexis 2003) (stating water allocation and use, use requirements, artesian wells,
water development generally and Arkansas Water Resources Development Act of
1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.012-.202 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (outlining Florida's State Water Resource Plan); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.203-.619 (West 2005)
(discussing Florida's permitted consumptive water use, well regulation, surface
water storage and management, finance and taxation and miscellaneous provisions); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 174C-1 to 174C-101 (1993 & Supp. 2004) (outlining
Hawaii's state water code); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 21G, §§ 1-19 (2002) (outlining
Massachusetts Water Management Act); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to 62.1-253
(LexisNexis 2001) (indicating Virginia's surface water management areas). See generally Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East:
Consideringa Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENrL. L.J. 255, 284-85 (1990) (discussing shortcomings of standard comprehensive permit system); Robert H.
Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L. Rv. 93, 98
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middle-of-the-road model for such an arrangement compared to
the extremes of a completely centralized or completely decentralized system found in the various actual regulated riparian
statutes.

268

Is such a system worth its costs? 269 There are significant financial costs in administering a regulated riparian system as well as the
costs of the tendency of government bureaucracies to replicate
their errors throughout the state. Yet, given the increasing failure
of traditional riparian rights (a common property system) to cope
with the needs of modern societies, 2 70 and the similarly troubling
performance of appropriative rights (as close to a private property
system as we are likely to achieve),271 there seems little choice but
to move to a regulated riparian system (a public property system).
Regulated riparianism is not a perfect system, but it would appear
to be the best suited to the cultural, economic, legal, hydrologic
and political settings of eastern states such as Pennsylvania.

(1989) [hereinafter Abrams, Replacing Riparianism] (discussing drawbacks of eastern permits systems); Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.03(a) (1) (indicating waters
subject to permit requirements).
268. See MODEL CODE, supra note 217, §§ 4R-4-01 to 4R-4-08 (describing special water managements area needs and plans for creation and implementation);
see also Charles R. Fletcher, Florida Water Resource Development: A Call for Statewide
Leadership, 18J. LAND USE & ENvri. L. 113 (2002).
269. See Dellapenna, supra note 100, § 9.05(a) (5) (D) (seeking best model for
regulated riparianism would be); see also Abrams, Replacing Riparianism,supra note

267, at 257-70 (describing legislation in eastern states enacting comprehensive permit statutes); Butler, supra note 43 (discussing water reform as reflection of balanced values); Davis, supra note 214, at 453-56 (discussing whether existing uses
should be preferred over new uses in permit statute drafting); Dellapenna, supra
note 82, at 367-70, 375-77 (discussing costs of public versus private property rights
systems); Freyfogle, supra note 170, at 510-19 (discussing merits of government
limited model rights); Gary D. Lynne & Jeffrey Burkhardt, The Evolution of Water
Institutions in Florida: A NeoinstitutionalistPerspective, 24J. ECON. IssUEs 1059 (1990);
Rose, supra note 81 (discussing "inherently public property" as "outside" government public and private property); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990) (comparing
evolution of property rights generally and riparian rights during industrialization);
Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator, and the Goddamn
Bureaucrat,14 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 207 (1974) (offering critique of Maloney, Ausness
and Scott's Model Water Code); David W. Yoskowitz, Markets: Mechanisms, Institutions, and the Future of Water, 13 ENVrL. L. REP. 10237 (2001).
270. See supra notes 46-102 and accompanying text (applying riparian rights
to particular disputes).
271. See supra notes 111-52 and accompanying text (applying appropriative
rights to water allocation).
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GROUNDWATER IN PENNSYLVANIA

Two hundred years ago, people used little groundwater and
knew even less about how to find it or how it behaved. 2 72 The best
technique they had for deciding where to dig a well was a divining
rod. 2 73 A successful well might provide water for a brief period or

for centuries. No one seemed to know why, when or under what
conditions a well would produce water. The idea of a body of law
addressing the management of groundwater was, at that time, literally unthinkable. With groundwater now providing the drinking
water for about fifty percent of the population of the United States
(about 140 million Americans),274 and with about two-thirds of all
groundwater pumped being used for irrigation (contributing about
one-third of all water used in irrigated agriculture),275 governments
cannot remain indifferent to the ways in which groundwater is
used.

276

The creation of the common law of groundwater in England
and the United States in the nineteenth century was steeped in ignorance. 277 The twentieth century saw the growth of the science of
groundwater and the emergence of technologies for the greater ex272. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Legal Classifications, in 3 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 19.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003) (discussing groundwater law).

273. See generally GEORGE APPLEGATE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO DOWSING: THE
DEFINITrVE GUIDE TO FINDING UNDERGROUND WATER (2002); RICHARD WEBSTER,
THE ART OF DOWSING (2001); EvAN ZARTMAN VOGT & RAY HARTMAN, WATER WITCHING USA (2000) (explaining how to find water before current techniques).

274. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Physical and Social Bases of Quantitative
GroundwaterLaw, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.01, at 18-1 (Robert E. Beck
ed., replacement vol. 2003) (providing statistics on groundwater in Unites States).
See generally U.S. Geological Survey, Groundwater Atlas of the United States (1996).
275. See Wayne Soley et al., Estimated Use of Water in the United States in

1995, U.S. Geological Survey Circular no. 1200 at 19 (figure 7) (1998) (showing
relative proportion of water source and disposition, as well as general distribution
of water from source to disposition).
276. See generally PAUL E. HARDISTy & ECE OZDEMIRO6LU, THE ECONOMICS OF
GROUNDWATER REMEDIATION AND PROTECTION (2004)

(applying economic cost-

benefit analysis to questions of protected and reclaimed groundwater from
pollution).
277. See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861) (describing knowledge regarding groundwater as "occult"), overruled on other grounds by Cline v.
American Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984) (adopting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS). See also Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 54 (1856); Greenleaf v.
Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1856) (noting laws of underground water cannot
be regulated); Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Chain. 1843) (discussing
landowner rights to underground water). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 272,
§ 19.02 (describing common law for groundwater); Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E.
Archer, A Comparison of State GroundwaterLaws, 30 TULSA L.J. 123, 125-29 (1994)
(discussing relationship between surface and groundwater).
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ploitation of groundwater. 2 78 This led to an explosive growth in the
extractions of groundwater as well as its increasing contamination. 279 By the time we learned a good deal more about ground-

water, unfortunately, it was too late for the legal community to deal
easily with the information, if only because courts treated the early
groundwater precedents as rules of property. Courts, therefore,
often were reluctant to change the rules to bring them into conformity with later scientific knowledge. The law relating to ground280
water thus long remained relatively undeveloped and confused.
As Mark Goodman, commenting on the state of groundwater law in
Arizona in 1978, summed it up, "[t]he history of [groundwater law]
is as thrilling as ignorance, inertia, and timidity could have made
it."2

81

278. See, e.g., Oscar E. Meinzer, Outline of Ground-Water Hydrology with Definitions, U.S. Geological Survey no. 494 (1923) (discussing hydrology of groundwater); HARoLD E.

THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION OF GROUND WATER:

THE PRESENT GROUND-WATER SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

A

SURVEY OF

(1st ed. 1951) (ex-

amining aspects of Nation's groundwater needing more research); Steve Schafer,
Economics and Finance, in FLAT WATER: A HISTORY OF NEBRASKA AND ITS WATER 113
(Robert D. Kuzelka & Charles A. Flowerday eds., 1993) (discussing Nebraska water
technology). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 274, §§ 18.02, 18.04. For a contemporary summary of the relevant knowledge, see PAUL F. HUDAK, PRINCIPLES OF
HYDROGEOLOGY (3d ed. 2005).
279. See THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY (2002) (explaining groundwater pumping devastation); ROBERTJ. GLENNON, WATER FoLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE
FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS (2003) (explaining intricacies of water resources); see Boldt-Van Rooy supra note 165 (discussing how states should react to
expansion of bottled water industry through legislation to protect fresh water resources); Todd A. Frampton, Comment, PrivateWell Owners Pay Price as MTBE Contamination Exposes the Lack of GroundwaterProtection in Federal and New York Law, 18
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 135 (2000) (discussing inadequacies of existing law concerning protection of groundwater); Janet S. Herman et al., GroundwaterEcosystems and
the Service of Water Purification,20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 479 (2001) (discussing protection of groundwater efforts as structure for water restoration efforts); Pamela Matson, Environmental Challengesfor the Twenty-First Century: Interacting Challenges and
Integrative Solutions, 27 ECOL. L.Q. 1179 (2001) (discussing challenges of viewing
environmental concerns as whole rather than separately); Henry L. Stephens, Jr.,
Common Law Remedies for Petroleum Contaminationof Soil and Groundwaterin Kentucky,
14J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (1998) (exploring statutory and common law
remedies available to property owners whose property has been contaminated by
petroleum leaks from nearby property); KeynenJ. Wall, Knowing When to Say Wen
to Hog Waste: Do State Lagoon Regulations Protect Ground Water in Kansas?, 11 KAN. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 113 (2001) (examining whether current water protection regulation adequately protects ground water in Kansas).
280. See Dellapenna, supra note 272, §§ 19.05-19.05(b) (4) (discussing history
of groundwater law).

281. See Mark N. Goodman, Current GroundwaterLaw in Arizona, 1978 Axiz. ST.
L. J. 205, 224 (1978) (discussing Arizona's new Groundwater Act and problems
which arise in application). One is also reminded of the remark by journalist Peter
Passell that "California's water system might have been invented by a Soviet bu-
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Foremost among the scientific realities to which most existing
common law legal regimes still have not responded is that groundwater and surface waters are just two stages of a single hydrologic
cycle. 28

2

What is the one today will be the other tomorrow. To

scientists, the relationship of groundwater to surface waters is
merely a well-known phenomenon, 28 3 but to lawyers and jurists
"[t]he implications with respect to water rights in these physically
interconnected sources of supply" are profound. 28 4 Followed rigor-

reaucrat on an LSD trip." Peter Passell, Economic Scene: Greening California, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1991, at D2.
282. See, e.g., Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005)
(holding groundwater not subject to surface water priorities, at least absent proof
of unreasonable harm to surface water user); see also Hubbard v. State, 936 P.2d 27
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding Ecology's decision to approve water permits discretionary);J. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Groundwater Implications for Nebraska, 83 NEB. L. REv. 541 (2004) (explaining use of tributary
groundwater needs to be integrated into surface water law); Scott D. Anderson,
Comment, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts
Approach, 26 B.C. ENVT'L AlT. L. Riv. 339 (1999) (arguing current regulation is

unable to prevent further nonpoint pollution to waterways); Sherry A. Caloia et al.,
The Water Rights Determinationand AdministrationAct of 1969: A Western Slope Perspective on the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 39 (1999) (examining effect

of legislation and other related laws on water resource allocation); Dellapenna,
supra note 274, § 18.03(a) (discussing ground and surface water relationship);
Robert Jerome Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona's
Futile Effort to Separate Groundwaterfrom Surface Water, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 567 (1994)

(analyzing 1993 court rulings against current hydrogeologic principles); Richard
G. Hildreth, Water Law at the Crossroads,14J. ENVrL. L. & LrrIG. 1, 2-5 (1999) (editor's forward) (discussing water management); Jeffrie Minier, Note, Conjunctive
Management of Stream-Aquifer Water Rights: The Hubbard Decision, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651 (1998) (discussing Hubbard court finding that any hydraulic connection is significant regardless of effect of groundwater withdrawal on stream);
Stephen D. Mossman, "Whiskey is for Drinkin' but Water is for Fightin' About" A
FirsthandAccount of Nebraska's Integrated Management of Ground and Surface Water Debate and the Passage of L.B. 108, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 67 (1996) (analyzing how
Nebraska will unify divergent water laws); Lain Strawn, Comment, The Last Gasp:
The Conflict Over Management of Replacement Water in the South PlatteRiver Basin, 75 U.
COLO. L. REv. 597 (2004) (presenting current conflict between decreed and undecreed appropriators as well as conflict between administrators of water rights);
Benjamin R. Vance, Comment, Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to
GroundwaterProtection,30 U.S.F. L. REv. 803 (1996) (discussing inadequate regulation and proposing solution to problems).
283. See, e.g., Brian G. Katz et al., Interactions Between Ground Water and Surface
Water in the Suwanee River Basin, Florida,33 J. Am.WATER RESOURCES ASSOC. 1237
(1997) (examining ground and surface water relationship in Florida); Janusz
Niemczynowicz, Present Challenges in Water Management: A Need to See Connections
and Interactions,25 WATER INT'L 139 (2000).
284. See WELLS HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS

LAWS

IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN

59 (Harold Ellis &J. Peter DeBraal eds., U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1972-77); see
also Frank Foley, Water and the Laws of Nature, 5 KAN. L. REv. 492 (1957) (discussing
water knowledge developed in this century).
STATES
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ously to its logical conclusion, this reality makes many existing legal
regimes dysfunctional.

28

5

Eventually, some courts began to redefine the relations of parties concerning their interests in groundwater consistently with
scientific opinion, 286 despite resistance to change the law for allocating groundwater because it is more complex than for surface
water. Today, different states apply one of five forms of law for the
allocation of groundwater. Three of the bodies of law for groundwater correspond rather closely to the three bodies of law applied
to surface water sources: the reasonable use rule (corresponding rather closely to traditional riparian rights) ,287 appropriative

285. See, e.g., Postema v. Pollution Control Hearing Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 741
(Wash. 2000) (explaining that hydraulic continuity of aquifer with stream having
unmet minimum flows is not sole basis for denial of groundwater application); see
Herman Bouwer & Thomas Maddock, III, Making Sense of the Interaction Between
Groundwater and Streamflow: Lessons for Water Masters and Adjudicators, 6 RIVERS 19
(1997); Dellapenna, supra note 274, § 18.03(a) (discussing quantitative groundwater law); Dellapenna, supra note 272, § 19.07; Eric Garner & Steven Anderson,
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Reviews the Mojave River Adjudication, 2 U. DENY. WATER
L. REv. 26, 27-32 (1998) (discussing California ground water law);Jason M. Miller,
Note, W4hen Equity is Unfair-Upholding Long-Standing Principles in California Water
Law in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 991 (2001)
(examining soundness of Mojave court decision); Eric Opiela, Comment, The Rule
of Capture in Texas: An Outdated PrincipleBeyond Its Time, 6 U. DENY. WATER L. REV.
87 (2002) (reviewing scope of Texas regulation, evaluating state's reluctance to
change legislature and proposing change to legislation); Veronica A. Sperling &
David M. Brown, Outline of Colorado GroundwaterLaw, 1 U. DEN'. WATER L. REV.
275, 286-94 (1998) (analyzing Colorado Ground Water Management Act); Rebecca Sugarman, The Mojave Basin Physical Solution: It's a Good Idea, But Is It Good
Law?, 6 HAsTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 307 (2000) (arguing court should
provide guidance for water rights holders).
286. See Maerz v. United States Steel Corp., 323 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982) (holding landowner may use right to extract underground water up to point
extraction interferes with similar right of neighbor); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (holding landowner has absolute rights to water
under his land and may withdraw any quantity of that water, even if result is draining water from neighbor's land, with liability); Cline v. American Aggregates Corp.,
474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984) (holding proprietor of land is not liable for drawing
water from his land unless: (1) withdrawal causes unreasonable harm to neighbor;
(2) withdrawal exceeds proprietor's reasonable share; and (3) withdrawal causes
harm to person entitled to use of water); State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217
N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974) (holding English or common law rule is no longer
controlling).
287. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Reasonable Use Rule, in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RiGHTS, ch. 22 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003) (introducing
reasonable use rule).
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rights288 and regulated riparianism. 289 The other two bodies sur-

vive from the earlier era of little information and limited exploitation: the absolute dominion rule 290 and correlative rights. 29 1 Such
survivals continue in part at least because the expense and difficulty

of obtaining the relevant knowledge impedes the full rationalization of groundwater law. 2 92 Moreover, these differing bodies of

groundwater law do not exhibit a straightforward correlation to patterns of supply and demand as do the bodies of water allocation law
for surface waters, as is readily seen by comparing the body of law as
applied to surface waters within a state to the radically different
293
body of law applied in the same state to groundwater.
Under the absolute dominion rule, sometimes called the rule
of capture, a landowner can extract water almost without limit for
any purpose and use it on or off the land above the aquifer of its
withdrawal. 2 94 Under appropriative rights, a landowner can extract
288. See Beck et al., supra note 104, § 11.06 (providing background information on appropriative rights); Goplerud, supra note 117, § 16.03 (discussing appropriative rights); Goplerud, supra note 118, §§ 17.04, 17.05 (discussing rights within
appropriative rights system).
289. SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, The Regulated RiparianApproach to Groundwater,
in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 23 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol.

2003) (discussing regulated riparianism).
290. SeeJoseph W. Dellapenna, The Absolute Dominion Rule, in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, ch. 20 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003) (defining and
discussing absolute dominion rule and era in which it was used).
291. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Correlative Rights Today, in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, ch. 21 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003) (explaining
correlative rights).
292. See Dellapenna, supra note 291, § 21.03(b) (3); Dellapenna, supra note
287, § 22.04(d).
293. For example, Arizona applies appropriative rights to surface waters and
regulated riparianism to groundwater. California and Nebraska apply a dual appropriative-riparian system (with appropriative rights predominating) to surface
waters and correlative rights to groundwater. Illinois and South Carolina apply
traditional riparian rights to surface waters and regulated riparianism to groundwater. Indiana and Maine apply traditional riparian rights to surface waters and
the absolute dominion rule to groundwater. Texas applies a dual appropriative-riparian system (with appropriative rights predominating) to surface waters
and the absolute dominion rule to groundwater.
294. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Brazil Coal Co., 452 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1983) (holding
lost water that percolates underground in hidden recesses and with no known
channel or course is part of land under which it is found); Maddocks v. Giles, 728
A.2d 150 (Me. 1999) (stating absolute dominion rule is based on premise that
underground water is absolute property of landowner); Sipriano v. Great Springs
Waters of America, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999) (stating rule of capture provides
that, absent malice or willful taste, landowners have right to take all water under
their land and use as they see fit); South Plains Lamesa RR., Ltd. v. High Plains
Underground Water Conserv. Dist., 52 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing rights of landowners to groundwater); see Dellapenna, supra note 290, § 20.05
(explaining absolute dominion rule); Opiela, supra note 285.
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groundwater consistent with a water right defined by amount, time,
place, purpose and temporal priority of the use.2 9 5 Under the correlative rights rule, landowners must share the yield of an aquifer in
proportion to the extent of their land holdings. 296 Under the reasonable use rule, the groundwater may be used reasonably and only
on the land from beneath which it had been withdrawn, thus limit29 7
ing the property rights in the aquifer of the overlying owners.
For the regulated riparian approach, anyone can withdraw water
pursuant to a time-limited state permit authorizing uses that an ad298
ministering agency determines are reasonable.
Pennsylvania law follows the reasonable use rule by two different routes. Underground streams, seldom found in Pennsylvania,
are subject to riparian rights. 299 The same is true as to artesian basins.3 00 While a few early cases held that percolating groundwater is
subject to the rule of absolute dominion,3 0 1 even the earliest cases
espousing the absolute dominion theory recognized the possibility

295. See Robert E. Beck et al., Elements of PriorAppropriation,in 2 WATERS AND
ch. 12 (Robert E. Beck ed., replacement vol. 2003) (examining
appropriative rights).
296. See, e.g., Tehachapi-Cummings Cty. Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 924-25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (stating where there is insufficient
water for reasonable needs of all overlying owners, solution of problem must be
based on numerous factors, including: (1) amount of water available; (2) extent
of ownership of basin; and (3) nature of projected use); Prather v. Eisenmann, 261
N.W.2d 766, 771 (Neb. 1978) (holding all domestic users of water are entitled to
fair share of water in aquifer); see Dellapenna, supra note 291, § 21.03(a) (discussing uses under correlative rights rule).
297. See, e.g., Nolte v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 256 N.W.2d 482 (Wis.
1978) (holding landowners will not be liable for interference with another's use of
water absent unreasonable harm). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 287,
§ 22.04(d) (describing reasonable use rule).
298. See Village of Tequesta v. JupiterInlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979) (providing examples of uses administering agencies
deem reasonable); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000), aff d
in part, vacated in part 94 Haw. 97 (2004); Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minn. Dep't of
Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1981) (holding Department of Natural Resources Commissioner's denial of order granting city permit to pump water from
site twelve miles from city was not unconstitutional taking); In re Application U-2,
413 N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 1987). See generally Dellapenna, supra note 289, §§ 23.03(b)(b) (7) (describing uses under regulated riparianism).
299. For examples of cases demonstrating underground streams are subject
to riparian rights see, Ross Common Water Co. v. Blue Mt. Consol. Water Co., 77 A. 446
(Pa. 1910); Brown v. Kistler, 42 A. 885 (Pa. 1899).
300. See Moeller v. Metzger, 491 A.2d 1356, 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (reversing compulsory nonsuit after plaintiff commenced equity action to enjoin flooding
from artesian well).
301. See, e.g., Appeal of Lybe, 106 Pa. 626 (1884) (holding percolating
groundwater subject to absolute domain).
WATER RIGHTS,
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of liability based on malice or neglect. 3 2 Pennsylvania courts now
follow the reasonable use rule.3 0 3 Deciding either the unreasona-

bleness of a use or a claim of negligent withdrawal involves a court
weighing competing modes of activity against each other. The withdrawal of percolating groundwater for use off the overlying land,
however, is never a lawful use of the water. 30 4 This rule is similar to
the rule that non-riparian uses of water taken from defined surface
30 5
water bodies are per se unreasonable.
Of the five bodies of law, the reasonable use rule is the most
constricting because water use is limited to the premises overlying
the aquifer from which the water is withdrawn and is also limited to
use for beneficial purposes incidental to the enjoyment of that
land.30 6 Yet, the reasonable use rule, like the absolute dominion

rule, leads to the tragedy of the commons for the same reasons that
the reasonable use rule as applied to surface waters leads to such a
tragedy: because each owner is free to decide when, where, how
and how much to use without regard to the effects on others sharing the resource, and the only rational course of conduct as the
resource begins to be exhausted is to increase one's exploitation
until the resource is gone.3 0 7 The correlative rights rule in theory
302. For cases demonstrating property owner is not liable for damage to another's wells or springs absent malice or negligence, see Rothrauff v. Sinking
Spring Water Co., 14 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1940); Williams v. Ladew, 29 A. 54, 55 (Pa.
1894); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Wheafley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528
(1855).
303. For cases demonstrating that reasonable use rule is controlling in Pennsylvania, see Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403, 407 (Pa. 1956); Zimmerman v. Union Paving Co., 6 A.2d 901 (Pa. 1939); Miller v. C.P. Centers, Inc., 483
A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). See generally Matt Berkowitz, Comment, Bottling the
Water Bottlers: A Critique of Pennsylvania Groundwater Law, 22 TEMPLE ENVrL. L. &
TECH. J. 235, 245-47 (2004) (deciphering government agencies and bodies of law
controlling Pennsylvania's groundwater).
304. See Hatfield Twp. v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 168 A.2d 333, 333-34 (Pa.
1961) (holding no absolute right exists to appropriate percolating waters for unlawful purposes).
305. See Dellapenna, supra note 21, § 7.02(d) (1) (explaining rule regarding
non-riparian uses of water from defined surface).
306. For case examples of the restrictive nature of reasonable use rule, see,
e.g., Farmers Inv. Co. v. Bettwy, 558 P.2d 14 (Ariz. 1976); United Fuel Gas Co. v.
Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1953); City of Blue Springs v. Central Dev. Ass'n,
831 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton,
412 A.2d 1064, 1071-72, 1076-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 427 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). See generally Dellapenna,
supra note 287, § 22.04(a); Dellapenna, supra note 290, § 20.08; Tarlock, supra
note 10, at 515-16 (discussing common law legacy as applied to land).
307. For further discussion of the reasonable use rule and absolute dominion
rule, see supranotes 82-102 and accompanying text. For one take on the problems
arising for groundwater from a related application of the reasonable use rule, see
Wendy B. Davis, Reasonable Use has Become the Common Enemy: An Overview of the
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requires limiting the extraction of water from an aquifer to a proportionate share of the safe yield of the aquifer; it would appear to
avoid this problem, yet the practical difficulties in determining that
safe yield often produces the same results. 308 Switching to appropriative rights would involve a different, but predictable set of
problems. 30 9 Here, too, the best alternative to existing law, if an
310
alternative is sought, would appear to be regulated riparianism.
V.

REGULATION AND PLANNING IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania basically relies on traditional common law regimes centering on the reasonableness of competing uses to allocate both surface water and groundwater. These regimes no longer
work well in light of the growing competition for water within the
Commonwealth. Pennsylvania already has taken some small steps
in the direction of greater government involvement in making
water allocation decisions. In Pennsylvania, public regulation of
water use exists, but is very limited. Somewhat more developed regulation exists in slightly over half of the state through the interstate
mechanisms of the Delaware River Basin Commission and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission. Additionally, the Commonwealth has not undertaken a comprehensive statewide planning
process that could lead to more developed public regulation of
water uses within the Commonwealth. The following subsections
briefly analyze each of these developments.
A.

Public Regulation of Water Use in Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania has enacted significant regulations for pollution
and other activities relating to water in order to meet applicable
federal standards, including: the Clean Stream Act; 3 1 1 the Dam
Safety and Encroachments Act;3 12 the Flood Plain Management
StandardsApplied to Diffused Surface Water and the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 ALB.
L. ENvrL. OUTLOOKJ. 1 (2004). On the consequences of adhering to the absolute
dominion rule, see Opeila, supra note 285; Tarlock, supra note 10, at 514-15.
308. See Dellapenna, supra note 291, § 21.03(b) (3); Dellapenna supra note
287, § 22.04(d).
309. For further discussion highlighting appropriative rights problems, see
supra notes 111-52 and accompanying text.

310. For further discussion noting advantages of regulated riparianism, see
supra notes 208-71 and accompanying text.
311. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 691.1-.1001 (West 1997).
312. See 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 693.1-.27 (West 1997).
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Act;3 13 and the Pennsylvania Safe Drinking Water Act. 314 None of
these, however, directly addresses the allocation of water to particular uses. They affect water allocation decisions indirectly, if at all,
through altering the costs of particular uses and thus either encouraging or discouraging their location at particular places within the
Commonwealth.
Pennsylvania has enacted some regulatory requirements for
certain aspects of water usage in the Commonwealth. Thus, since
1923 the Commonwealth has regulated public utilities for generating power or for providing water supplies.3 15 Public water systems
must obtain a permit from the Department of Environmental Pro316
tection (DEP) authorizing reliance on a particular supply source.
DEP is to issue a permit only upon finding that the proposed use
will not interfere with existing uses or future needs by another public water supply agency and will not interfere with navigation, jeop317
ardize public safety or otherwise injure the Commonwealth.
DEP can impose conditions necessary to protect the environment.3 18 The permit itself does not confer a legal right to withdraw
water from a water source; a public water system still must obtain a
water right pursuant to common law riparian rights for surface
sources and pursuant to the reasonable use theory for groundwater,
31 9
or by purchasing or condemning affected private rights.
Public water supply systems must also obtain a certificate of
convenience from the Public Utility Commission (the Commis-

313. See id. §§ 679.101-.601.
314. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.1-.17 (West 2003); see also Wilbar Realty, Inc.
v. Dep't. of Envtl. Resources, 663 A.2d 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), appeal denied,
674 A.2d 1079 (Pa. 1995) (upholding Environmental Hearing Board's penalties
for violations of Safe Drinking Water Act).
315. See 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 591-641 (West 1997) (regulating water supplies
through various legislative acts).
316. See id. § 636 (requiring permit for acquisition of water rights by public

water supply entity).
317. See id. § 637 (authorizing Water and Power Resources Board to investi-

gate any new water source or supply).
318. See Butler Twp. Area Water & Sewer Auth. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 664
A.2d 185 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), appealdenied, 686 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1996) (upholding requirements imposed by Environmental Hearing Board on township as part

of permit process).
319. See 32 PA.

STAT. ANN. § 639 (West 1997) (authorizing public water supply
agencies to exercise eminent domain as authorized in their permit); Commonwealth v. Phila. Suburban Water Co., 581 A.2d 984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal
denied, 593 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1991) (holding that acquisition of water, as opposed to

water rights, by public water supply agency is defined by specific water purchase
agreement).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol17/iss1/1
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sion) .320 The authority of the Commission to regulate public water
systems extends even to suppliers of bottled water, but, as with all
public water supply systems, only if they serve at least twenty-five
customers on a regular basis year-round. 321 The Commission is to
determine the need for, and the rates to be charged for, the delivery of water to consumers within the utility's service area. 322 Moreover, a public water supply utility cannot discontinue service without
approval by the Commission. 323 Generally, Pennsylvania courts de324
fer to the expertise of the Commission in its proceedings.
Several court decisions delineate the relationships between
public water systems. Perhaps the most important decision upholds
the authority of the Commission to require a permit for one public
water system to purchase water from another public water systemwater that had already been subject to the permit process when the
selling system obtained a permit to use the water for public supply.3 25 The Commission, which is authorized to impose conditions
necessary to improve water quality and otherwise necessary to provide for the public convenience, does not have the authority to require one public supply system to sell water in bulk to another
public supply system when the proposed seller is unwilling to enter
3 26
into the agreement.
320. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1301-1328 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) (regulating reasonable rates for public utilities).
321. See id. §§ 501-13 (authorizing commission to enforce public utility regulations). See Peter Daniels Realty, Inc. v. Northern Equity Investors Group, Inc.,
829 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding private utilities are not required to
have permits); Warwick Water Works, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 699 A.2d 770
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (upholding commission's actions in denying application to
abandon water service); Commonwealth v. Rannels, 610 A.2d 513 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992) (requiring bottled water system to serve at least twenty-five year-round residents to be considered community water system). See generally Berkowitz, supra
note 303.
322. See Sharp v. Conewago Twp., 833 A.2d 297 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 847 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 2004) (upholding amendatory ordinance governing
connection to water systems of homes); Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n, Inc. v. Pine
Twp., 794 A.2d 435 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (vacating assessment for benefit conferred by water line to tract of land).
323. See Warwick Water Works, 699 A.2d at 770 (describing process for discontinuing service).
324. See Shenanago Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 686
A.2d 910 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 698 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1997) (dismissing complaint against Public Utility Commission for seeking payment from
water utility for cost of constructing water facilities in township).
325. See Commonwealth v. Phila. Suburban Water Co., 581 A.2d 984 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1991).
326. See Rheems Water Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 620 A.2d 609 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993) (requiring grandfathered utilities to conform to new standards in Public
Utility Code).
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If a statute specifically defines a service area for a municipal or
other public water authority, no one else may supply water within
that area.3 27 One court enjoined a township water authority against

continuing to deliver water within an established service area of another water utility, but under a provision of the Municipal Authorities Act 328 rather than pursuant to the state's regulatory authority

over public water systems. 3 2 9 Apart from these limited situations,
330
public water supply agencies are free to compete for customers.
In such settings, ordinary principles of contract law apply to disputes that arise between public water supply authorities and their
33 1
customers.
The rates a public water supply system charges must be reasonable and uniform.3 3 2 That requirement does not apply, however, to
sales between public water systems; the two systems are bound only
by the price fixed in their contract as was held in Raccoon Township
v. Aliquippa Municipal Water Authority.3 33 In that particular case, the
court upheld the seller's use of a commodity demand method of
pricing the water as within the contracts' specification of actual
3 34
costs as the basis of the price.
Local governments in Pennsylvania increasingly base their land
use zoning decisions upon the availability of water for the proposed
project, the need to protect water resources from the consequences
of land development or otherwise to assure wise management of

327. See Commonwealth v. Daugherty, 829 A.2d 1273 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)
(holding property owner who had water service turned off for nonpayment did not
violate statute requiring property to be connected to water line); Lower Bucks
Joint Mun. Auth. v. Bristol Twp. Water Auth., 586 A.2d 512 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(allowing water utility to enjoin township's water authority from providing water
service to areas already being serviced).
328. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306A(b) (2) (2000) (repealed 2001).
329. See Lower Bucks Joint Mun. Auth., 586 A.2d 512 (noting state has authority
to regulate public water systems).
330. See Beaver Falls Mun. Auth. v. Mun. Auth. of Conway Borough, 689 A.2d
379 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 704 A.2d 639 (Pa. 1997) (upholding sale of
water not in authority's service area); Highridge Water Auth. v. Lower Indiana
County Mun. Auth., 689 A.2d 374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (upholding increase in
sales by competing water authority despite contract between other water authority
and municipal authority).
331. See Allegheny County v. Moon Twp. Mun. Auth., 671 A.2d 662 (Pa. 1996)
(upholding conveyance of water pollution control system).
332. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2003).
333. 597 A.2d 757 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 606 A.2d 904 (Pa.
1991) (holding rates charged by authority outside of its water service area are not
subject to statutory limitations).
334. See id.
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the waters of the state. 335 Purely state regulations do not always preempt local zoning authority under Pennsylvania law. 33 6 The zoning
decisions must be consistent with the standards established in the
statute delegating zoning authority to local governments. 33 7 Local
governments cannot use their zoning authority to preempt the authority vested in state agencies under, for example, the Clean
33
Streams Law.

B.

8

The Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts

The Delaware River Basin includes parts of Delaware, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. 33 9 This basin contains one of
the largest metropolitan areas in the United States (Philadelphia)
and is close to an even larger metropolitan area (New York City),
along with rural and relatively undeveloped areas. In 1926, New
York City declared its intent to make the Delaware River, to which
335. See Polay v. Bd. of Supervisors of W. Vincent Twp., 752 A.2d 434 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000), appeal denied, 795 A.2d 982 (Pa. 2000) (upholding zoning ordinance that restricted commercial sale of spring water to one part of township); see
also WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Robeson Twp., 863 A.2d 139
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (upholding township's denial of application for subdivision); Fisher v. Viola, 789 A.2d 782 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 806 A.2d
863 (Pa. 2002) (upholding township's zoning ordinances as substantial to community's health, safety, morals and welfare). See generally Berkowitz, supra note 303, at
250-54; John M. Hartzell, Agicultural and Rural Zoning in Pennsylvania: Can You Get
Therefrom Here?, 10 VILL. ENv-rL. L.J. 245 (1999) (examining threats to agriculture
and agricultural zoning in Pennsylvania).
336. See Southdown, Inc. v.Jackson Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 809 A.2d 1059
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (upholding zoning ordinance prohibiting extraction of
natural minerals on land zoned agricultural or residential); Butler Twp. Area Water
Auth. v. Dep't. ofEnvtl. Res., 664 A.2d 185 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), appeal denied, 686
A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1996) (upholding permit condition requiring installation of meters
on water supply lines).
337. See In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718 (Pa. 2003)
(holding agricultural zoning designed to prevent development of property to serve
public interest as "green space" constitutes unlawful reverse spot zoning); C&M
Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2002)
(striking down ordinance of one-acre minimum lot size as not reasonable or substantially related to preserving agricultural land and activities); Caco Three, Inc. v.
Bd. of Supervisors of Huntington Twp., 845 A.2d 991 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004),
appeal denied, 860 A.2d 491 (2004) (reversing township's disapproval of preliminary
land-development plan).
338. See Morris v. South Coventry Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 836 A.2d 1015,
1024-25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003), appeal denied, 860 A.2d. 126 (2004) (upholding
developer's use of land despite complaints regarding treated wastewater).
339. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 213;Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate
Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle over the 'Hooch, 12 NYU
ENVTL. L.J. 828, 840-50 (2005) [hereinafter Dellapenna, The 'Hooch] (outlining development of Delaware Compact). Maryland actually includes a tiny corner of the
basin but has neither sought nor been invited to participate in the compact or
commission.
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the city is not even remotely riparian, its major source of municipal
water.3 40 This set the stage for a long, drawn-out confrontation between the State of New York (the uppermost riparian on the Dela41
ware) and the lower-basin States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
This in turn eventually led to an interstate compact to regulate and
develop the waters of the basins. 342 The success of that compact led
ten years later to a very similar second compact for the Susquehanna River Basin, which includes parts of Maryland, New York and
3 43
Pennsylvania.
While none of Pennsylvania's statutory schemes actually regulates the right to use water as such, Pennsylvania has achieved something like a regulated riparian system through the river basin
commissions created by the Delaware and Susquehanna Compacts.
The two river basin commissions were comprised of representatives
of the participating states and the federal government with comprehensive authority to regulate all obstructions of, withdrawals from,
and discharges into the waters of the respective basins, as well as the
power to plan for and respond to water emergencies.3 44 The commissions thus have the authority to operate a system for regulating
and managing individual withdrawals or diversions of either surface
345
waters or groundwater anywhere in the basin.
The most unusual feature of the two commissions is the congressional consent to the subordination of all new federal projects
in the basins to the planning authority of the commissions. 34 6 As
340. See NEw YORK Crry

BD.

OF WATER SUPPLY, ANNUAL REPORT 5,

104-05

(1927) (setting out results of study of possible sources for increasing water supply
of New York City).
341. See New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954) (authorizing New York
City to divert Delaware River watershed); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336
(1931) (denying NewJersey injunction to prevent New York from diverting water
from Delaware River); see also Dellapenna, The 'Hooch, supra note 339, at 840-41.
342. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102 (discussing conservation agreement by states to protect Delaware River Basin). See generally Dellapenna, The
'Hooch, supra note 339, at 841-45 (discussing background of Delaware Compact).
343. See Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102 (discussing state involvement
with commission). See generally Dellapenna, The 'Hooch, supra note 339, at 849-50
(discussing Delaware Compact as model for Susquehanna Compact).
344. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, arts. 2-4 (discussing organization
powers and duties of commission); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, arts. 2,
6 and 11 (noting organization, flood protection and regulation).
345. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 10 (regulating withdrawals);
Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 11 (noting powers of commission to
regulate withdrawals and diversions of water). See generally Dellapenna, The 'Hooch,
supra note 339, at 845-49 (describing regulatory authority of commission).
346. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 11, § 11.1 (noting intergovernmental relations of federal projects); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102,
art. 12, § 12.1 (discussing rules regarding federal agencies and projects).
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the commissions make their decisions by a simple majority vote, 347
the presence of a voting federal delegate on the Commission does
not avoid the subordination of new federal projects to local control. 348 The Delaware Compact is more protective of federal preroga-

tives than the Susquehanna Compact. In the Delaware Compact, Congress limited federal subordination by requiring a unanimous vote
for certain decisions 349 and by requiring that the federal delegate
approve any comprehensive plan and certain other decisions. 350
No comparable powers are found in the Susquehanna Compact, but
perhaps it was realized that such powers were not necessary: Congress reserved the right in both compacts to amend them without
the consent of the participating states. 35 1 Thus far, Congress has

not attempted to exercise this power. So unusual is the federal subordination in these compacts that they are sometimes described as
a new and different type of arrangement-a "Federal-Interstate
3 52

Compact."

The two compacts created regulatory systems much like any
regulated riparian system with two important limitations. First, the
need for a permit to withdraw or divert water only applies in "protected areas"-areas where demands upon water create a shortage
or interfere with the respective commissions' comprehensive plans
for the basin. 353 Second, the compacts delegate the authority to
issue permits to those states with a permit system for withdrawals or
347. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 2, § 2.5 (describing voting
power of commission); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 2, § 2.5 (noting
three of four members must vote for action).
348. See, e.g., R.C. ALBERT, DAMMING THE DELAWARE: THE RISE AND FALL OF

TocKs ISLAND DAM (1st ed. 1987).
349. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 3, § 3.3 (requiring unanimous vote for variant of commission decisions).
350. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 11, § 1.4 (requiring federal
delegate to approve any comprehensive plan).
351. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 1, § 1.4 (allowing Congress to
withdraw from commission); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 1, § 1.4
(describing power of Congress to withdraw).

352. SeeJerome C. Muys, Approaches and Considerationsfor Allocation of Interstate
Waters, in WATER LAw: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 311, 316-18 (Kathleen
Marion Carr &James D. Crammond eds., 1995); Erik G. Davis, Comment, Interstate
Compacts That Are for the Birds: A Proposalfor Reconciling Federal Wetlands Protection
with State Water Rights Through Federal-Interstate Compacts, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 325
(1996) (advocating federal-interstate water compacts to solve jurisdictional issues
and conflicts); see generally Dellapenna, The 'Hooch, supra note 339, at 844-45 (discussing power balance between state and federal government); George William

Sherk, Resolving Interstate Water Conflicts in the Eastern United States: The Re-Emergence
of the Federal-InterstateCompact, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 397 (1994).
353. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 10, §§ 10.2-.4 (determining
protected areas); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 11, §§ 11.2-.4 (discussing protected areas, permits and emergencies).
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diversions within protected areas in those states. 354 State permits
are to be superseded when the commissions declare a drought
emergency,3 55 although in practice, even in Pennsylvania, the commissions defer to the state authorities, provided the states proceed
consistently with the commission-adopted plans. Commission permits are judicially reviewable "in any court of competent
jurisdiction.

3

56

Pennsylvania, the only basin state participating in either commission, has not adopted a comprehensive regulated riparian system to enable the Commonwealth to capture back the regulatory
authority of the commissions. 3 57 Pennsylvania, therefore, is still dependent on the two commissions to a degree that Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey and New York are not. The two commissions
operate for those regulated riparian states as a coordinated planning agency rather than as a water-permitting agency. For Pennsylvania, however, the commissions operate as the permitting
authority for users in their respective basins within the
Commonwealth.
The Delaware River Basin Commission requires permits for
groundwater withdrawals from an area of southeastern Pennsylvania that the Commission has declared to be a "protected area"
under its authority.3 58 As under regulated riparian statutes generally, the commissions are charged to grant, modify or deny permits
according to their compatibility with the commissions' comprehensive plan and consistent with the reasonableness of the use ('just
and equitable interests and rights of other lawful users from the
354. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 10, §§ 10.1, 10.3(ii), 10.8
(granting states authority to issue permits); Susquehanna Compact, supra note
102, art. 11, §§ 11.1, 11.3(2), 11.8 (discussing regulatory powers).
355. See Delaware Compact, supranote 102, art. 10, §§ 10.4, 10.8 (superseding

state power in cases of emergency); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 11,
§§ 11.4, 11.8 (noting emergencies supersede state permits).
356. Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 10, § 10.6 (discussing standards
of judicial review); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 11, § 11.6 (noting
acceptable jurisdictions for judicial review).
357. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6001-6031 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (creating
state policy to manage pollution, conservation and development); MD. CODE ANN.,
ENVIR. §§ 5-501 to 5-514 (1996 & Supp. 2004) (articulating state policy to central
use of state ground and surface waters); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:1A-1 to 58:1A-17
(West 1992 & Supp. 2005) (creating New Jersey Water Supply Management Act);

N.Y. ENVrL.

CONSERV. LAw

§§ 15-1501 to 15-1529 (McKinney 1997 & 2005 Supp.)

(discussing regulation of water supply and permits); see generally Dellapenna, The
'Hooch, supranote 339, at 846-47 (noting Pennsylvania's lack of comprehensive reg-

ulated riparian system).
358. See Berkowitz, supra note 303, at 250 (discussing Delaware River Basin
Commission's permit requirement).
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same source"). 359 Generally, the two basin commissions act as surrogates for Pennsylvania's government, but there is always a risk
that a commission on which Pennsylvania has only one vote will be
swayed by the interests of the other participants. It is no accident,
however, that all but one of the cases in which a litigant challenged
a regulation or decision of the commissions arose in Pennsylvania. 3 60 None of these challenges succeeded.
The most important challenge to the regulatory authority of
either of the two interstate commissions was Dublin Water Co. v. Delaware River Basin Commission.3 6 1 The Water Company challenged the
Delaware River Basin Commission's authority to regulate individual
water withdrawals within the basin. In Pennsylvania, the Public
Utilities Commission exercises basic regulatory authority over public utilities like the Water Company,3 62 while the Secretary of the
Department of Environmental Resources exercises regulatory authority over the construction of waterworks suitable for supplying

359. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 10, § 10.5 (discussing standards for issuing permits); Susquehanna Compact, supra note 102, art. 11, § 11.5
(noting standards to issue permits).
360. SeeBadgleyv. New York, 606 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
906 (1980) (dealing with challenge by City of New York to regulation); Oley Twp.
v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (dismissing
claim against Pennsylvania DEP); Texaco Refining & Mktg., Inc. v. Delaware River
Basin Comm'n, 824 F. Supp. 500 (D. Del. 1993), affd mem., 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding commission could not charge for withdrawal of basin water); Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County Water Auth., 545 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (determining Commission did not violate equal protection); Delaware
Water Emergency Group v. Hansler, 536 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding commission actions valid); Dublin Water Supply Co. v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n,
443 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding commission acted constitutionally);
Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (holding conditions placed on water authority interfered with state's regulation and were preempted by Delaware Compact); Borough of Morrisville v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 399 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 532 F.2d
745 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding NEPA does not require commission to pass on environmental significance of other financing methods once chosen method is found
to not significantly affect environment); Levin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Benner
Twp., 669 A.2d 1063 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), affd mem., 547 Pa. 161, 689 A.2d 224
(1997) (holding imposition of six conditions on grant was preempted by Susquehanna Compact); State College Borough Water Auth. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Halfmoon Twp., 659 A.2d 640 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 670 A.2d 145 (Pa. 1995)
(holding conditions placed on water authority interfered with state's regulation
and were preempted by Susquehanna Compact).
361. 443 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (challenging authority of Delaware
River Basin Commission); see generally Dellapenna, The 'Hooch supra note 339, at
847-48 (discussing Dublin Water Co.).
362. See 66 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1341-1362 (Purdon 1959), now replaced by 66 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-513 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (giving general authority
to regulate public utilities within state).
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potable water to the general public, 363 yet, the Delaware River Basin
Commission has regulatory authority over the actual diversion or
withdrawal of water within the basin. 36 4 The Water Company sued
all three agencies, claiming that the Water Company's obligation
under state law to provide adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable
service to its customers preempted the authority of the other agencies to protect the resources necessary for that service. The court
granted summary judgment for all the defendants and questioned
3 65
the plaintiffs good faith in filing the complaint.
A number of persons or entities other than direct water users
have attempted to challenge the regulatory authority of the Delaware River Basin Commission.3 66 These challenges also failed. The
central role of the two river basin commissions in regulating water
use in Pennsylvania was further underlined in two cases decided in
1995 relating to the authority of the Susquehanna River Basin Commission. The courts held that the Susquehanna River Basin Commission's authority preempted municipal authority to regulate
water usage through zoning decisions.3 67 Even the apparent consent of the water user to the zoning decision did not preclude its
368
later challenge to the legality of the decision.
Notwithstanding the apparently comprehensive authority
vested in the two compact commissions, they do not have sufficient
staff to adequately police all water users within the areas they regulate in Pennsylvania.3 69 Thus, reliance on the compact commissions to provide regulatory oversight to water users in place of a
Pennsylvania regulatory regime is misplaced. In fact, it leaves Penn363. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 711-716 (Purdon 1977), now replaced by The
Pennsylvania Safe Drinking Water Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.1-.17 (West 2003)
(finding drinkable water to be in public's best interest of public).
364. See Delaware Compact, supra note 102, art. 10 (noting commission's
power to regulate).
365. See Dublin Water, 443 F. Supp. at 315 (granting summary judgment for
defendants).
366. See Delaware Water Emergency Group v. Hansler,536 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (finding commission's actions valid); Bucks County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate
Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding court will not disturb appropriately prepared environmental impact statements). See generally Dellapenna, The
'Hooch supra note 339, at 848-49 (discussing other challenges to commission).
367. See Levin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Benner Twp., 669 A.2d 1063, 1084 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995), aff'd mem., 689 A.2d 224 (Pa. 1997) (holding that commission's
authority preempts municipal authority); State College Borough Water Auth. v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Halfmoon Twp., 659 A.2d 640, appeal denied, 670 A.2d 145 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995) (holding conditions interfered with state's regulations).
368. See Levin, 669 A.2d at 1079 (explaining consenting water user does not
prevent challenges to decision).
369. See Berkowitz, supra note 303, at 250 (noting lack of sufficient resources
to regulate and monitor all water use).
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sylvania with very little in the way of regulation or even of planning
for water use, at least at the statewide level. If thoroughgoing regulation is necessary for the effective management of water use in
Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth must enact its own regulated riparian system. It cannot continue to rely on these two interstate
commissions to cope with the Commonwealth's regulatory needs.
Even if Pennsylvania were to enact a comprehensive regulated
riparian system for the Commonwealth, it would not render the two
interstate commissions superfluous. The river basins transcend the
boundaries of any one state, and numerous questions therefore
arise that cannot be resolved satisfactorily solely through the regulatory efforts of one state. When Maryland sought to impose its water
allocation preferences for the Potomac River unilaterally on a public water supply system in Virginia, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that Maryland had no authority over water users in Virginia.3 70 The Court reached this decision even though it recognized the Potomac River was within Maryland up to the low-water
mark on the Virginia bank, and that the Virginia water system
would have to place its water intakes on the bed of the river within
the state of Maryland. 37' Such trans-boundary concerns can be adequately addressed only if the interested states reach cooperative decisions, although even then there will be intense disputes over
whether the interests of each community have been effectively considered.3 7 2 The need for cooperative trans-boundary decision-making assures the continued relevance of the two interstate commissions in which Pennsylvania participates.
C.

Planning in Pennsylvania

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has been engaged in
statewide planning regarding some aspects of water management
for decades. The Flood Plain Management Act essentially is a zoning statute for lands subject to flooding that creates little, if any,
370. See Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 79 (2004) (granting Virginia's request for relief).
371. See id. at 62, 66-67 (discussing state boundary lines); see also Maryland v.
West Virginia, 217 U.S. 577, 582 (1910) (establishing boundary lines between Maryland and West Virginia); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 176 (1894) (determining Pocomoke Sound and Pocomoke River are separate bodies of water).
372. See Lane Harvey Brown, Group Sues over Decision Allowing Use of Creek
Water: Let Aberdeen Have Emergency Access, BAL. SUN, Mar. 13, 2003, at 6B (discussing
dispute over Baltimore's plan to increase diversions from Susquehanna River for
use outside watershed of river, and regulatory oversight by Susquehanna River Basin Commission).
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authority over the use of water as such.3 73 The Commonwealth's

Storm Water Management Act requires counties to adopt storm
water management plans in the county. 3 74 These plans are incor375
porated into the local communities' general zoning ordinances.
Persons who can show injury from the failure to adopt and implement such plans can sue to enforce the statutory duty so long as
their injuries are different from those of the general public. In Merlino v. Delaware County,3 7 6 the court awarded damages against the
county for its failure to implement the Storm Water Management
Act that resulted in flooded and dangerous streets, flooded property, reduced property values, inflated sewer fees and even aesthetic
3
losses from facing an unsightly creek and flooded park.

77

Still, the sort of planning provided for in such statutes did not
begin to approach questions regarding the allocation of water
within the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania took a big step forward in
2002 when the legislature authorized the creation of a statewide
water planning process under the auspices of the DEP.3 78 The pro-

cess includes a statewide water planning committee, the State Water
Resources Committee and six regional planning committees.
Regional committees, defined generally according to the major
watershed of the Commonwealth, 379 are composed of persons appointed by the Governor.3 80 Four of those persons are representatives of county conservation districts, planning commissions or
373. See 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 679.101-.601 (West 1997) (discussing regulations
of Flood Plain Management Act); see generally Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Constraints
Upon Development in Environmentally Sensitive Areas: Regulation of Wetlands, Streams,
and Floodplains in Pennsylvania, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 368-69 (1991) (discussing
administration of Flood Plain Management Act).
374. See id. § 680.5 (West 1997) (setting forth requirements).
375. See, e.g., In re Decision of Bd. of Supervisors of Penn Twp., 62 Pa. D. &
C.4th 492, 503 (Lancaster C.P. 2002) (analyzing plan implementation).
376. 711 A.2d 1100 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
377. See id. at 1107-08 (explaining Delaware County's failure to implement
plan).
378. See Water Resources Planning Act, 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3136
(West Supp. 2005) (creating state water planning process). The vote of the statute,
often referred to as "Act 220," was fairly lopsided, 140-56 in the House of Representatives and 43-5 in the Senate. See David E. Hess, The Water Resources Planning
Act Will Help Us to Answer Essential Questions, PrTrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 6,
2002, at A26 (supporting "Act 20"); see also Steven T. Miano, Law Takes Step Toward
Water Resources Management, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Phil., PA), Dec. 19, 2002, at
5 (asserting "Act 20" will benefit public). Cf Tarlock, supra note 10, at 537-38
(describing West Virginia's enactment of somewhat similar planning statute as "a
progressive 'first step'" toward effective water management).
379. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3113(a) (defining regional committees).
The major exception to defining the regions by watershed is the creation of separate regional committees for the upper and lower Susquehanna basins.
380. See id. § 3113(b) (providing structure for appointment).
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similar local governmental bodies. 38 ' The Governor appoints seventeen other members to each regional committee, broken down
to represent various stakeholders interested in water management. 382 Additional representatives of local government and interstate compact commissions serve as non-voting members.38 3 The
comstatute is careful to indicate that the authority of the regional
384
mittees does not affect municipal zoning or other powers.
The Statewide Water Resources Committee consists of eighteen members.3 85 Six of the members are representatives of the six
regional committees, appointed by the majority and minority leaders of the Commonwealth's Senate and House of Representatives. 38 6 The Governor appoints the other twelve members, six to
represent water users38 7 and six to represent local governments, environmental and conservation interests, and professions that relate
to water resource management. 38 8 Additionally, the Secretaries of
(or representatives of the Secretaries) six departments or commissions of the Commonwealth shall serve as voting members of the
statewide committee, and representatives of two other commissions
and of each interstate compact commission shall serve as non-vot3 89
ing members of the statewide commission.
The members of the regional and the statewide committees
390
serve without pay, but receive reimbursement for their expenses.
381. See id. § 3113(b) (1) (i) (stating background of representatives).
382. See id. § 3113(b) (1) (ii) (explaining Governor's appointment process).
383. See id. § 3113(b) (iii), (iv) (providing requirements for non-voting members).
384. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3136(c) (setting limitation).
385. See id. § 3114(b)(1) (setting limit on committee membership).
386. See id. § 3114(b) (2) (i) (explaining procedure for appointing representatives).
387. See id. § 3114(b) (2) (ii) (instructing representation of cross section of
wafer user interests including agriculture, conservation districts, industrial and
commercial enterprises, mining, energy development and production and public
water supply).
388. See id. § 3114(b)(2)(iii) (noting Governor shall seek suggestions and
recommendations for Statewide committee membership from representative
organizations).

389. See 27

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 3114(b) (2) (iii) (establishing voting mem-

bers as Secretary of Environmental Protection, Secretary of Agruculture, Secretary
of Conservation and Natural Resources, Executive Director of PA Fish and Boat
Commission, Chairman of PA Public Utility Commission, and Executive Director
of PA Emergency Management Agency, and non-voting members as Secretary of
Community and Economic Development, Executive Director of Governor's Center
for Local Government Services, and representative of each Compact Basin
Commission).
390. See id. §§ 3113(b)(6), 3114(b)(10) (considering member's reasonable
expenses as necessary and reasonable travel and other expenses incurred during
performance of their duties).
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The statewide committee is to supervise the work of the regional
committees and incorporate the resulting regional water plans into
the state water plan.3 9 1 Ultimately, each water plan, for the geographic region within the scope of the plan is to include:

1.
2.
3.

an inventory of surface and underground water
2
resources;3 9
assessment and projection of existing and future

393
water uses and needs;

identification of potential problems and conflicts (including the identification of areas where demand exceeds, or is likely to exceed, the safe yield of the
sources)

;394

4.

assessment of the current and future ability of public
water supply agencies to fulfill their responsibil95
ities;3

5.

assessment of floodplain, storm water and navigation
396
needs and problems;

6.

assessment of the water needed to service important
natural, scenic, environmental or recreational values;

7.

3 97

identification of projects or practices for conserving
398
water or increasing the efficiency of its use;

391. See id. §§ 3111, 3115(a)(2)(i) (instructing DEP, in consultation with
state-wide committee, to develop policies and guidelines for preparing or amending regional plan components and state water plan).
392. See id. § 3112(a) (1), (2) (including identification criteria for surface and
underground water resources).
393. See id. § 3112(a) (3), (4) (identifying specifically non-withdrawal use
needs and withdrawal use demands).
394. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(a) (5), (6) (addressing problems or
conflicts among water uses and users, as well as identifying critical water planning
areas).
395. See id. § 3112(a)(7) (emphasizing assessment of public water supply
agencies in providing adequate quantity and quality of water to their service areas).
396. See id. § 3112(a) (8), (9) (specifying assessment of means for restoration,
development and improvement of transportation by water).
397. See id. § 3112(a) (10) (covering areas of national, regional, local or statewide significance, including national and state parks; designated wild, scenic and
recreational rivers; national and state wildlife refuges; and habitats of federal and
state endangered or threatened species).
398. See id. § 3112(a)(11) (including identifying projects and practices to provide for reuse and recycling of water, increase supply or storage of water or preserve or increase groundwater recharge and recommended process for providing
appropriate positive recognition of such projects or practices in actions, programs,
policies, projects or management activities).
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8.
9.

10.

identification of practical alternatives for meeting
39 9
water needs within the Commonwealth;
review and evaluation of statutes, regulations, policies and institutional arrangements relating to water
management; 40 0 and
Proposal of methods for implementing recommended actions, programs, policies, projects or management activities.

40

1

The statute provides a similarly detailed list of the elements to be
considered in developing each plan. 40 2 The statewide committee is
specifically charged to "provide serious and deliberative consideration" to the regional plans and their recommendations as well as
40 3
federal and interstate plans and priorities.
The statewide plan must be completed within five years of the
effective date of the statute, with periodic review every five years
thereafter. 40 4 The statute requires public hearings and various
other procedures to be followed at both statewide and regional
levels. 40 5 The plans are to serve as "a policy and guidance document," and not as legally binding regulations. 40 6 The statute reinforces this intent by declaring expressly that nothing in the Act is to
be construed as authorizing, diminishing or expanding the author399. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(a) (12), (13), (15) (focusing on identifying practical alternatives for adequate supply of water to satisfy existing and
future reasonable and beneficial uses, assessing both structural and nonstructural
alternatives to address identified water availability problems, adverse impacts on
water uses, or conflicts between water users, and review and evaluation of water
resources management alternatives and recommended programs, policies, institutional arrangements and projects).
400. See id. § 3112(a)(14), (15) (specifying water management as development, conservation, distribution and emergency management of water resources).
401. See id. § 3112(a) (16) (relating to identifying projects and practices for
conserving water or improving efficiency of water use in note 398 and accompanying text).
402. See id. § 3112(b) (addressing considerations for both state and regional
plans).
403. See id. §§ 3112(c), 3115(c) (noting statewide committee will also reconcile differences or conflicts among regional plans).
404. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3115(a) (1), (d) (noting periodic review
includes amendments and updates to statewide plan, and any determination, including recommendations for revisions to regional plans, shall be set forth in
writing).
405. See id. § 3115(b), (c) (establishing regional committee procedures for
development of regional plan components to be used in statewide plan, as well as
regional and statewide procedures for recommendations and adoption of regional
plan components and statewide plan).
406. See id. § 3116(a) (noting plans serve purpose of providing information,
objectives, priorities and recommendations to be considered and weighed in
broad range of state, local and private decisions).
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ity of any governmental agency to regulate, control or require per40 7
mits for the withdrawal or use of water.

In connection with the planning process, DEP is charged with
creating and maintaining a statewide data system on water resources, in cooperation with federal, interstate, state and local agencies. 40 8 In order to ensure the accuracy of the statewide data system
and to facilitate the planning process, all large water users in the
state are required to register their uses. 40 9 Except for certain protected confidential information, 410 the information in the statewide
data system is a matter of public record. 411 The statute also creates
a technical assistance center within DEP to provide assistance for
and authorizes
persons voluntarily undertaking to conserve water 412
41 3
grants to encourage voluntary water conservation.
The regional and state plans are to designate critical water
planning areas, which is any area containing a significant hydrologic unit within which existing or future demands exceed or
4 14
threaten to exceed the safe yield of available water resources.
Such a designation can come even before the completion of the
relevant water plan. 4 15 For each critical water planning area, the
regional committee is to appoint a critical area advisory committee
407. See id. § 3136(a) (establishing limitations to actions of any governmental
agency under statute, and regulations adopted under statute, or in statewide plan).
408. See id. § 3117 (stating data system purpose is gathering, processing and
distributing information on availability, distribution, quality and use of water resources in Commonwealth). Registration fees from users of the statewide data system are to be used to defray the costs of the data system and of the registration
system required under section 3118. See id. § 3131 (a).
409. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3118 (listing information to be registered
as source, location and amount of withdrawal or use or both). Large water users
generally are water users who withdraw an average of at least 10,000 gallons per
day for a thirty-day period. See id. § 3118(b) (1).
410. See id. § 3119 (requiring that person submitting confidential information
to identify information that is confidential information and provide justification
for its confidential nature).
411. See id. § 3131(b) (advising that information of public record shall be
available for inspection and review at offices of DEP, state-wide committee or appropriate regional committee).
412. See id. § 3120 (stating technical assistance center will provide technical
assistance on water resources uses issues, including methods for efficient water use,
including reduction of unaccounted-for water loss and replenishment and conservation of water resources).
413. See id. § 3121 (authorizing grants for purposes of reimbursement of up
to seventy-five percent of cost of preparing voluntary water use reduction plan, and
for water resources education, technical assistance and water conservation, including promotion of voluntary reduction of unaccounted-for water loss).
414. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(a) (6) (addressing one of many criteria for state and regional plans).
415. See id. § 3112(d) (1) (describing designation of critical water planning
areas and preparations and approval of critical resource plans).
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to evaluate policy, program and management alternatives for the
area. 4 16 DEP is charged with developing a critical area resource
plan for the area, with the advice and assistance of the critical area
advisory committee and the appropriate regional committee and
the statewide committee. 417 The critical area resource plan must be
adopted through the same process whereby the statewide or regional plans are adopted.4 18 The statute, however, only makes provision for voluntary implementation of the critical area resource
plan.

41 9

The statewide and regional committees must 420 cooperate with
the interstate compact commissions 421 as well as with federal, state
and local agencies involved in water management. DEP is specifically charged to enter into cooperative agreements with those agencies to avoid duplication of effort and to coordinate planning and
4 22
monitoring activities.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

Under the public trust doctrine, states have powers and responsibilities relating to water resources. In 1972, Pennsylvania incorporated its public trust doctrine into an environmental rights
amendment to the Commonwealth's constitution:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and main4 23
tain them for the benefit of all the people.
416. See id. § 3112(d) (2) (discussing creation and duties of critical areas advisory committee).
417. See id. § 3112(d) (3), (5) (describing how to devise critical area resource
plan and what it shall include).
418. See id. § 3112(d) (4) (noting critical area resource plan is to be adopted
as area plans are adopted).
419. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(d) (6) (noting critical area resource
plans are to be implemented voluntarily).
420. See id. §§ 3103, 3136(b), (d) (stating with whom state and regional committees must cooperate).
421. For further discussion on the cooperation of committees and federal
and state sub-divisions, see supra notes 339-73 and accompanying text.
422. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (explaining DEP shall enter into administrative agreements with appropriate federal and state subdivisions and/or
agencies for certain purposes).
423. PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 27 (describing environmental rights). See generally
Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions,EnvironmentalRights Provisions, and the Doctrine
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The import of this provision remains unclear. It seems generally agreed that it is not self-executing against private actors, although the case cited for this proposition was decided by a badly
fractured court that leaves the actual result of the case, apart from
its failure to stop a particular private project, far from clear. 42 4 The

provision has been used to sustain particular environmental legisla425
tion at the state and local level.

The provision is self-executing against public agencies. 426 Yet
even against public agencies, the import of the provision remains
far from clear. 42 7 Furthermore, few cases have involved water resources. In one case, a company was held to have a cause of action
invoking the environmental rights amendment seeking to enjoin
the relocation of a highway when the project threatened to cause
water pollution that would adversely affect the ability of the complainant to serve its customers. 4 28 That is about as close as we get to
a court's actual application of the amendment to a water management issue.
Reading the environmental rights amendment as constitutionalizing the public trust doctrine does not advance one's understanding of the provision very much given the fluidity of that
doctrine. Moreover, occasional Pennsylvania decisions apply the
of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HA-tv. ENVrL. L. REv. 333, 368 (1993) (discussing addition of pro-environmental initiatives into Pennsylvania's Constitution).
424. See generally Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
311 A.2d 588, 594 (Pa. 1973) (discussing self-executing nature of amendment).
425. See generally United Artists' Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
635 A.2d 612, 620 (Pa. 1993) (concluding designating privately-owned building to
be historic without owners' permission was not taking under Pennsylvania's Constitution); O'Connor v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 582 A.2d 427, 431 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) (discussing self-executing possibilities of Pennsylvania's Constitution); In re
Gaster, 556 A.2d 473, 477 (discussing whether Pennsylvania's Constitution allows
Environmental Protection Department from condemning property for wetlands
replacement), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
426. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272 (Pa. 1976) (discussing self-executing nature of amendment). Because the amendment is self-executing against state
agencies, the Environmental Hearing Board does occasionally apply the amendment in its deliberations. See, e.g., W. Pa. Water Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., EHB
Docket No. 88-315-E, at 20 (1991).
427. See O'Connor, 582 A.2d at 431 (discussing application of Pennsylvania
Constitution); Snelling v. Dep't of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976)
(examining applicability of Pennsylvania Constitution); Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 335 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (describing balance of social
and environmental concerns implicated when applying Pennsylvania
Constitution).
428. See generally Pa. Gas & Water Co. v. Kassab, 322 A.2d 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1974) (discussing implication of constitutional rights in project that harms
environment).
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public trust doctrine without referring to the amendment. 429
Whether the most ambitious attempt to develop a coherent rationale for applying the amendment to actual situations will gain ac4 30
ceptance in the courts remains to be seen.
VII.

CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?

Despite the disclaimer that the creation of the state water plan
and the registration of uses does not affect private water rights, 43 1
one cannot rule out the possibility that the state water plan will ultimately lead to changes in those rights. After all, there are good
reasons to conclude that major reform of existing water law is, or
soon will be, necessary for the Commonwealth. 43 2 Moreover, the
primary argument that opponents of water law reform in Pennsylvania mustered was that without a comprehensive inventory and
plan, no one could really know whether water law reform is necessary in the state. 43 3 Once the plan is created, that argument at least
will be gone. Moreover, the water plan statute expressly requires
429. See generally Watson v. Trustees of Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 795 A.2d
1068, 1070 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (discussing fiduciary duties and public trust);
Lehigh Falls Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. Super Ct. 1999) (discussing public trust doctrine and its effects).
430. SeeJohn C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania ConstitutionSeriously When it
Protects the Environment: Part I-An InterpretiveFrameworkfor Article 1, Section 27, 103
DICK. L. REv. 693, 696 (1999) (explaining varying court reactions to amendment);
John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the
Environment: Part Hl-Environmental Rights and Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REv. 97,
99-100 (1999) (describing different interpretations of amendment); see also MargaretJ. Fried & MoniqueJ. Van Damme, Environmental Protection in a Constitutional
Setting, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1369, 1387-99 (1995) (analyzing divergent interpretations
of amendment by Pennsylvania courts); Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create
an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 107, 141 (1997) (noting Pennsylvania courts' contradictory interpretations of amendment); Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State
Constitutions, 46 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1179 (1997) (noting Pennsylvania courts' view on
whether amendment covers private acts is unsettled); Andrew H. Shaw, The Public
Trust Doctrine: Protector of Pennsylvania'sNatural Resources?, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 383, 392-93 (2000)
(describing cases interpreting constitutional
amendment).

431. Water Resources Planning Act, 27

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§ 3131-3136

(West Supp. 2005) (describing details of Water Resources Planning Act).
432. For further discussion of the future of riparian rights, see supranotes 79102; see also Fortuna, supra note 223 (explaining how Georgia exempts many farm
uses from permit requirements); Larry O'Neill Putt, Water Resource Protection in Alabama: The Need for a Paradigm Change, 7 T.G. JONES L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing
water resource protection in Alabama); Kelly Samek, Unknown Quantity: The Bottled
Water Industry and Florida's Springs, 19 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 569, 575 (2004)
(describing competitive water use system in Florida); Tarlock, supra note 10, at
517-20 (discussing regulation in eastern United States).
433. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Farm Bureau President Speaks to Legislators, PR NEWswiNE, Apr. 8, 2002 (discussing need for water reform in Pennsylvania).
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the State Water Resources Committee to review and evaluate existing laws, regulations, policies and institutional arrangements in
the preparation of the state water plan. 43 4 While the statute does
not specifically require the state water plan to include recommendations for new statutes or regulations, the requirement that the
plan include recommendations regarding "programs, policies, institutional arrangements, projects and other provisions" necessary to
achieve the purposes of the regional and state plans 43 5 appears
broad enough to encompass recommendations for legal reforms.
In a number of states, the registration of water rights and the
creation of a state water plan has often been the first step on the
road to a regulated riparian system. 43 6 Should a decision be made
to move in that direction, not only will the Commonwealth have
ample models to draw upon in crafting such a regime, but the water
planning statute already addresses some of the basic issues to be
resolved in creating such a regime in the form of a full panoply of
enforcement measures. Unauthorized use of water is declared a
public nuisance 43 7 and is subject to an administrative enforcement
order and civil and criminal penalties issued by DEP.43 8 DEP is authorized to undertake administrative investigations and inspections
43 9
to enforce the obligations under the planning process statute.
Fines for violations of the statute (that is, for failure to register) or
for violation of the Clean Water Act are to be used to defray the
440
costs of the planning process.
The panoply of enforcement measures seems like regulatory
overkill for a statute that only imposes one narrow obligation on
water users in the Commonwealth-that they register their uses
and keep that registration up to date-and that is only for larger

434. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(a) (14) (explaining what state water
and regional plan must include).
435. See id. § 3112(a) (15) (discussing what state and regional plans shall
include).
436. See, e.g., William S. Cox, III, The Alabama Water Resources Act: A Hybrid
Model of "RegulatedRiparianism,"WATER LAw: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 151
(Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995) (discussing water
rights).
437. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3132, 3134(a), 3135 (describing charge of

public nuisance upon violation of water law).
438.
remedies
439.
440.

See id. §§ 3133, 3134(b), (c), 3135 (describing enforcement orders, civil
and penalties).
See id. § 3131 (c) (authorizing reasonable inspections by DEP).
See id. § 3131(d) (discussing fines and penalties under statute).
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water users. 4 4 1 Indeed, on reading the statute for the first time, one
might gain the impression that it was drafted as a regulated riparian
statute, but that the regulatory core of the statute had been
dropped without revising the enforcement measure. That, in fact,
appears to have been precisely what happened.
On the other hand, some observers have concluded that the
Pennsylvania planning process is dominated by business and indus44 2
Such dominance might be the best guarantor that the protry.
cess will not lead to a significant new regulatory system, particularly
if the severe drought that prompted the creation of the planning
443
does not recur before the process is complete. As in
process
other states, change in the legal situation in Pennsylvania simply is
not likely unless a crisis occurs that creates serious public dissatisfac44 4
tion with the interstate regime.

441. See id. § 3118 (describing water use registration and reporting). Large
water users generally are water users who withdraw an average of at least 10,000
gallons per day for a thirty-day period. See id. § 3118(b)(1).
442. See Editorial, All Dried up: Schweiker Should Veto This Bad Law, PITTSBURGH
POsT-GAZET-rE, Nov. 29, 2002, at A22 (discussing water laws); Dan Hopey, Water-Use
Bill Worries Environmental Groups: They Say Legislature is Rushing Through IndustryFriendly Plan, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAZETrE, Nov. 25, 2002, at A7 (commenting on
industry-friendly aspects of water laws); Jan Jarrett, The Water Resources PlanningAct
Contains Huge Loopholes, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 2002, at A20 (discussing water laws); Garry Lenton, State to Consider Water Use Plan, HARRISBURG PATRIOT,
Nov. 20, 2002, at BI (examining water use plan in Pennsylvania). See also Ralph
Nardone, State's Water Plan Gets First Overhaul in 25 Years, NE. PA. Bus. J., Dec. 30,
2003, at 26 (discussing Pennsylvania's water use plan).
443. See Brubaker, supra note 9 (discussing effect of droughts); Carrie Caldwell, Drought May ForcePennsylvania to Address Water Use Planning,INTELLIGENCERJ.
(Lancaster, PA), May 17, 2002, at 1 (discussing effects of droughts in Pennsylvania); Myers, supranote 9 (discussing water regulatory system); PA DEPDiscusses
Importance of Water-Resources Legislation, PR NEwswiRE, June 24, 2002 (examining
water resources legislation); PA DEP Secretary UnderscoresNeed for Water-Resources Legislation, PR NEwswiRE, Feb. 16, 2002 (discussing need for water resources regulation); Shea & Blanchard, supra note 9 (commenting on effects of droughts in
Pennsylvania and NewJersey); State Must Take More Steps to Save Water Supplies, Official Says, LANCASTER NEW ERA, May 17, 2002, at 5 (discussing water resource management). See alsoJim Hook, Plenty of Water, But for How Long?, PuB. OPINION, Jan.
7, 2004, at I (commenting on water resources and regulation).
444. See generally Ray Jay Davis et al., Influencing Water Legislative Development:
What to Do and What to Avoid, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 583 (1995); Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. L. REv.
539, 559-61 (2004) (discussing problems with riparian rights); Donnelly supra note
11; Tarlock, supra note 10, at 517.
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